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Many kinds of beliefs can be held both strongly and emotionally, which means that they can 
prove difficult to change. Such beliefs can be either pathological (e.g. delusions) or non-
pathological (e.g. religious, political and supernatural beliefs as well as belief in conspiracy 
theories). The difficulty associated with distinguishing between delusions and other types of 
strong beliefs has given rise to the term ‘master explanatory systems’ (MES), which include 
paranoid beliefs, belief in conspiracies, political beliefs, religious beliefs and paranormal 
beliefs. The present study sought to investigate the commonalities between pathological and 
non-pathological beliefs, in addition to their correlation with other psychological constructs.  
Methods  
This study comprised three large-scale online surveys and one online experiment. The first 
survey involved over 500 participants from three different universities (Liverpool, Ulster and 
Oxford) in the United Kingdom (UK). The second survey involved a representative sample of 
1508 participants from the UK, while the third survey involved a smaller representative 
sample (about 630 participants) of the UK population. Finally, the online experiment involved 
245 participants, who were divided into two groups. 
The data derived from the three surveys and the online experiment were analysed by 
means of different statistical approaches. First, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed 
to study the relationship between paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories, while a 
multivariate regression was run between the two types of beliefs and certain other 
psychological constructs. Second, the same statistical approach as used in the first study was 
also used to investigate the relationship between religious (monotheistic) belief and atheism. 




factor (or 'S') underlying all the MES. Finally, a mortality salience intervention was conducted 
to examine the effect of the fear of death on the strong belief latent factor S. 
Results 
The first study revealed that paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories are better explained 
as two separate yet related factors. Moreover, they are both related positively to loneliness 
and factors relevant to the external locus of control (i.e., powerful others and chance). 
However, belief in conspiracy theories but not paranoia was related positively with poor 
analytical reasoning. 
The second study indicated that religious belief and atheism are also can better 
explained as two distinct yet related factors. The scale that was designed for the two factors 
(monotheism and atheism) was found to exhibit high reliability. 
In terms of the third study, a bifactor model incorporating strong beliefs of paranoia, 
beliefs in conspiracies, religiosity, and nationalism as well as the three factors associated with 
paranormal beliefs was found to have a better fit indices when compared with the 
confirmatory factor analysis of those beliefs, while the latent strong belief factor S was found 
to underlie all the MES. 
Finally, the online experiment revealed that the mortality salience manipulation 
increased the participants’ death anxiety, worsened their analytical reasoning, and enhanced 
the S. 
Conclusions 
Taken together, the findings of this study support the existence of the strong belief latent 
factor S. The surveys showed S to exhibit consistent correlation with the other psychological 
constructs of interest. However, further studies involving clinical samples are recommended 




Chapter 1. Paranoia and Delusions 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the psychological literature concerning 
paranoia and delusions. It begins by defining the concept of delusion and then offers a 
comprehensive overview of the various types of delusions. Next, it discusses the prevalence 
and relationships of these different delusions with regard to psychiatric diagnoses. The 
difficulty associated with distinguishing delusions from other types of beliefs, such as 
religiosity, conspiracy theories, political ideologies and paranormal beliefs, is also discussed. 
The chapter concludes by offering a summary of the discussion and setting out the 
implications for a phenomenological approach to identifying delusions. 
 
1.2 Definition of Delusions 
In common parlance, the term ‘delusion’ is considered to refer to ‘a false belief or opinion 
about self or situation’. In its most widely accepted use, the term signals the harbouring of 
erroneous beliefs or sentiments regarding a certain subject, despite the existence of factual 
evidence to the contrary (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020). This interpretation, therefore, 
assumes that delusions represent a variety of strong belief, which requires a clear 
conceptualisation of belief. Borrowing from the realm of philosophy, the field of psychology 
holds that beliefs are propositions about the world that are considered to be true 
(Schwitzgebel, 2015). Further, these propositions should (i) be coherent both individually and 
broadly as part of other webs of beliefs, (ii) be supported by evidence that is subjectively 
sufficient and (iii) have an impact on an individual’s (believer’s) actions and emotions when 




In terms of psychiatric theory, delusions are often considered to be beliefs that can be 
analysed as propositional attitudes under the constraints of coherence and rationality 
(Mullen & Gillett, 2014). However, this approach to delusions is not universally accepted. For 
example, Berrios (1991) argued that delusions are not meaningful speech acts and, further, 
that their content does not refer to either the world or the self.  
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American 
Psychological Association [APA], 2013) adopts the aforementioned approach, defining 
delusions as 
 
fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. Their 
content may include a variety of themes. The distinction between a delusion and a 
strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on the degree 
of conviction with which the belief is held despite clear or reasonable contradictory 
evidence regarding its veracity (p. 87).  
 
It is common for paranoia and delusions to be confused in the literature, although 
they are fundamentally different but overlapping constructs (i.e., there are non-paranoid 
delusions, non-delusional paranoia, and paranoid ‘persecutory’ delusions). The core feature 
of paranoia is ideation regarding personal vulnerability and exaggerated socially evaluative 
concern that others are threatening the well-being and safety of the self (Meisel et al., 2018). 






1.3 Types of Delusions 
It has previously been argued that delusions can be divided into two broad types: pedestrian 
and stark. Pedestrian delusions entail cognitive mistakes in terms of the belief(s) held, while 
stark delusions are simply inexplicable because they are not associated with a belief system 
that can be deduced and analysed logically (Klee, 2004). However, the former type of delusion 
would not be considered a true delusion in most psychiatric accounts. 
Another general categorisation of delusions, which was proposed by Karl Jaspers 
(1997), yields two other contrasting types of delusions, primary delusional beliefs, and 
overvalued ideas. Primary delusions represent a broad category of delusional beliefs that are 
‘irreducible’ and so can only be understood by analysing an individual’s personality and past 
experiences. Jaspers (1997) discussed primary delusions as false judgements that exhibit four 
qualifying characteristics:  (i) the delusion or delusion-like belief is held with extraordinary 
conviction, (ii) that conviction is impervious to counterarguments and past experiences, (iii) 
the belief entails impossible content and (iv) the belief is not understandable. Jasper’s (1997) 
understandability criterion is crucial, and it is signalled by the inability of the clinician to 
understand how the patient’s belief had arisen based on their personality and experiences. 
For Jaspers (1997), therefore, delusions are a consequence of a sudden ‘breakdown in 
meaning’. 
This distinction assumes that delusions are qualitatively different from other kinds of 
beliefs and attitudes. Such a notion is supported by phenomenological research that has 
sought to identify subtle differences in mental states between people who suffer from 
delusions and people who strongly hold beliefs of other kinds. For example, the German 
researcher Klaus Conrad developed a ‘stage model’ for the formation of delusions during the 




soldiers and determined that their delusions were preceded by an altered way of experiencing 
both themselves and the world. Conrad referred to this initial stage as ‘Trema’ (i.e. stage 
fright) because it concerns the feeling that something is about to happen. Conrad’s findings 
were limited by the homogeneous nature of the all-male sample as well as by the failure to 
compare their experiences with the experiences of people who exhibit strongly held yet non-
psychotic beliefs (Mishara, 2009). 
In contrast to phenomenological researchers, many modern psychologists assume 
that delusions exist on a continuum alongside more usual beliefs and attitudes (Freeman et 
al., 2005). The reasoning for this will be briefly set out below, although this chapter will first 
consider how delusions can be classified according to their content, as described by Kraepelin 
(1990) in his account of the symptoms of dementia praecox (schizophrenia). 
 
1.3.1 Persecutory Delusions 
The first type of delusion, which is perhaps the most common type, comprises persecutory 
delusions. This type of delusion is mainly characterised by the strong belief that another party 
is intent on causing harm to the self (Bentall et al., 2001). Some scholars view persecutory 
delusions as a form of paranoia in which individuals exhibit a strong conviction that others 
seek to harm them (Freeman, 2016). 
Freeman (2016) expounded on persecutory delusions by asserting that they are threat 
beliefs that have been developed in the contexts of environmental and genetic risks and, 
further, maintained by various psychological predispositions and processes. Among the 
psychological predispositions considered by Freeman (2016) are low self-confidence, 
intolerance of the effects of anxiety and anomalous experiences, biases in reasoning (e.g. a 




tendency to attribute experiences to external causes) as well as worries and safety-seeking 
strategies. In an earlier paper co-authored with other scholars, the excessive use of 
experiential reasoning and the limited use of rational reasoning were associated with 
persecutory ideation (Freeman et al., 2012). However, while Bentall et al., (2001) implicated 
the same psychological processes, they argued that persecutory delusions function as a form 
of defence against low self-esteem by attributing the causes of negative experiences to the 
malign intent of other parties. It has proved quite difficult to devise psychological tests 
capable of distinguishing between Freeman’s (2016) direct threat belief model and Bentall et 
al.’s (2001) defensive model. Indeed, a recent meta-analytic summary of the relevant 
psychological literature found mixed evidence and so did not decisively support either 
approach (Murphy et al., 2019). 
A common feature of the two models is the fact that delusional paranoia is considered 
to exist on a continuum with subclinical paranoia. As such, the hierarchy of paranoia entails 
five stages of paranoia in non-clinical populations, ranging from simple social evaluative 
concerns to severe threats (Freeman et al., 2005). At the most basic stage, paranoid thoughts 
begin as social evaluative concerns, for example, the fear of vulnerability or rejection and the 
belief that the world is potentially dangerous. The second stage entails ideas of reference, 
wherein social evaluative concerns are asserted and processed cognitively, for example, by 
harbouring beliefs that others are watching or talking about the self. The third stage entails 
the aggregation of these paranoid thoughts to a mild threat level, at which point the individual 
starts to think that others want to irritate them or cause them distress. The fourth stage 
involves a moderate threat level, and the individual develops the belief that other people are 
going out of their way to adversely affect the individual’s well-being. During the final stage, 




harbour the belief that others are determined to cause them harm physically, psychologically 
and even socially. Moreover, they believe that others are conspiring against them. This 
hierarchy of paranoia is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 
The Hierarchical Structure of Paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005) 
 
 
Recent studies have sought to statistically test whether paranoid beliefs do indeed 
exist on a continuum. One approach in this regard has involved looking for evidence in large 
epidemiological datasets. Bebbington et al. (2013) used data from the UK Adult Psychiatric 
Morbidity Survey to investigate the distribution of paranoid ideation among the general 
population. Their study identified persecutory ideas as having four components, namely 




harmed. They found strong evidence of a continuum. Yet, their study was limited by the fact 
that it included no clinical participants. More recently, Elahi et al. (2017) used three 
taxometric methods to assess the continuum of paranoia among 360 psychotic patients, 157 
prodromal (incipient psychosis) patients and 2357 healthy individuals. They found a 
dimensional latent structure of paranoia to be a better fit than a categorical structure, which 
suggests the similarity between the processes involved in subclinical paranoia and those 
involved in clinical paranoia. 
 
1.3.2 Grandiose Delusions 
Grandiose delusions entail unfounded and often exaggerated beliefs that the individual has 
special attributes, for example, wealth, identity and power, which should be revered (Isham 
et al., 2019). Individuals with grandiose delusions often think extremely highly of themselves 
and place themselves on a pedestal, typically believing that they are superior to others. 
Generally, such individuals not only treat themselves as special but also expect or demand 
that others treat them in a special manner too. 
Due to the exorbitantly high status that individuals with grandiose delusions award 
themselves, this type of delusion is sometimes referred to as the ‘delusion of exceptionality’. 
However, a recent qualitative study found that patients who hold such beliefs are often more 
preoccupied with their lives having a special meaning than with being superior to other 
people (Isham et al., 2019). Although grandiose delusions are quite common, there remains 
a dearth of research on them, perhaps owing to their perceived benign nature when 
compared with other forms of delusions. However, this perception might be misleading 
because grandiose delusions can be harmful in some cases (e.g., believing one has 





1.3.3 Delusions of Control 
Human beings perceive themselves to be free moral agents who are at liberty to choose their 
own course of action. With this sense of free will comes a sense of control over the self that 
is frequently challenged by environmental (local) factors (Roskies & Nahmias, 2017). It has 
been argued that delusions of control stem from this sense of free will (Riemer, 2018). 
Delusions of control encompass the strong belief that others are trying to exert control over 
the individual and, therefore, that the individual’s will is being impeded. Several variants of 
these kinds of beliefs were included among Schneider’s (1959) first rank symptoms of 
schizophrenia, including feelings, impulses and volitional acts that a patient has experienced 
and believed to be controlled by an external force. 
A distinction is made in the literature between the sense of agency and the sense of 
ownership. For instance, a person who is being pushed from behind has a sense of ownership 
of the experience (i.e. they are the one having the experience) but not a sense of agency 
(Gallagher & Trigg, 2016). From this perspective, delusions of control are considered to be 
experiences of a diminished sense of agency, whereas other disorders (e.g. anxiety disorders 
such as agoraphobia) more clearly reflect diminished self-ownership (a threat to the integrity 
of the self that is created by overwhelming and uncontrollable emotion).  
 
1.3.4 Delusions of Reference 
Delusions of reference entail incorrigible beliefs that something refers to the self even when 
it does not and there exists evidence to the contrary (Startup et al., 2009). Such delusions 
concern the individual’s impervious belief that he/she is the subject of an issue or that he/she 




source of the belief, there are two kinds of delusions of reference: delusions of reference 
concerning communication and delusions of reference concerning observation (Startup et al., 
2009). As the names suggest, delusions of reference concerning communication entail strong 
beliefs that others are conveying information in subtle or non-verbal ways that the individual 
cannot understand, while delusions of reference concerning observation entail strong beliefs 
that others are referring to the induvial by virtue of observing their conduct. 
As common psychotic symptoms, it is important to distinguish between delusions of 
reference and ideas of reference. Although both stem from the actions or communications of 
others, individuals with ideas of reference change their ideas when presented with evidence 
to the contrary, whereas individuals with delusions of reference do not change their mind 
even when presented with evidence to the contrary. 
 
1.3.5 Delusions of Guilt 
Delusions of guilt, which are sometimes referred to as delusions of sin or self-accusation, refer 
to the individual’s strong belief that he/she has committed some atrocious offence and so is 
deserving of punishment (Bentall et al., 2001). Such individuals hold the strong belief that the 
sins they have committed are unpardonable, meaning that they are burdened with guilt and 
await the inexorable consequences of their actions.  
Delusions of guilt are sometimes confused with persecutory delusions, and it can 
prove difficult to distinguish between the two. It has been argued that persecutory delusions 
can be subdivided into two main types depending on whether or not they are accompanied 
by guilt: ‘bad me’ delusions and ‘poor me’ delusions (Chadwick et al., 2005). The first type 
involves beliefs whereby an individual feels that they utterly deserve to face persecution due 




not deserve the persecutions they undergo as they have not previously committed sins. As 
such, ‘bad me’ persecutory delusions are in some way delusions of sin because the individual 
believes that they have committed acts deserving punishment and, further, because they are 
also willing to accept punishment in retribution. Empirical studies have indicated that 
paranoia in non-clinical groups tends to be predominantly of the ‘bad me’ type, whereas 
patients with psychosis tend to either constantly hold ‘poor-me’ paranoid beliefs or fluctuate 
between the two kinds (Melo et al., 2006; Morrison et al., 2015; Udachina et al., 2012). 
 
1.3.6 Other Delusional Disorders 
Thus far, this chapter has discussed the five most common subtypes of delusions according 
to their content, as proposed by early studies on the subject, beginning with the work of 
Kraepelin (1990). However, there exist several other distinct types of delusions. Among them 
is the somatic type of delusion, which entails strong beliefs that the individual’s bodily 
appearance is grossly unnatural or deformed when compared with other human beings, or 
that the individual’s organs or bodily parts are malfunctioning (Bates et al., 2019). This false 
belief causes individuals to believe that they have a medical problem or some sort of physical 
defect, although in reality they are normal. A good example of somatic delusions is the oral 
somatic delusion, which entails the individual believing that their mouth is deformed. 
Erotomanic delusions entail the belief that the individual is loved by or in love with 
another individual – often of a higher status – whereas in reality there exists no such 
relationship (Bates et al., 2019). Occasionally, men exhibit the delusion of pregnancy, 
meaning that they believe they have been impregnated and are heavily pregnant with a child 




the jealous subtype of delusional disorder, which involves the strong belief that their partner 
is being unfaithful to them (Bates et al., 2019).  
Finally, delusions of misidentification have received considerable research attention, 
especially from neuropsychologists who are interested in the processes involved in identifying 
others on the basis of their facial features. The most well-documented of these delusions is 
the Capgras delusion (Capgras & Reboul-Lachaux, 1923; Ellis et al., 1994), which involves the 
belief that others, usually those who are usually emotionally close to the patient, are being 
replaced by imposters or robots.   
 
1.4 Prevalence and Relationship with Diagnosis 
Having discussed some of the most common types of delusions in the previous section, it 
should now prove useful to consider the prevalence of delusions and their relationships with 
psychiatric diagnoses. This issue is inherently problematic because, as has previously been 
discussed, defining delusions has proven to be challenging. Furthermore, over the past 20 
years, a vigorous debate has arisen regarding the value of conventional categorical psychiatric 
classifications (Bentall, 2004, 2009). A variety of alternative approaches have been suggested 
in this regard, including dimensional models (e.g. van Os & Kapur, 2009), empirically driven 
hierarchical taxonomies (Kotov et al., 2017), network models that assume symptoms cluster 
not due to underlying disease processes but because they causally influence each other 
(Borsboom & Cramer, 2013) and approaches such as the US National Institute of Mental 
Health’s Research Domain Criteria programme, which searches for transdiagnostic processes 
common to a range of psychiatric disorders (Insel et al., 2010). 
One approach to examining the prevalence of delusions involves the use of 




attempted to assess the distribution of psychiatric symptoms among representative samples 
of mainly Anglo-Saxon (North American, British, European, Australian and New Zealand) 
populations. A large-scale study conducted by van Os et al. (2000) found that, in a sample of 
more than 7000 Dutch people, about 3% had ‘true’ delusions and about 9% had ‘not clinically 
relevant’ delusions. A 15-year longitudinal study conducted by Poulton et al. (2000) in 
Dunedin, New Zealand, found that, by the time the participants were in their early 20s, around 
13% were paranoid. Moreover, in a study conducted in France by Verdoux et al. (1998), over 
1000 patients who were visiting their family doctors were asked to complete a questionnaire 
about common delusional beliefs. Only about 11.5% of patients were visiting the doctor due 
to psychiatric problems. Beliefs about ‘people not being who they seemed to be’ were found 
to be the most common (reported by about 69% of patients, although it could be argued that 
this is not delusional and simply refers to the perception that others are dishonest), while 
delusions that ‘the individual had experienced telepathic communication’ were reported by 
about 47% of patients and delusions about ‘seemingly innocuous events having double 
meanings’, ‘the individual being persecuted in some way’ and ‘occult forces being at work’ 
were reported by 42.2%, 25.5% and 23.4%, respectively. 
With regard to conventional diagnoses, delusions are typically considered to be 
symptoms of disorders within the psychotic domain. For example, Schneider (1959) identified 
three types of delusions of control as being among the first rank symptoms of schizophrenia. 
Recent studies have reported that delusions in general occur in the majority of patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. For instance, in a large-scale study conducted among 811 acute 
schizophrenic patients, the World Health Organization (WHO; 1973) reported that 
persecutory, reference and mood delusions were present in 52%, 50% and 49% of patients, 




presenting with a first episode of schizophrenia (Freeman & Garety, 2014; Moutoussis et al., 
2007). Delusions have also been frequently reported as symptoms in patients diagnosed with 
both bipolar disorder (Baethge et al., 2005; Black & Nasrallah, 1989; Burton et al., 2018) and 
major depression (Coryell et al., 1984; Johnson et al., 1991). 
Within the DSM, the term ‘delusional disorder’ is used to indicate the presence of 
underlying delusional beliefs without other symptoms of psychosis (Upthegrove & A. S., 
2018). However, while psychotic disorders are experienced by up to 7% of the population 
during their lifetime (Perela et al., 2007), this diagnosis is very rare (a lifetime risk of 0.05–
0.5%) and has a later age of onset when compared with other psychoses such as schizophrenia 
(Joseph & Siddiqui, 2019). 
A number of prior studies have considered the prevalence of specific delusions. For 
example, the persecutory and jealous types of delusions have been found to be more 
common in males, whereas erotomanic delusions have been found to be more common in 
females (Joseph & Siddiqui, 2019).  
A study concerning the prevalence of delusional jealousy, which is a widely known risk 
factor for both homicide and violence, found it to be a comparatively rare phenomenon that 
is only abundant in schizophrenia and related psychoses (Soyka & Schmidt, 2011). From a 
large sample of data from 14,309 patients who were being treated at a psychiatric hospital 
over a period of about eight years, the study identified only 72 cases of delusional jealousy 
(representing only 0.5% of the sample), with 59.7% of the cases being males. This prevalence 
was, however, higher among the schizophrenia patients at 1.3%. Standing out amongst the 
symptoms that were relied upon when determining the relationship with diagnosis in the 





Another study found that delusions of reference were a common phenomenon during 
early psychosis (Wong et al., 2008). From a sample of 137 outpatients who were exhibiting 
early symptoms of psychosis, 31.4% (n = 47) of patients were diagnosed with ideas or 
delusions of reference. A generally equal representation was identified in terms of both sexes 
and various sociodemographic factors. Although the study determined that it was impossible 
to explain delusion based solely on patient characteristics, it found a strong association 
between this particular delusion and persecutory delusions.  
As discussed above, persecutory delusions are the most prevalent type of delusion in 
patients with psychosis. Indeed, over 70% of patients experiencing a first episode of psychosis 
are diagnosed with persecutory delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2014; Moutossis & Bentall, 
2007). Freeman and Garety (2014) highlighted six factors of particular important in relation 
to influencing these kinds of beliefs: negative beliefs about the self, reasoning biases (e.g. a 
tendency to jump to conclusions), worry thinking styles, sleep disturbances, interpersonal 
sensitivities and anomalous internal experiences. 
 
1.5 Distinguishing Delusions from Other Types of Beliefs 
As previously noted, it is often difficult to distinguish delusions from other types of strongly 
held beliefs. As such, questions arise as to whether certain strong beliefs represent delusional 
disorders or simply symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia (Marneros et al., 2012). The 
diagnostic and epidemiological research reviewed in this chapter has typically assumed that 
the distinction is clear or, at least, possible to make in principle. To date, only a very few 
researchers have systematically compared delusions to belief systems such as political beliefs, 





Chapter 2. Master Explanatory Systems 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the last chapter, which discussed the difficulty associated with 
distinguishing between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. In light of this difficulty, it is 
pertinent to consider whether delusions – and here the focus will be on paranoid beliefs 
because they are the type of delusion that has been most frequently studied – are similar to 
other strongly held beliefs. This chapter begins with a brief discussion underscoring the need 
to consider the framework of strong beliefs leading to delusions and paranoia. It then delves 
deeper and discusses religiosity, political ideologies, conspiracy theories and paranormal 
beliefs as part of the master explanatory systems (MES) of strong beliefs. 
 
2.2 Framework of Strong Beliefs Leading to Delusions and Paranoia 
The difficulty of distinguishing between delusional and other kinds of strongly held beliefs is 
exemplified by two – now classical – case studies in which it proved vital to assess certain 
strong beliefs to ascertain the diagnoses of the individuals who held them as well as the 
implications of their actions. 
The first case study involved a murder trial in which the mental health professionals 
who testified as expert witnesses were asked to determine whether the alleged murderers 
were suffering from a shared psychotic illness or simply held an extreme religious belief (Utah 
v Lafferty, 1984). Ron and Dan Lafferty had visited the home of their brother Alan, who was 
married to Brenda. At the time, Brenda was taking care of her 15-month-old daughter, Erica. 
They killed both Brenda and Erica by stabbing them and then fled, attempting to evade the 




instructed by Jesus Christ to commit the murders. Indeed, being strong Mormon 
fundamentalists, they believed that Dan was the present-day Prophet Elijah, who spoke the 
word of the Lord. A conundrum arose during the trial because the mental health professionals 
could not agree as to whether the brothers suffered from a shared psychotic illness or simply 
held extreme religious beliefs. 
 A similar scenario occurred in another trial, this time for mass murder (Norwegian 
State v Anders Behring Breivik, 2012). Anders Breivik killed a total of 77 people and injured 
319 others on 22nd July 2011. He detonated a bomb in Oslo, which killed eight, and then 
proceeded to the nearby Utøya Island, where he shot to death 69 young political activists 
attending a summer camp, injuring 319 others. Breivik claimed that he was a member of a 
secret organisation of Knights Templar that radically fought feminism, Islamification, 
immigration and other axioms that they felt were leading to cultural suicide in Europe. An 
initial pretrial psychiatric analysis report compiled in December 2011 had found that he was 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, which would have allowed his lawyers to successfully 
submit a plea of insanity. The report was thus massively criticised, and two new psychiatrists 
were appointed by the court. These psychiatrists declared Breivik to be legally sane. In the 
ruling, the court stated that he was sane and fit for sentencing, although it was noted that he 
held strong conspiracy theory beliefs, as do many other people. 
These two case studies illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing between delusions and 
two types of belief systems that are commonly held with great conviction and, further, that 
are often resistant to counterarguments. Bentall (2018) proposed that beliefs of these kinds 
can be considered to be MSE: ‘master’ because they dominate reasoning about the world and 




and ‘systems’ because they consist not of particular propositions but rather of structured 
networks of propositions.  
 
2.3 Religiosity as an Aspect of the MES of Strong Beliefs 
Religion is a complex human phenomenon comprised of various elements that are not always 
closely associated with each other. For instance, most religious systems consist not only of 
sets of propositions about the world (e.g. “There is a God”) but also of certain rituals and 
practices as well as communities of individuals who share the same beliefs. It is possible, for 
example, for someone to be a regular worshipper for entirely social reasons and without 
strongly believing religious doctrine or for someone to strongly believe the doctrine without 
engaging in communal worship. 
 In this chapter, the focus is on the propositional aspects of religion, that is, beliefs and 
doctrine. Globally, these are enormously variable. Even when studies have focused on the 
monotheistic/Abrahamic religions, they have suggested different factor analytics depending 
on their approach to the analysis. For example, Lemos et al. (2010) identified four religious 
factors and determined that two of them (belief in God and supernatural beliefs) can be 
defined as beliefs. However, Koenig and Büssing (2010) used only a single religiosity factor in 
the five-item Duke University Religion Index. which supports the approach to consider 
religiosity as a strong belief.  
Religion often illustrates two stark contrasts: the conservative and the extremist 
approaches. Although conservatism is viewed as somewhat liberal in terms of accepting and 
respecting others’ views, while extremism is viewed as radical due to attempts to impose 
religious views on others, there is no clear-cut difference between the two positions (Mohdin, 




the extent to which they are willing to act out the postulates of their beliefs. Explanations of 
such beliefs have been used in the media in an attempt to associate terrorist attacks with one 
of two explanations, namely insanity or religious fundamentalism. For example, in the second 
case study discussed in the previous subsection concerning the need to consider strong 
beliefs, Anders Breivik was declared to be mentally ill due to suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia, whereas the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were branded as religious zealots 
(Obaidi, 2016). 
An important question when considering religiosity as an MES concerns its 
relationship with other kinds of beliefs. First, a question arises as to whether religious people 
are the same as those who believe in the paranormal. This issue was examined in a study 
regarding whether there was a significant relationship between the level of religiosity and the 
individual differences between two groups: (i) religious and paranormal believers and (ii) 
sceptics (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007). Internet-based questionnaires were administered to a 
large sample of 3261 Finnish participants, and the responses indicated a positive relationship 
between religious and paranormal beliefs among both paranormal believers and sceptics, but 
a negative relationship among religious people. Thus, the empirical relationships between the 
two types of belief systems may be very complex. 
It has previously been suggested that religious belief may help individuals to cope with 
the threat of their own mortality. For example, in a study exploring the existential function of 
religion among Christians, Muslims, atheists and agnostics, significant differences were found 
when examining the participants’ management of death awareness (Vail et al., 2012). In three 
quasi-experimental studies, reminders of death were found to enhance belief in a higher 
power (God/Jesus, Allah and Buddha) among practicing religious groups, although they had 




There has been considerable speculation as to the age differences of religious belief. 
A study of religiosity across various age groups conducted in 106 countries revealed that 
young adults were less religious and so less susceptible to strong beliefs emanating from 
religion (Pew Research Center, 2018). Interestingly, older people were found to be more 
religious in most countries (Pew Research Center, 2018). This finding suggests that cultural 
factors that impact different cohorts early in their lives may have a strong impact on whether 
or not they become religious. 
Other studies have sought to understand the psychological mechanisms that 
predispose people to be religious. For example, one such study assessed the impact of the 
level of understanding of the physical world on religious and paranormal beliefs (Lindeman & 
Svedholm-Hakkinen, 2016). The study revealed that supernatural beliefs associated with 
religion correlated with poor mental rotation, poor intuitive and physical skills, poor 
mechanical abilities, low systemising and analytical thinking styles, as well as other physical 
and biological phenomena. High correlation was also found between supernatural beliefs and 
the assigning of mentality to non-mental phenomena. A further regression analysis of this 
subject confirmed that strong beliefs were influenced by overall physical capabilities entailing 
skills, interest and knowledge as well as intuitive thinking styles.  
Another important consideration when discussing religiosity as an aspect of MES is the 
impact of religion on psychotic symptoms. For instance, religious content has been found to 
arouse hallucinations in patients diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (Krzystanek et al., 
2012). In a retrospective analysis of medical notes collected between 1932 and 1992, 
religiosity was found to contribute to the hallucinations of 46.8% of patients. Interestingly, 
religious hallucinations were found to have increased significantly during the period following 




Another study considered religious delusions in patients with psychosis and assessed 
how they interacted with the patients’ spiritual coping (Mohr et al., 2010). The study involved 
236 outpatient psychotic patients, including 38 with already identified delusions of religious 
content, 85 with other types of delusions and 113 with no persistent delusional symptoms. 
The study found that for almost half the study population (45%), the spirituality associated 
with religion helped them to cope with their illnesses. However, those patients with 
religiosity-based delusions were found to have more severe clinical psychoses than the other 
patients, were more likely to abscond from psychiatric treatment services and received less 
treatment support from religious communities. 
 
2.4 Political Ideologies as an Aspect of the MES of Strong Beliefs 
It has been suggested that religiosity exerts an impact on politics by promoting 
authoritarianism and dispelling democratic values (Hunsberger, 1995; Schwartz & Huismans, 
1995). Such claims are often based on the assertion that strong religious beliefs ensure strict 
adherence to religious constructs and, therefore, place believers under the control of their 
religious leaders. As the previous section discussed religiosity as an aspect of MES, it is 
appropriate to begin this section by considering the impact of religiosity on politics. 
Using Israel as a case study of a religious nation, a prior study evaluated the effect of 
religiosity on the endorsement of democratic values (Canetti-Nisim, 2004). The study found 
that, despite their strong perceived religiosity as well as the unsettled political and security 
atmosphere of the country, Israelis believe in democratic values to a considerable extent, 
which counters the idea that religiosity affects political ideologies and decreases support for 




An earlier study by the same author that was conducted in Germany found contrasting 
results when examining the impact of religiosity on political ideologies (Canetti-Nisim, 2003). 
It was determined that religiosity culminates in political extremism, which undermines 
democracy. Considering religion from the two vantage points of mainstream religion and 
alternative religions, Canetti-Nisim (2003) found that they converged in terms of the attitudes 
and perceptions toward democracy in Germany. According to the author’s understanding of 
the German context, religion has two meanings: one characteristic of mainstream religion 
with belief in the supernatural and the other characteristic of alternative religiosity without 
belief in the supernatural. Although the belief systems of these two religious leanings were 
found to be different, Canetti-Nisim (2003) argued that they were similar in that they both 
undermined or challenged the prospects of democracy in favour of their own beliefs. 
Some prior studies of political ideologies have suggested that such ideologies can be 
universally described based on the right (conservative)-left (liberal) dimension (Jost et al., 
2009). The former school of thought has a preference for conserving political institutions as 
they are, while the latter supports radical change and the introduction of new systems (Jost 
et al., 2009). Political leftist schools support the tenets of freedom, equality and rights among 
others, advocating for more liberal government stances, while rightist schools support 
absolute authority, hierarchy and order in governance, thereby advocating for hegemony and 
authoritarianism with more autocratic regimes. However, other studies have indicated that 
political ideologies can best be described by a two-dimensional structure of right-wing 
authoritarianism and a social dominance orientation. The term ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ 
(RWA) was first used by Altemeyer (1981) to describe people who willingly submit to 
authorities and uphold their social norms while being hostile in terms of their attitudes 




(1981) refined the work on authoritarianism by Adorno et al. (1950; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018). 
Pratto et al. (1994) used the term ‘social dominance orientation’ (SDO) in their work on social 
dominance theory. An SDO indicates that an individual differentiates between in-group 
relations, desires those relations to be equal or hierarchical and perceives the social roles they 
need to take on. 
Prior studies have indicated that political ideologies influence the physiological and 
psychological responses of individuals to their environments (Hibbing et al., 2014). Indeed, it 
has been claimed that conservative individuals tend to devote more psychological resources 
and reasoning to political constructs. Conservative individuals are, therefore, more likely to 
hold strong political beliefs than liberal individuals.  
Other research on political leftist and rightist ideologies has indicated that political 
extremism is a major factor in relation to predicting conspiracy theories (van Prooijen et al., 
2015). Citing four studies conducted in the United States and the Netherlands, van Prooijen 
et al. (2015) showed a strong relationship between political ideologies and conspiracy beliefs. 
People in both the extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing groups exhibited a preference 
for simple solutions to societal problems as well as for conspiracy theories, while the effect 
was smaller on those participants who were politically moderate. The study concluded that 
political extremism is related to strong beliefs regarding conspiracies due to the highly 
structured thinking styles used by extremists to understand and assess political actions. 
Moreover, recent studies reported that political ideologies and extreme religious beliefs are 
associated with poor performance on cognitive tests that tap cognitive flexibility (Zmigrod et 
al., 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2019).   
A meta-analysis of the psychological predictors of conservativism found that it was 




as well as with low levels of tolerance of uncertainty, integrative complexity and self-esteem 
(although the latter effect was small) (Jost et al., 2003). However, a more recent study found 
that political conservatives are happier than liberals and so are less susceptible to certain 
extreme beliefs (Schlenker et al., 2012). Based on four case studies, Schlenker et al. (2012) 
revealed that conservative individuals are likely to have greater personal agency 
characterised by responsibility and self-control, a stronger outlook of positivity due to their 
self-worth and optimism, more transcendent moral beliefs stemming from religiosity, 
tolerance of others and a greater belief in fairness. These constructs were found to account 
for their happiness. The findings of Schlenker et al. (2012) appear to contradict media 
stereotypes of conservatives as unhappy and dissatisfied individuals. 
Moreover, a recent study conducted in Sweden discredited the idea that 
conservatives are more susceptible to extreme beliefs. The study indicated that it is not just 
conservatives who are predisposed to extremist beliefs, as extreme right- and left-wing 
individuals are more inclined to strongly believe and adopt conspiracy theories when 
compared with moderate individuals (Krouwel et al., 2017). Such people are often less 
interpersonally trustful and engage in more negative economic and political evaluations of 
their environments. On this basis, extreme political ideologies – whether rightist or leftist – 
can be seen to predispose individuals to a range of inflexible strong beliefs. 
 
2.5 Conspiracy Theories as an Aspect of the MES of Strong Beliefs 
As discussed above, some political ideologies culminate in conspiracy theories. These 
conspiracy beliefs have been found to stem from a plethora of political, social and 




Conspiracy theories entail plots shrouded in secrecy that are set in motion by two or 
more powerful actors. Such plots often revolve around attempts to usurp economic or 
political power, infringe agreements, withhold information or vital secrets, violate people’s 
rights and alter institutions for ulterior motives (Douglas et al., 2019). Individuals perpetrate 
such conspiracy beliefs by using them to explain prejudices, revolutions, terror and even 
genocide. Due to rejecting the scientific consensus, the advocates of conspiracy theories have 
also been responsible for individuals rejecting mainstream medicine to the point that certain 
curable diseases remain prevalent in some parts of the world. Even global warming has been 
misconstrued as a result of conspiracy beliefs. It is, therefore, important to consider 
conspiracy beliefs as an aspect of the MES of strong beliefs. 
As highlighted above, extreme political ideologies, whether leftist or rightist, are 
known to contribute to the formulation of conspiracy theories. For instance, an Italian survey 
study found conspiracism to be negatively associated with education and positively 
associated with religiosity, although no significant correlation was found with political trust 
(Mancosu et al., 2017).  
Conspiracy theories have been associated with various cognitive predispositions, 
including susceptibility to other conjunction fallacies. The conjunction fallacy is a form of 
probabilistic reasoning error in which people overestimate the probability of two events 
happening simultaneously (Brotherton & French, 2014). Brotherton and French (2014) 
employed a correlation analysis of two independent studies. In the first study, the participants 
who endorsed conspiracy theories were found to make more conjunction errors than those 
who did not endorse conspiracism. In the second study, the findings of the first study were 




It was determined that conspiracism is directly associated with domain-general susceptibility 
to conjunction fallacies and errors in belief. 
Conspiracism is also associated with a reduced capacity for analytic thinking (Swami 
et al., 2014). Based on four studies with a large sample size of 990, Swami et al. (2014) found 
a strong belief in conspiracy theories to be associated with lower analytic thinking and 
reduced open-mindedness. More positively, they found that even among such individuals, 
verbal fluency tasks could be effectively used to elicit analytic thinking. 
Conspiracist thinking is not always maladaptive. Consider a unique albeit common 
type of conspiracy theory: commercial conspiracy. This entails the belief that parties engaged 
in commerce are conspiring to defraud others for some commercial gain, for example, to 
increase their profit. A pilot study with a British sample of over 300 participants revealed that 
most individuals were cynical with regard to advertising gimmicks employed by organisations 
such as banks and drug, alcohol and tobacco companies (Furham, 2013). Such people believed 
that the companies were not revealing the true position of their businesses to the markets in 
which they operate, as they were instead focusing on making a killing from the markets. 
Further analysis revealed that less religious, more pessimistic, more economically challenged 
and less open-to-experience individuals were more likely to trust and propagate commercial 
conspiracism beliefs. 
The underpinnings of the renowned conspiracy novel The Da Vinci Code (Brown, 2002) 
represent one of the most well-known contemporary cases of conspiracy theories about 
Christian history. According to the book, the Roman Catholic Church kept secret Jesus' 
marriage to Mary Magdalene, from which a "holy lineage" originated, which was guarded by 
the Priory of Sion (Newheiser et al., 2011). An analysis of the functional nature of the beliefs 




conspiracy theories (Newheiser et al., 2011). In the analysis, the underlying psychological 
factors, individual differences and other factors that could contribute to belief in conspiracies 
were assessed, and they were counterchecked against resistance to counterevidence 
(Newheiser et al., 2011). The analysis revealed that people were more likely to believe in the 
constructs of The Da Vinci Code if they had previously held congruent religious beliefs (New 
Age spiritual) rather than competing (Christian religion) beliefs.  
 
2.6 Paranormal Beliefs as an Aspect of the MES of Strong Beliefs 
A number of factor-analytic studies have suggested that belief in paranormal ideologies 
creates a coherent set of dispositions and predispositions (Lange & Thalbourne, 2002). A 
single factor of paranormal belief was suggested in studies using the Australian Sheep-Goat 
Scale, wherein the ‘sheep’ represent the paranormal believers and the ‘goats’ represent the 
unbelievers, the scale has 18 items (e.g.,  ‘I believe I am psychic’ and I believe I have marked 
psychokinetic ability’) and the responses are ranging between ‘true’, ‘uncertain’, and ‘false’  
(Drinkwater et al., 2018; Lange & Thalbourne, 2002). The Australian Sheep-Got scale is 
consisted of 18 Although the multidimensional structure of paranormal beliefs was suggested 
in analyses of the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), a single dimension 
appears to dominate this structure (Tobacyk, 2004).    
It has been argued that paranormal beliefs and delusional beliefs are related in the 
sense that they have similar foundations in terms of individuals’ thought processes being 
impacted by cognitive dysfunctions (Irwin et al., 2012). Using a convenience sample of 207 
participants, Irwin et al. (2012) administered online questionnaires to measure paranormal 
beliefs, confirmation bias, inferential confusion and metacognitive beliefs. The study revealed 




associated with inferential confusion, which is a reasoning style determined by imperfect 
judgments about the possible states of relationships in real life, and confirmation bias, which 
refers to the extent to which people tend to favour and recall information that supports their 
own beliefs. 
The impact of meta-cognition on paranormal beliefs was assessed in another study 
that yielded similar results. Drinkwater (2017) examined the impact of paranormal beliefs on 
individual resilience, as assessed using a mental toughness scale, and adaptive coping 
mechanisms. Among the conclusions of this study was the notion that mentally tough 
individuals are better able to cope with adaptive behaviour even in stressful situations and so 
are less susceptible to paranormal beliefs. Conversely, individuals who are not mentally tough 
are more susceptible to paranormal beliefs, which represent just one pathway to many 
psychoses. 
Another psychological factor that might contribute to paranormal beliefs is cognitive 
complexity. General cognitive abilities are known to be negatively correlated with paranormal 
beliefs (Tam & Shiah, 2004). As such, there is high correlation between education levels, which 
indicate cognitive complexity and development, and paranormal beliefs.  
 
2.7 MES of Strong Beliefs  
This chapter has discussed the nature of MES. Such belief systems, similar to delusions, are 
held with great conviction and so are resistant to counterarguments, although they are not 
usually considered to be delusions, probably due to their prevalence (Bentall, 2018). The 
subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis describe a series of studies of MES, mainly based 
on surveys, which explore the structures of such belief systems, the relationships between 




Chapter 3: The paranoid and conspiracy mentalities are related but 
distinct phenomena: Structure and psychological correlates.  
 
3.1 Abstract 
Paranoia and conspiracy theories both involve suspiciousness about the intentions of others 
but have rarely been studied together. In three studies (N = 496, N = 1,519 and N = 638) we 
compared single and two-factor models of paranoia and conspiracy theories as well as 
associations between both belief systems and other psychological constructs. Two-factor 
model were best fit in all of the three studies. Both belief systems were associated with 
poor locus of control (powerful others and chance) and loneliness. Paranoid beliefs were 
associated with negative self-esteem and, in two studies, insecure attachment; conspiracy 
theories were associated with positive self-esteem in all three studies and narcissistic 
personality traits in the final study. Conspiracist thinking but not paranoia was associated 
positively with poor performance on the Cognitive Reflection Task. The findings suggest that 
paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories are distinct but correlated belief systems with 






In a seminal essay written during the McCarthy period, the American historian 
Richard Hofstadter (1952) described the persistence of a ‘paranoid style’ in American 
politics. Hofstadter gave numerous examples of this style from the history of his own 
country (for example, panics about the activities of the Illuminati in the 18th century and 
about the Freemasons in the 19th) but noted that it is not monopolised by any particular 
nation nor any particular political ideology. This paranoid style is, arguably, still discernible 
in modern political discourse but communism no longer figures prominently amongst the 
threats to our way of life, which Appelrouth (2017) now suggests “come in a variety of 
forms, some old, some new: ‘Islamofascists’, homosexuals, liberals, illegal aliens, feminists, 
the mainstream media” (p. 344).  
 Although Hofstadter (1952) said that he had, “neither the competence nor the desire 
to classify any figures of the past or present as certifiable lunatics” (p. 3-4) he argued, 
nonetheless, that it was reasonable to borrow the term ‘paranoid’ from the clinical 
literature. The style, he argued, had to do with “the way in which ideas are believed and 
advocated rather than with the truth or falsity of their content” (p. 5) so that “the feeling of 
persecution is central, and it is…. systematised in grandiose feelings of conspiracy” (p. 4). His 
essay and subsequent commentaries have therefore assumed at least a close parallel or 
even equivalence between the forms of paranoia observed in psychiatric patients and the 
conspiracy theories that characterise extremist political thinking, implying that belief in 
conspiracies might be a subclinical variant of the kind of paranoia observed in the 
psychiatric clinic. 
The only difference that Hofstadter (1952) acknowledged was that “the clinical 




directed specifically against him; whereas the spokesman of the paranoid style finds it 
directed against a nation, a culture, or a way of life” (p. 4). As Imhoff and Lamberty (2018) 
have recently noted, this difference – that paranoia concerns threats to the individual 
whereas conspiracies are explanations that attribute important events to secret plots by 
powerful groups – implies that the former may be linked to interpersonal vulnerability and 
the latter linked to distrust in political institutions. However, because theoretical accounts 
of paranoia (e.g. Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman, 2016) and conspiracy theories (e.g. 
Brotherton, 2015) have developed separately with very little cross-referral between the two 
literatures, there have been few attempts to study the relationship between the two 
phenomena. 
 
3.2.1 Paranoid beliefs 
 Paranoid delusions, characterised by the belief that others may be intending harm to 
the individual, are a common symptom of severe mental illness associated with significant 
distress in patients with psychosis (schizophrenia). However, sub-clinical paranoia is widely 
experienced (Freeman et al., 2005) with studies indicating that up to 20 per cent of healthy 
individuals show significant paranoid ideation (Verdoux et al., 1998). Psychometric evidence 
confirming that clinical paranoia lies at the extreme end of a continuum with non-clinical 
paranoid beliefs (Bebbington et al., 2013; Elahi et al., 2017) might be thought to provide 
support for Hofstadter’s thesis. 
There is compelling evidence that paranoia, both in population and clinical samples, 
is associated with early life adversity – especially disrupted attachment bonds – and also 




established models of the psychological mechanisms responsible, although differing in 
detail, emphasize the role of negative self-schematic processes (Bentall et al., 2001; 
Freeman, 2016). Consistent with this approach, an external locus of control (Kaney & 
Bentall, 1989; Mirowsky & Ross, 1983), negative beliefs about the self (Tiernan et al., 2014) 
and insecure attachment styles (Pickering et la., 2008; Wickham et al., 2015) have all been 
associated with paranoia in both clinical and non-clinical populations. However, cognitive 
impairments have also been implicated in both paranoid patients (Bentall et al., 2009) and 
also in deluded patients in general. For example, a highly replicated finding is that paranoid 
and other deluded patients show a tendency to ‘jump-to-conclusions’ when making 
judgments about sequentially presented data (Dudley et al., 2016). 
 
3.2.2 Conspiracy mentality 
 Like paranoia, conspiracist thinking is common in the general population. In a recent 
analysis of the US National Comorbidity Study-replication (N = 5645), 26.7% agreed with the 
item, “I am convinced there is a conspiracy behind many things in the world”; endorsement 
of this item was associated with lower educational achievement and earnings, being outside 
the labour force, belonging to a minority ethnic group, poor well-being and low social 
capital (Freeman & Bentall, 2017). Because conspiracy theories are often shared, they may 
have important political consequences. For example, their endorsement is associated with 
the rejection of socially important scientific theories, such as the theory that global warming 
is the consequence of human use of fossil fuels (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). 
 Although many specific conspiracy theories are in wide circulation (e.g. the Apollo 




evidence of a general disposition to believe in conspiracy theories, sometimes referred to as 
conspiracy mentality (Bruder et al., 2013). Hence, people who believe in one conspiracy 
theory are likely to believe in other even contradictory conspiracy theories, for example that 
it is plausible that Princess Diana faked her own death and also that she was killed by the 
British government (Wood et al., 2012). Nevertheless, Conspiracy theories can be influenced 
by situational factors, particularly the experience that life is uncontrollable, which appears 
to lead to greater willingness to believe them (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015; van Prooijen, 
2017); consistent with this observation, it has been shown that individuals who have a high 
need for closure seize on conspiratorial explanations for uncertain events when such 
explanations are readily available (Marchlewska et al., 2018). Other individual difference 
factors are also likely to be important, and some of these appear to mirror those thought to 
be important in paranoia. For example, Swami et al., (2014) and van Prooijen (2017) found 
that conspiracy theories were associated with poor analytic thinking, whereas Freeman and 
Bentall (2017) and Green and Douglas (2018) found that, like paranoia, they are associated 
with insecure attachment. Other studies (Cichocka et al., 2016; de Zavala & Fredrico, 2018) 
have found that conspiracy theories are associated with individual and collective narcissism 
and, consistent with this last observation, Imhoff and Lamperty (2017) found that people 
high in conspiracy mentality have a need to feel unique, and are more likely to endorse 
conspiracy theories if they think that they were endorsed only by a minority. 
 
3.2.3 Empirical studies of the association between paranoia and conspiracy theories. 
 Only a modest number of studies have empirically investigated the relationship 
between paranoia and conspiracy theories. Grzesiak-Feldman and Ejsmont (2008), in a small 




Jews, Arabs, Germans, and Russians positively correlated with scores on Fenigstein and 
Vanable's (1992) paranoia scale. Darwin et al., (2011), in a study with 120 students, found 
that conspiracy mentality, paranoia and schizotypy (but not paranormal beliefs) were inter-
correlated. Bruder et al., (2013), in a validation study for their Conspiracy Mentality 
Questionnaire (see below) found that it correlated strongly with Fenigstein and Vanable's 
(1992) paranoia scale (r = .40, N = 120) and Brotherton and Eser (2015) reported a strong 
correlation between paranoia and scores on their Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (r = .52, 
N = 150). Wilson and Rose (2014) reported modest associations between paranoia and 
belief in conspiracy theories in a number of student samples (r varying between .27 and 
.30). Cichocka et al., (2016), using data from three online studies (Ns varying from 202 to 
505) found that CTs were associated with narcissistic personality traits; although a positive 
correlation was found between conspiracy theories and paranoia, this effect was explained 
by paranoia mediating between low self-esteem and conspiracy theories. Finally, in the 
analysis of the NCS-R data, also found a positive association between paranoid beliefs and 
scores on the one-item conspiracy beliefs measure, but associations between insecure 
attachment and conspiracy theories survived even when paranoia was controlled for 
(Freeman & Bentall, 2017). 
 In a meta-analysis of 11 datasets from seven of these studies (plus one study not 
considered here because a nonspecific measure of schizotypy rather than paranoia was 
employed), Imhoff and Lamberty (2018) found considerable heterogeneity in the data, but 
the overall effect size was equivalent to a correlation of r = .36 between paranoia and belief 
in conspiracy theories. In a complex analysis of data from an online survey of 209 German 
participants using three different measures of paranoia and three measures of belief in 




paranoia) were stronger than those between them and a two correlated factor model was 
found to best fit the data. The latent paranoia variable was found to correlate more with 
personal variables (e.g. high neuroticism, the tendency to feel egocentric threat) whereas 
the conspiracy belief factor correlated with politically relevant measures (e.g. low trust in 
government). These findings were broadly replicated in larger sample (N = 390) of US 
citizens. 
 
3.2.4 Purpose of the present study 
 Here we report three studies in which we build on Imhoff and Lamberty's (2018) 
findings by testing the relationship between paranoia and conspiracy theories, first in a 
large student sample and then in two large samples representative of the UK population. 
The studies had two broad aims. First, we aimed to determine whether paranoia and belief 
in conspiracy theories are separate phenomena. In all three studies we therefore used 
confirmatory factor analysis to compare models in which paranoia and conspiracy theories 
are treated as a single construct and those in which they are treated as separate but 
correlated constructs, predicting that the latter would be a better fit. To test the robustness 
of the findings, we used two different measures of paranoia and two different measures of 
belief in conspiracy theories across the three studies, and in our final study we also took 
steps to eliminate possible method effects attributable to differences in item design. 
 Second, if paranoia and conspiracy theories are independent but correlated 
phenomena, it seems likely that some of the psychological processes which explain these 
propensities are shared whereas others are unique to each. We therefore tested 




that have previously been shown to be important in either one or both of them. Based on 
the literature available to date (Tiernan et al., 2014), and Imhoff and Lamberty's (2018) 
argument that paranoia is uniquely associated with interpersonal vulnerability, we expected 
that paranoia would be more closely associated with negative beliefs about the self than 
conspiracy theories. Past research suggests that both belief systems will both be associated 
with an external locus of control (e.g. Kaney & Bentall, 1989; van Proojen & Acker, 2015) 
and insecure attachment (e.g. Pickering et al., 2008; Green & Douglas, 2018). Given that 
conspiracy theories have been associated with narcissism (Cichocka et al., 2016; de Zavala 
and Fredrico, 2018), and given the previously reported strong association between paranoia 
and negative beliefs about the self (Tiernan et al., 2014), we expected narcissism to be 
specifically associated with conspiracy theories (Study 3). 
 In two studies (2 and 3) we considered the relationships between both belief 
systems and analytical reasoning. Although dual process theories of cognition differ in detail 
(Evans, 2008) it is now widely accepted that human reasoning processes fall into two main 
types: type 1 (fast, intuitive and associative) versus type 2 (slow, analytic, rational and 
propositional) (Kahneman, 2012), and it seems plausible that thinking about emotionally-
laden topics such as conspiracies and paranoia will be cognitively ‘miserly’, that is to say 
dominated by type-1 thinking and with limited engagement of more effortful type-2 
thinking. Freeman, Evans, and Lister (2012) reported that high paranoia scores in healthy 
individuals were associated with self-reported experiential (intuitive, from the gut) 
reasoning. Swami et al., (2014) reported similar findings for belief in conspiracy theories and 
that priming analytical thinking reduced belief in conspiracies. However, the associations 
were modest and Freeman et al. (2014) were unable to replicate their finding for paranoia 




the two types of reasoning whereas an objective measure would be preferable. In our 
second and third studies we therefore included expanded versions of Frederick's (2005) 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which measures ‘miserly’ cognition in which type 1 thinking 
is not regulated by more effortful type-2 analytical thinking (Toplak et al., 2014). Bronstein 
et al. (2019) reported a modest association between poor performance on the CRT and 
subclinical paranoia, and a similar association has been reported for conspiracy theories by 
van Prooijen (2017). Hence, we expected that poor CRT performance would be associated 
with both belief systems in this study. 
Finally, in Studies 1 and 2 we examined the relationships between paranoia and 
belief in conspiracy theories and social relationships, although our predictions were more 
tentative. On the one hand, because (as Hofstadter pointed out) paranoid beliefs tend to be 
idiosyncratic whereas conspiracy theories tend to be shared, it might be predicted that 
paranoid people would be more socially isolated, and hence lonelier, than people who 
believe in conspiracy theories and, indeed, in a previous study with a student sample we 
found that paranoia was strongly associated with loneliness (McIntyre et al., 2018). On the 
other hand, in previous studies, loneliness has been associated with poor interpersonal trust 
(Rotenberg, 1994) and, in our own previous work, we found that conspiracy theories were 
associated with low social capital (Freeman & Bentall, 2017). We therefore included a 




3.4 Study 1 
3.4.1 Methods 
Participants and procedure 
Participants received invitations to complete an online survey by emails sent to participant 
panels at Liverpool, Oxford and Ulster universities. Ethical approval was obtained from the 
university ethics committees.  
 A total of 790 people participated in the survey, 254 males with a mean age of 27.57 
years (SD = 15.48) and 536 females with mean age of 26.05 (SD = 11.76). 569 of the 
participants were students, 180 employed, and 24 not in employment (17 did not provide 
data). For the purpose of the present study, we excluded 222 participants who completed 
the survey in less than 15 minutes (a criterion suggested by Qualtrics, to ensure adequate 
attention to the questionnaires) and 35 participants who completed less than 50% of the 
items. Because of the cultural sensitivity of many of the items, we also excluded 37 
participants those who were not born in the UK. The final sample was 496 participants (158 
males, M = 28.97 years SD=13.75, and 338 females, M = 26.13 years, SD = 12.19). 
 
Measures 
The data considered here formed part of a multipurpose survey which included a wide 
range of questions on political, religious, social and other kinds of belief systems and 
relevant psychological constructs. Only those measures relevant to the present study are 
reported here but a list of the remaining measures is provided in the supplementary 





The Revised Paranoia and Deservedness Scale (PaDS –R) was designed on the basis of 
psychometric analyses of the original scale (Melo et al., 2009) in a large sample of healthy 
individuals and patients with psychosis (Elahi et al., 2017) and other recent findings 
indicating that paranoia consists of four elements: interpersonal sensitivity, mistrust, fear of 
persecution and ideas of reference (Bebbington et al., 2013). The revised scale consists of 8 
paranoia items (the P scale), two each from these domains (e.g. respectively, “My friends 
often tell me to relax and stop worrying about being deceived or harmed”, “You should only 
trust yourself”, “I believe that some people want to hurt me deliberately”, and “Sometimes I 
think there are hidden insults in things that other people say or do”) and two additional 
deservedness items (the D scale) which were not used in the present study. Items are 
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from “Strongly agree” to Strongly disagree”. In this 
sample, the eight-item P scale had an alpha coefficient of .87. 
 
The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder et al., 2013) is a five item scale (e.g. 
“I think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never 
informed about”) assessing participants’ general tendency to believe in conspiracies. 
Responses are on 11-point scales indicating how likely it is that respondents think each of 
the items is true from 0 (“0% – Certainly not”) to 10 (“100% – Certain”). The alpha 
coefficient in this sample was .84.  
 
The Relationship Questionnaire (RQ; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) was used to assess 
attachment style. Participants read four vignettes describing secure, fearful, preoccupied 




are then asked to rate each vignette “according to how well or poorly each description 
corresponds to your general relationship style” on 7-point scales from “Disagree strongly” 
to “Agree strongly”. Scores on the four scales can be used to compute higher order 
measures of attachment anxiety (negative model of self) and attachment avoidance 
(negative model of other). 
 
The Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006), developed originally to assess 
processes thought to be important in psychotic phenomena, measures four self-schematic 
constructs: negative beliefs about the self (e.g “I am unloved”), positive beliefs about the 
self (e.g. “I am respected”), negative beliefs about others (e.g. “Other people are hostile”) 
and positive beliefs about others (e.g. “Other people are fair”), each with 6 items rated on 5-
point scales (“Don't’ believe” to “Believe totally”). In the present study, alpha coefficients for 
the four subscales ranged from .80 to .93. 
 
The Multidimensional Locus of Control Scale (MLCS; Levenson, 1974) has three 8-item 
subscales: internality (e.g. “Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my 
ability”), chance (e.g. “When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky”) and powerful 
others (e.g. “My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others”). Each item is rated on a five-
point scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. In the present sample, the 
internality subscale had an alpha of .64, the chance subscale had an alpha of .72 and the 





The Loneliness Scale (Hughes et al., 2004) has three items (e.g. “How often do you feel left 
out?”) answered on 3-point scales (“Hardly ever”, “Some of the time”, “Often”). In the 
present sample, the alpha coefficient was .83.  
 
Statistical approach 
First, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted to compare two models: (1) a 
model in which all paranoia and conspiracy mentality items loaded on a single 
conspiracy/paranoia factor, and (2) a model in which paranoia and conspiracy mentality are 
separate but correlated latent variables. Second, after establishing that the two-factor was a 
better fit, we examined associations with subscales of each of the other psychological 
constructs of interest (attachment style, self-schemas, locus of control and loneliness). For 
this purpose we calculated a regression model in which all of the psychological constructs 
were entered simultaneously as predictors. In this model, conspiracy mentality (CMQ items) 
and paranoia (PaDS-R P items) were considered as latent factors, which were allowed to 
covary. This approach does not require us to partial out common and shared components of 
paranoia and conspiracist thinking but it does allow us to test for the specificity of the 
associations between constructs and belief systems. To achieve this, equality constraints 
were initially placed on the regression coefficients predicting the latent variables; these 
equality constraints were tested using Wald tests. If a Wald test was significant, the 
regression coefficients between the construct and paranoia and conspiracy theories were 
considered to be significantly different.  
 Confirmatory factor and regression models were conducted in Mplus 7.0 (Muthen & 




The following recommendations were followed to assess model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998, 
1999): a non-significant chi-square (χ2), Comparative Fit Index (CFI: Bentler, 1990)  and 
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI: Tucker & Lewis, 1973) values above .95 reflect excellent fit, while 
values for these two indices above .90 reflect acceptable fit; Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation with 90% confidence intervals (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) with values of .06 or 
less reflect excellent fit while values less than .08 reflect acceptable fit. The Standardized 
Root-Mean-Square Residual (SRMR; Chen, 2007) was also used with values of .06 or less 
indicating excellent fit and values less than .08 indicating acceptable fit. The Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) was used to evaluate and compare models, with 
the smallest value indicating the best fitting model. In relation to the BIC, Raftery (1996) 
suggested that a 2-6 point difference offers evidence of model superiority, a 6-10 point 
difference indicates strong evidence of model superiority, and a difference greater than 10 
points indicates very strong evidence of model superiority.  
 
3.4.2 Results 
The correlation matrix for the variables included in the study is shown in Table 3.1. The 
Pearson correlation between PaDS-R total scores and CMQ total scores was significant, r = 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model fit for paranoia and conspiracy theories 
The model fit indices for the initial confirmatory factor models, which included only the 
PaDS-R P and CMS items, showed that the two factor model provided acceptable fit (2 (64) 
= 204.888, p > .05; RMSEA = .068; CFI = .934; TLI = .919, SRMR = .046)  and the one factor 
model did not (2 (65)=844.474, p >.05; RMSEA = .158; CFI = .634; TLI = .561, SRMR = .126). 
The BIC was also lower for the two factor model (BIC = 21590.384) compared to the one 
factor model (BIC = 22300.743) and the difference was much greater than 10 points and so 
indicates very strong evidence of the superiority of the two factor model. The standardised 
factor loadings for the paranoia and conspiracy mentality latent variables were all high, 
positive and statistically significant ranging from .520 to .858, and the correlation between 
the latent variables was .417. The composite reliability (Raykov, 1997) for paranoia (CR = 
.870) and conspiracy mentality (CR = .841) were high. 
 
Associations between paranoia, conspiracy theories and psychological constructs 
Bivariate correlations and partial correlations (controlling for the other belief system) 
between paranoia and conspiracy mentality and each of the psychological constructs are 
shown in the supplementary materials Table 3.S2. 
 Table 3.2 shows the regression coefficients and Wald tests for our regression model. 
Both anxious attachment (model of self) and avoidant attachment (model of other) were 
associated with both belief systems, but the effect of anxious attachment was much greater 
for paranoia than conspiracy mentality. Paranoia was associated with low positive beliefs 
about the self and high negative beliefs about the self but both systems were associated 




significantly greater for paranoia than conspiracy mentality. As expected, two of the locus of 
control subscales – chance and powerful others – were associated with both belief systems, 
although the effect of chance was greater for paranoia. An association with internality was 
only found for paranoia although this was not significantly greater than the non-association 
found for conspiracist thinking. Finally, although both belief systems were associated with 
loneliness, the effect was much stronger for paranoia. 
Table 3.2.  
Study 1 standardised regression coefficients and tests of equality from multivariate 
regression model predicting paranoia and conspiracy beliefs. 
Predictor Variables 
Paranoia 
  (se) 
Conspiracy 
  (se) Wald df p 
Attachment  Model of Self -.422 (.035) * -.120 (.045) * 45.508 1 < .001 




Positive self -.122 (.051) * -.037 (.060) 1.881 1 .170 
Negative self .209 (.051) * -.073 (.056) 30.545 1 < .001 
Positive other -.093 (.050) -.059 (.051) 0.450 1 .502 
Negative other .339 (.045) * .283 (.047) * 1.461 1 .227 
 
Locus of Control Internality -.099 (.048) * -.013 (.051) 2.746 1 .098 
Chance .299 (.052) * .171 (.060) * 4.664 1 .031 
Powerful Others .174 (.052) * .139 (.058) * 0.430 1 .512 
Loneliness  .501 (.039) * .152 (.047) * 53.968 1 < .001 
 
R-squared .456 (.036) * .152 (.031) * 27.019 1 <. 001 
Note: * p < .05 
 
3.4.3 Study 1 Discussion 
This study found evidence that paranoia and conspiracist thinking, although 
correlated to approximately the same extent found in previous studies (Imhoff & Lamberty, 
2018), appear to be distinct phenomena. a model with two correlated factors (i.e., paranoia 
and conspiracy theories) was a far better fit to the data than a single factor model. The two 




attachment anxiety, negative beliefs about the self, loneliness and (marginally) internality 
were more associated with paranoia, consistent with  Imhoff and Lamberty's (2018) account 
of the difference between the two systems and also with psychological models of paranoia 
which emphasize the role of low self-esteem and interpersonal sensitivity (Bentall et al., 
2001; Freeman, 2016). The strong association between paranoia and loneliness observed in 
the present study has been observed in a previous study with a student sample (McIntyre et 
al., 2018). 
 The study had several limitations. First, the primarily student sample was 
unrepresentative of the general population. Hence, we decided to attempt to replicate our 
findings with a larger, more diverse and more representative sample. Second, our 
conspiracy mentality measure was a short assessment of the tendency to believe in 
conspiracies in general, so that participants did not have to rate the plausibility of specific 
conspiracy theories; we decided to replace it with a scale that does. Third, the BCSS, which 
we used to measure self-schemas, was originally designed for the purposes of research into 
psychosis and we therefore replaced it with a more conventional measure of self-esteem. 
Finally, we included an expanded version of Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test 






3.5 Study 2 
3.5.1 Methods 
Participants and procedure 
Participants were recruited to be a close to representative national sample by the survey 
company Qualtrics, and were stratified by age (minimum age 18 years; approximately equal 
numbers from age bands 18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-49; 50-64; 65+), sex and household 
income (approximately equal numbers from quintiles defined on the basis of Office for 
National Statistics data 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/
incomeandwealth/bulletins/householddisposableincomeandinequality/financialyearending2
016): £0-599; £600-1,155; £1,156-2,247; £2,248-£3,604; £3,605-£7.061; £7,062 and above). 
1,852 UK residents attempted the survey but, after removal of incomplete surveys or 
surveys completed implausibly quickly (pre-defined following pilot work by the survey 
company as < 12 minutes) the final sample was 1,508. 
 Of these, 742 were male with a mean age of 50.57 years (SD = 18.12) and 766 were 
female with a mean age of 45.04 years (SD = 15.64). 1440 were British nationals and 68 had 
other nationality.  
 
Measures 
The data for this study were again drawn from a multipurpose survey and all additional 
measures are listed in the supplementary materials (Table 3.S1). The following measures 




study, α = .91); The Relationship Questionnaire; The Multidimensional Locus of Control Scale 
(alphas for internality =  .75; chance = .82; powerful others = .85); and the Loneliness Scale 
(α = .88). The following additional measures were used: 
 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; Brotherton et al., 2013) is a 17-item scale (e.g., 
“Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public” and “Groups of scientists 
manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public”)1. Responses are 
rated on 5-point scales (“Definitely not true” to “Definitely true”). The alpha coefficient for 
the scale was .94. 
 
Self-esteem rating scale short form (SERS; Lecomte et al., 2006) is a 20-item scale, designed 
to assess self-esteem without scores being contaminated by mood which, in confirmatory 
factor analyses with both nonclinical and clinical (severe mental illness) samples, has been 
shown to yield two negatively correlated subscales, positive self-esteem (10 positive 
statements about the self, e.g. “I feel good about myself”) and negative-self-esteem (10 
negative statements about the self, e.g. “I feel that others do things much better than I do”). 
Participants rate each statement from 1, ‘never’, to 7, ‘always’.  In this study, α = .94 for 
positive self-esteem and .94 for negative self-esteem. 
 
1 This version of the scale included two additional items based on the work of Wood et al. 
(2012) designed to test whether people high on conspiracy mentality would endorse 
mutually contradictory conspiracy theories: “Princess Diana faked her death so that she 
could retreat into isolation” and “Princess Diana had to be killed because the British 






Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is a 3-item scale which requires an answer to 
mathematical questions, in which the structure of the question implied the wrong answer, 
so that the correct answer requires effortful reflection and ‘cognitive miserliness’ leads to 
wrong answer e.g. “A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost?”. A second version of the scale, the CRT-2 (Thomson & 
Oppenheimer, 2016) included a 4-item scale with a lower degree of mathematical 
complexity, e.g. “A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left?” and we 
combined both measures to make a 7-item scale. Participants typed their answers into a 
textbox. To ensure that the participants answered the questions quickly, only 30 seconds 
from the moment of presentation was allowed for each answer, after which the 
questionnaire automatically moved to the next item. The alpha coefficient for 1,235 who 
completed all 7 items was .71. 
3.5.2 Results 
Zero-order correlations between the study variables are shown in Table 3.3. In this study, 
the correlation between the summed scores on the PaDS-R and our conspiracy measure, the 
GCBS2, was .44, p < .001.  
 
 
2 Replicating Wood et al. (2012), a positive correlation was found between participants’ 
ratings of the plausibility of the two contradictory conspiracy theories, “Princess Diana faked 
her own death so that she could retreat into isolation” and “Princess Diana was killed 
because the British government could not accept that the mother of the future king was 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model fit for paranoia and conspiracy theories 
The model fit indices for the CFA models which included the PaDS-R P and GCBS items 
showed that the two factor model provided acceptable fit (2 (274) = 2169.513, p >.05; 
RMSEA = .067; CFI = .892; TLI = .882, SRMR = .051)  and the one factor model did not (2 
(275) = 5816.359, p >.05; RMSEA = .115; CFI = .685; TLI = .657, SRMR = .120). The BIC was 
also lower for the two-factor model (BIC = 102145.63) compared to the one factor model 
(BIC = 107084.68) and indicates very strong evidence of the superiority of the two factor 
model. The standardised factor loadings for the paranoia and conspiracy mentality latent 
variables were all high, positive and statistically significant ranging from .488 to .842, and 
the correlation between the latent variables was .459. The composite reliability (Raykov, 
1997) for the paranoia (CR = .907) and conspiracy mentality (CR =.947) were high. 
 
Associations between paranoia, CTs and psychological constructs 
Bivariate associations and partial correlations between the belief system variables and 
psychological constructs are shown in the supplementary materials (Table 3.S3).  
 The regression model and Wald tests of whether the predictor variables are 
differentially associated with the two types of belief systems are shown in Table 3.4. In 
general, the patterns of association are similar to those observed in Study 1, but with higher 
significance. Both insecure attachment styles are associated with paranoia and not 
conspiracy theories. Paranoia is strongly associated positively with negative self-esteem 
whereas, for conspiracy theories, the association is trivial.  Only CTs are positively associated 
with positive self-esteem. For the locus of control subscales, both types of belief systems 




for chance is greater for conspiracy theories than for paranoia (the reverse was the case in 
Study 1); only conspiracy theories are associated with low internality scores (in Study 1 
paranoia was associated with low internality).  
Table 3.4.  
Study 2 standardised regression coefficients and tests of equality from multivariate 
regression model predicting paranoia and conspiracy beliefs. 
Note: p<.05* 
 
 Loneliness is equally associated with both belief systems whereas conspiracy 
theories are uniquely associated with miserly analytical thinking as measured by the CRT. 
 
3.5.3 Study 2 Discussion 
Replicating Study 1 and previous studies (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018), paranoia and 
belief in conspiracy theories, although correlated, were best modelled as two separate 
constructs. Also replicating Study 1, paranoia was more closely associated than belief in 
Predictor Variables 
Paranoia 
  (se) 
Conspiracy 
  (se) 
Wald df p 




-.092 (.020) * .040 (.026) 20.571 1 < .001 
Self-esteem Positive -.024 (.025) .145 (.033) * 19.247 1 < .001 
Negative 
 
.461 (.031) * .081 (.039) * 63.389 1 < .001 
Locus of Control Internality  .022 (.025) -.080 (.030) * 9.214 1 .002 
Chance .111 (.032) * .202 (.043) * 4.576 1 .032 
Powerful 
Others 
.116 (.034) * .175 (.045) * 1.636 1 .201 
Loneliness .180 (.026) * .146 (.034) * 0.736 1 .391 
Cognitive 
Reflection Test  
Correct -.025 (.019) -.173 (.024) * 33.788 1 < .001 
       




conspiracies with psychological constructs indicative of interpersonal vulnerability, 
specifically insecure attachment and negative beliefs about the self. Both chance and 
powerful others locus of control were associated with both belief systems, again as in Study 
1; the inconsistent findings of internality (negatively associated with paranoia in Study 1 but 
with conspiracy theories in Study 2) should be interpreted in the context of the small 
magnitude of the effects in both studies. As in Study 1, both paranoia and conspiracy 
theories were associated with loneliness but the effect for paranoia was much less, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that Study 2 employed a sample that was much more representative of 
the general population.  
 The finding that poor performance on the CRT was specifically related to belief in 
conspiracy theories is striking. Previous studies have reported that impaired analytic 
thinking is associated with both belief systems (Bronstein et al., 2019; van Prooijen, 2017) 
but no previous study has considered both belief systems together.  
 Although Study 2 represented a methodological advance on Study 1, particularly in 
terms of the sample, we decided to conduct a third study to address some remaining 
questions. The first concerned a potential methodological limitation affecting both Study 1 
and Study 2. We wondered whether the superiority of a two-factor model over a single 
factor model of paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories could reflect a method effect 
related to item format. Items in both the Conspiracy Mentality Scale employed in Study 1 (“I 
think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never 
informed about”) and Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale employed in Study (“Groups of 
scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public”) 
required participants to indicate their agreement with specific propositions about events in 




often tell me to relax and stop worrying about being deceived or harmed”) less directly 
assessed beliefs and include affective elements. We therefore created a new paranoia scale, 
with exactly the same response format as the GCBS, in which each item was entirely 
propositional. 
 Second, although both Studies 1 and 2 showed a specific association between 
insecure attachment and paranoia, the scale we used to measure attachment, the 
Relationship Questionnaire, was not that used by Green and Douglas (2018) in their study 
showing an effect of attachment insecurity on conspiracy theories; in Study 3 we therefore 
used a brief version of the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR-12; Lafontaine et al., 
2015) employed in their study. 
 Third, we sought to replicate our finding that impaired performance on the CRT is 
specifically associated with belief in conspiracy theories. Finally, given previous findings that 
belief in conspiracy theories is associated with narcissism (Cichocka et al., 2016; de Zavala & 





3.6 Study 3 
3.6.1 Methods 
Participants and procedure  
Participants were recruited by the survey company Qualtrics using the same sampling frame 
employed in Study 2, with participants stratified by sex, age and household income. A total 
of 722 UK residents attempted the survey but, after removal of incomplete surveys or 
surveys completed implausibly quickly (pre-defined following pilot work by the survey 
company as < 15 minutes) the final sample was 638. Of these, 296 were male with a mean 




The data for this study were again drawn from a multipurpose survey and all additional 
measures are listed in the supplementary materials (Table 3.S1). The following measures 
were identical to those used in Study 1: The Multidimensional Locus of Control Scale (alphas 
in this study for internality = .79; chance = .84; powerful others = .86); the Self-Esteem 
Rating Scale (alphas for positive self = .94; negative self = .95). The study also used the 15-
item of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale employed in Study 2 (alpha = .96)3. 
 
The revised Paranoia Scale designed especially for this study was based on the PaDS 
employed in Studies 1 and 2, but items were rewritten so that each contained a specific 
 
3 The two additional items from Study 2 designed to assess contradictory CTs based on the 




proposition formatted similarly to the items of the GCBS, and with an identical response 
format. There were two items for each of the domains identified by Bebbington et al. 
(2013): interpersonal sensitivity (“There is a risk that I will be criticised or rejected in social 
situations”); mistrust (“You should only trust yourself”); ideas of reference (“When I am out 
in public, people sometimes talk about me”) and fear of persecution (“Some people want to 
hurt me deliberately”). Coefficient alpha for the scale was .85. 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Fredrick, 2005) was expanded to include 4-items from 
(Toplak et al., 2014) and 3-items from (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). This version used 
the four-option multiple choice format with choices presented in random order as 
recommended by Sirota and Juanchich (2018); 45 seconds was allowed for each answer, 
after which the questionnaire automatically moved to the next item. The alpha coefficient 
for 597 who completed all 10 items was .70. 
 
A brief version of the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR-12; Lafontaine et al., 
2015) is a 12-item scale used for the assessment of two attachment styles: attachment 
anxiety (e.g. “I worry that others won’t care about me as much as I care about them”) and 
avoidant attachment (e.g. “I feel comfortable depending on others”). Responses are rated 
on 7-point scale, from (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). The alpha coefficient for 





The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-13; Gentile et al., 2013) has 13-items in which 
participants are presented with pairs of attributes in each item and have to choose the one 
they most agree with (e.g. “A- I find it easy to manipulate people. B- I don’t like it when I 
find myself manipulating people”). For scale scoring, item A should be coded as 0 while item 
B should be coded as 1. Then reverse the coding for items number 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12 and 
13. And to get the total score sum the reversed items with items number 2, 5, 8, 9 and 11. 




Zero-order correlations between the study variables are shown in Table 3.5. In this study, 
the correlation between the summed scores on the paranoia and the conspiracy measures, 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model fit for paranoia and conspiracy theories 
The model fit indices for the CFA models which included the Revised Paranoia Scale 
and GCBS items showed that the two factor model provided acceptable fit (2 (229) = 
813.70, p < .001; RMSEA = .063; CFI = .913; TLI = .904, SRMR = .055) whereas the one factor 
model did not (2 (230) = 1656.88, p < .001; RMSEA = .099; CFI = .788; TLI = .767, SRMR = 
.097). The BIC was also lower for the two-factor model (BIC = 38336.09) compared to the 
one factor model (BIC = 39508.56), providing strong evidence of the superiority of the 
former. The standardised factor loadings for the paranoia and conspiracy mentality latent 
variables were all positive and statistically significant ranging from .302 to .837, and the 
correlation between the latent variables was .530. The composite reliability (Raykov, 1997) 
for paranoia (CR = .855) and conspiracy beliefs (CR =.956) were high. 
 
Associations between paranoia, conspiracy theories and psychological constructs 
Bivariate associations and partial correlations between the belief system variables 
and psychological constructs are shown in the supplementary materials (Table 3.S4). The 
regression model and Wald tests of whether the predictor variables are differentially 






Table 3.6.  
Study 3 standardised regression coefficients and tests of equality from multivariate 
regression model predicting paranoia and conspiracy beliefs. 
Note: * p < .05 
 
 The results for self-esteem and locus of control were broadly consistent with the 
previous studies, with negative self-esteem associated with paranoia (with a significantly 
less but nonetheless significant effect for conspiracy theories), positive self-esteem 
associated positively with conspiracy theories but negatively with paranoia, and the chance 
and powerful others locus of control variables associated with both belief systems. 
Importantly, as predicted on the basis of previous research (e.g. Chichoka et al., 2016), 
narcissism was specifically associated with conspiracy theories and, consistent with the 




  (se) 
Conspiracy 









-.024(.048) .048(.048) 0.698 1 .404 
Self-esteem 
Positive -.157(.054) * .130(.052) * 9.841 1 .002 
Negative .379(.045) * .222(.045) * 4.300 1 .038 
Narcissism 




Internality .074(.050) .018(.051) 0.494 1 .482 
Chance  .233(.048) * .321(.045) * 0.893 1 .344 




Correct .089(.051) -.332(.052) * 18.428 1 < .001 
       




 Contrary to prediction there was no association between either of the ECR 
attachment measures and either of the two belief systems. 
 
3.6.3 Study 3 Discussion 
The general picture that emerged from this study is consistent with the findings from 
the two previous studies. A two factor CFA model was the best fit to the data, despite our 
assiduous efforts to eliminate possible method effects. Negative self-esteem had a greater 
association with Paranoia compared with its association with conspiracy theories. The 
observation that conspiracy theories were specifically associated with narcissism is 
consistent with previous studies (Cichocka et al., 2016; de Zavala & Fredrico, 2018), and 
helps to explain the association also observed with positive self-esteem. We discuss this 
finding and also the replicated finding of a specific association between conspiracy theories 
and poor analytical thinking in the general discussion below. The major unexpected finding 
from this study was the lack of association between either belief system or the two 
attachment scales. This is unlikely to be an artefact of our analytic approach as inspection of 
Table 3.S3 in the supplementary materials indicated that all the relevant bivariate 





3.7 General Discussion 
In this paper, we have reported three studies of the relationship between paranoia 
and conspiracy theories, one with a largely student population and two with larger samples 
that were much more representative of the UK population. Many, although not all of the 
results were broadly consistent across the studies.  
 In all three studies we found that paranoia and conspiracist thinking, although 
correlated to a similar extent found in previous studies (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018), were 
separable psychological phenomena. In our confirmatory factor analyses, models with two 
correlated factors were consistently far better fits to the data than single factor models. This 
finding was upheld despite the fact that, across the three studies, we employed two 
separate measures of conspiracist thinking (the Bruder et al., 2013 Conspiracy Mentality 
Questionnaire and Brotherton et al’s., 2013 Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale) and two 
measures of paranoia (a version of Melo et al’s., 2009 Persecution and Deservedness Scale 
and a revised version of the scale designed especially for this research) and despite the fact 





Summary of associations between paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories and 
psychological constructs in Studies 1 – 3. Upper row for each construct shows direction of 
association (positive, negative, or not significant) and lower row shows whether a significant 
difference between paranoia and conspiracies. Note that this table does not show the 
magnitude of the effects. 






  Paranoia CTs Paranoia CTs Paranoia CTs 
Attachment Anxious + + + ns ns ns 
  P>C P>C No difference 
 Avoidant + + + ns ns ns 
  No difference P>C No difference 
Self-esteem  Positive - ns ns + - + 
  C>P C>P C>P 
 Negative + ns + ns + + 
  P>C P>C P>C 
Narcissism      ns + 
    C>P 
Locus of 
control 
Internality - ns ns - ns ns 
  No difference P>C No difference 
 Chance + + + + + + 
  P>C C>P No difference 
 Powerful 
others 
+ + + + + + 
  No difference No difference No difference 
Cognitive reflection (errors)   ns + ns + 
    C>P C>P 
Loneliness + + + +  
  P>C No difference  
 
 The findings on the relationships between the two types of belief and our 
psychological constructs are summarised in Table 3.4, and as would be expected for distinct 
but correlated phenomena, these point to both common and specific factors. The most 
striking common factor is that both are associated with an external locus of control and, 




others. These findings are broadly consistent with the results from previous studies of 
paranoia (e.g., Kaney & Bentall, 1989) and conspiracy theories (e.g., van Prooijen & Acker, 
2015) and can be understood in the context of research that has shown that experiences of 
low control lead to belief system justification and more extreme attitudes (Kay et al., 2008; 
Kay & Eibach, 2013).  
 Both belief systems were also associated with loneliness although, in one study 
(Study 1, with the least representative sample), this effect was greater for paranoia. Despite 
some inconsistencies, the remaining findings support our hypothesis, and that of previous 
researchers (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018), that paranoia is specifically associated with 
interpersonal vulnerability. This is particularly evident in the self-esteem data, for which, 
across all three studies, paranoia is associated with high negative self-esteem and low 
positive self-esteem and, less consistently, in the attachment data.  
 Our findings for paranoia and negative self-esteem are consistent with a large 
number of previous studies that have employed nonclinical and clinical samples (Tiernan et 
al., 2014). By contrast, in the two studies reported here that included the most 
representative samples, we observed positive associations between positive self-esteem 
and belief in conspiracy theories and, in the final study, also a positive association between 
conspiracy theories and narcissism.  Reviewing previous studies of conspiracy theories and 
self-esteem, Cichocka et al., (2016) noted that findings had been inconsistent, leading them 
to propose that conspiracy theories are associated with an excessive sense of self-worth 
linked to narcissism; in three studies they observed the predicted association between 
narcissism and conspiracy theories, which we replicated in our Study 3, but they also found 
that self-esteem alone was not associated with conspiracist thinking. An important 




negative self-esteem whereas previous studies, including those by Cichocka et al., (2016) 
used unidimensional scales. Our choice partly reflected our clinical background in which the 
distinction is meaningful in the context of psychopathological states; although historically it 
has been contested (Marsh, 1996) the distinction has been supported in factor analytic 
investigations of both the Core Self-Schema Scale used in Study 1 (Fowler et al., 2006) and 
the Self-Esteem Rating Scale (Lecomte et al., 2006) used in Studies 2 and 3. Overall, our 
findings are therefore consistent with Cichocka et al’s., (2016) hypothesis that conspiracy 
theories are associated with an inflated sense of self-worth. 
 Previous research has repeatedly reported robust associations between insecure 
(especially anxious) attachment and paranoia in both healthy and clinical (psychosis) 
samples (e.g. Pickering et al., 2008; Wickham et al., 2015); a recent systematic review found 
that 11/12 clinical studies observed this effect (Lavin et al., 2019). Two studies have 
reported a similar association with conspiracy theories (Freeman & Bentall, 2017; Green & 
Douglas, 2018). In two of the present studies, including Study 2 which had the largest and 
most representative sample, anxious attachment was more highly associated with paranoia 
than conspiracy theories and, in one, the avoidant style was also more highly associated 
with paranoia. This picture is complicated by the results of Study 3, which used Lafontaine 
et al.’s, (2015) short version of the Experience of Close Relations Scale rather than 
Bartholomew and Horowitz’s (1991) Relationship Scale employed in Studies 1 and 2, and in 
which no association was observed between either anxious or avoidant attachment and 
either paranoia or conspiracy theories. It is unlikely that the change of scale can explain 
these null results, as the two previous studies that have reported associations between 
attachment and conspiracy theories used an earlier variant of the RQ (Freeman & Bentall, 




have no explanation for the null results for attachment in Study 3. However, on balance, 
both in the existing literature and the studies reported here, insecure attachment, especially 
of the anxious variety, seems more clearly associated with paranoia than with conspiracist 
thinking. 
 Finally, we included versions of the Fredrick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test in two 
of our studies and, against expectation, in both found evidence that poor performance was 
associated with conspiracy theories but not paranoia. This observation is striking given that 
clinical paranoia is associated with poor performance on cognitive tests related to executive 
function (Bentall et al., 2009), and that poor analytic reasoning strongly predicts the 
‘jumping-to-conclusions’ data gathering bias (Ross et al., 2016) which has been widely 
replicated in deluded patients (Dudley et al., 2016). A possible explanation is that paranoid 
beliefs are typically idiosyncratic whereas other kinds of strong beliefs, including conspiracy 
theories, are typically shared and transmitted socially (Bentall, 2018). It has been argued 
that one feature of conspiracy theories is that they can usually be rejected by reflection and 
simple thought experiment (Aaranovitch, 2009); for example, faking the Moon landing 
would require 46,000 NASA employees to repeat the same lie for decades, something 
which, arguably, would be more difficult to engineer than actually going to the Moon. One 
function of analytic thinking is the detection of implausible or pseudo-profound ideas 
(Pennycook et al., 2015) and fake news (Bronstein et al., 2019), a skill that is possibly less 
likely to impact on the evaluation of self-generated beliefs than on the evaluation of 
theories transmitted from others.  
We acknowledge some limitations of the studies reported here. Although the 
reliability coefficient of most of the scales in this study were good, the locus of control 




general population. Although Studies 2 and 3 were much more representative of the British 
population (and larger than any previous studies addressing the relationship between the 
two belief systems), and although the correlations we observed in our data were similar to 
those observed in studies in North America and continental Europe, generalizability to other 
countries and cultures should not be assumed. Indeed, it seems very likely that both belief 
systems will vary with personal, economic and historical circumstances. In the case of 
paranoia, there is considerable evidence that early life adversity plays an important role 
(Bentall et al., 2015).  The observation that belief in conspiracy theories can be reinforced by 
loss of control experiences (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015) suggests a mechanism by which 
economic threats can lead to conspiracist thinking. Finally, it is important to note that all 
three studies were cross sectional. 
 
Figure 3.1. 
Conceptual diagram showing relationship between paranoia and conspiracy mentality in 





A heuristic model that synthesizes the findings from the studies is shown in Figure 
3.1. It should be noted that this model is structural, identifying common and specific 
psychological features of paranoia and conspiracy theories, and we make no strong claims 
about the causal role of the psychological processes identified. However, some findings 
relevant to this issue have been reported in previous studies. For example, it has been 
shown that changes in negative self-esteem predict changes in paranoia in the short 
(Thewissen et al., 2008) and long-term (Fowler et al., 2012) and that priming uncertainty 
exacerbates belief in conspiracy theories in the short term (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). 
Further experimental and longitudinal studies are required to explore the role of common 





Chapter 4: Atheism Is Not the Absence of Religion: Development of 
the Monotheist and Atheist Belief Scales and Associations with 
Death Anxiety and Analytic Thinking 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Many previous studies have assumed that atheism is the absence of religious belief 
or lies at one end of a spectrum of religiosity. In the philosophical literature, however, 
atheism is a positive belief system. This paper describes two online studies that tested 
whether atheism and religion are separate, negatively correlated belief systems. In study 1 
(N = 488, 206 male, M = 31.7 years, a convenience sample recruited via Twitter), we 
designed a scale (the Monotheist and Atheist Beliefs Scale [MABS]) to measure religious and 
atheistic beliefs and used exploratory factor analysis to identify its structure. In study 2 (N = 
638, UK population, representative sample, 296 male, M = 45.0 years, recruited by the 
survey company Qualtrics), we tested the structure of the MABS with confirmatory factor 
analysis and studied its associations with analytic thinking (using the Cognitive Reflection 
Test [CRT]) and death anxiety in analyses in which religiosity was treated as unidimensional 
and in which religiosity and atheism were treated as separate. Data from both studies 
supported a two-factor model. In contrast to previous studies showing that atheists are 
superior at analytic thinking, we found that the CRT scores were negatively associated with 
religious belief but had no relationship with atheistic belief. In contrast to previous studies 
showing a curvilinear relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, we observed that 
death anxiety was linearly associated with religious belief but was not associated with 







Despite the commercial success of a number of popular books advocating atheism, 
for example by the British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins (2006) and the American 
philosopher Sam Harris (2004), psychological research on the topic is sparse. A 2014 survey 
of the scholarly literature found only 100 papers on the psychology of atheism published 
across the disciplines of psychology, sociology, religious studies and political science 
between 2001 and 2012, of which only 42 were empirical (Brewster et al., 2014). A search of 
Google Scholar from 2015 through the end of 2019 using the search term ‘psychology of 
atheism’ produced 95 hits, but, of them, only 15 were empirical studies. For example, 
Bradley and colleagues investigated American atheists’ justifications for their beliefs, finding 
that many justifications were nonintellectual. Some atheists reported bad personal 
experiences with religion, finding the idea that there is no God emotionally satisfying or 
believing that religions had a damaging impact on society (Bradley et al., 2018). The authors 
also found that a substantial subgroup of atheists had a clear conception of a relational God 
towards which they felt negative emotions, such as anger (Bradley et al., 2017).  
In an investigation of the cognitive factors that may predispose one to atheism, 
Pennycook and colleagues (2016) reported a meta-analysis of 35 studies examining the 
relationship between religious beliefs and analytic thinking (usually defined in terms of the 
subjects’ performance on some variant of Frederick’s (2005) cognitive reflection task) and 
concluded that ‘atheists and agnostics are more reflective than religious believers’. Other 
psychological constructs appear to have more complex relationships with atheistic beliefs. 




anxiety and religious belief, with some evidence of an inverted U relationship when 
religiosity was considered as existing on a continuum with atheism so that people very high 
or low on religious belief show low levels of anxiety (Jong et al., 2018). This finding has been 
interpreted as being consistent with studies showing that belief in supernatural agents is 
associated with low levels of death anxiety in people who identify as religious but with high 
levels of death anxiety in those who identify as atheist (Jong et al., 2013).  
An important conceptual issue that has clouded interpretation of the limited studies 
in the field is the treatment of atheism as a category defined in opposition to religious 
belief. Indeed, in much of the relevant literature, atheism is described as ‘nonbelief’ or at 
least as being at the opposite end of a spectrum from religion, with agnosticism between 
the two extremes. This approach fails to recognise that atheism can be positive belief 
system as is evident in both the philosophical literature (e.g., Gray, 2018) and in the forceful 
arguments of atheism’s modern advocates, such as Dawkins and Harris. This failure to 
acknowledge that both atheistic beliefs and religious beliefs may be held more or less 
strongly—so that, for example, it is possible to be neither religious nor an atheist or to hold 
some nuanced combination of the two types of belief—makes the interpretation of 
empirical studies of atheism problematic. For example, in Pennycook et al.’s (2016) meta-
analysis, every study defined atheism either as a category in opposition to religion or in 
terms of low scores on a religiosity measure. It is therefore not possible to determine 
whether higher levels of analytic thinking are associated with the absence of religious belief 
or a positive set of atheistic beliefs or both, making the conclusion that ‘atheists … are more 
reflective than religious believers’ (Pennycook et al., 2016) uncertain or at least a possible 
oversimplification. Arguably, the same issue characterises studies that use nonreligious 




religiosity. For example, a sizeable body of research literature apparently supports the claim 
that religious belief is negatively associated with intelligence (Zuckerman et al., 2013) 
and/or that intelligence is positively associated with atheism (Lynn et al., 2009), but, in the 
absence of appropriate independent measures of religious and atheistic belief, it is 
impossible to tell which of these propositions is correct. 
 
Purposes of the present studies 
The present studies aimed to test the hypothesis that atheism is a positive belief 
system independent of religion and to develop a suitable questionnaire instrument (the 
Monotheist and Atheist Beliefs Scale [MABS]) that will be useful to researchers in the field. 
In two studies, we used exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to compare 
models in which atheistic and religious beliefs were considered as belonging to a single 
dimension as well as models in which they were considered independent but negatively 
correlated constructs, predicting that the latter would better fit the data. In the second 
study, we also studied independent associations between the two belief systems and 
analytic thinking and death anxiety to explore whether there are specific associations with 
each belief system and to contrast the findings with those obtained when treating belief as 






4.3 Study 1 
4.3.1 Method 
In study 1, we piloted items for a scale designed to measure religious and atheistic 
beliefs and used exploratory factor analysis to identify the structure of the scale. We 
hypothesised that religious (monotheistic) beliefs and atheistic beliefs would form 
negatively correlated but separate factors. 
 
Participants 
The participants were recruited via a series of tweets from the senior author’s 
Twitter account (20k+ followers) and were not intended to be representative of the UK 
population. They were told that the purpose of the survey was to pilot a questionnaire 
about religious and atheistic beliefs and were invited to follow a link to an online survey 
hosted by the survey company Qualtrics and to provide feedback via Twitter if they chose. 
Of the respondents, 206 were male and 282 female (total N = 488); their (M = 31.7 years, SD 
= 12.20; min = 20; max = 82), and 80.8% had received a university education. When asked 
about their religious identity (‘Religious conviction: How would you classify your religious 
belief now?’ with answers chosen from a drop-down menu), 90 (18.4%) identified as 
Christian, 4 (0.8%) as Muslim, 2 (0.4%) as Jewish, 6 (1.2%) as Buddhist, 32 (6.5%) as other 
religion, 87 (17.8%) as agnostic and 267 (54.5%) as atheist. Ethical approval was obtained 








Monotheist and Atheist Beliefs Scale 
We focused on beliefs, defined as propositions about the world (Bentall, 2018). 
Hence, we excluded items that concerned practice (e.g., religious worship) or identity (e.g., 
the sense of belonging to a religion or to a society of atheists) or that had an explicit 
affective content. Twelve items reflecting religious beliefs were created, some by adapting 
items from the Duke University Religion Index (Koenig & Büssing, 2010) and Huber and 
Huber’s (2012) Centrality of Religiosity Scale (see Table 4.1). These included, for example, 
‘God has revealed his plan to us in holy books’ and ‘Sometimes, it is possible for human 
beings to feel the presence of God’. Given the extraordinary variety of religious beliefs 
worldwide, it was not possible to sample beliefs relating to all religious belief systems, so all 
the items were designed with the monotheistic and, especially, Abrahamic religions in mind. 
Eight atheism items were constructed to match the monotheistic belief items in form, 
informed by the relevant literature on atheism, including Dawkins (2006), Harris (2004) and 
Gray (2018). The items covered a broad range of beliefs associated with atheism, including 
negative beliefs about religion (e.g., ‘Praying to God is a waste of time’ and ‘Moral 
judgement should be based on respect for humanity rather than religious doctrine’), as well 
as those endorsing a nonreligious ontology (e.g., ‘There is nothing in the universe that 
cannot be explained by scientific laws’) and human progress (e.g., ‘Despite wars and crises, 
history reveals that human progress is inevitable over the long term’). The full item set is 







Monotheism scale’s adapted items and the original items from both the Duke University Religiosity 
Scale and Centrality of Religiosity Scale. 




In my life, I experience the presence of the 
Divine (i.e., God) 
Sometimes it is possible for human 
beings to feel the presence of God. 
My religious beliefs are what really lie 
behind my whole approach to life 
God is aware of everything we do. 
Centrality of 
Religiosity Scale 
How often do you pray? 
 
God hears the prayers of human beings. 
How often do you experience situations in 
which you have the feeling that God or 
something divine intervenes in your life? 
God or something divine sometimes 
interferes in the affairs of human 
beings. 
To what extend do you believe in an 
afterlife—e.g. immortality of the soul, 
resurrection of the dead or reincarnation? 
There is an afterlife (immortality of the 
soul, resurrection of the dead or 
reincarnation). 
How often do you experience situations in 
which you have the feeling that God, 
deities, or something divine wants to 
communicate or to reveal something to 
you? 
God sometimes reveals his will directly 
to human beings. 
In your opinion, how probable is it that a 
higher power really exists? 
A higher power really exists. 
How often do you pray spontaneously 
when inspired by daily situations? 
 





Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on SPSS version 25 using oblimin rotation 
(because the religious belief and atheistic scales were expected to be negatively correlated). 
As recommended by Reise and colleagues (2000), we used maximum likelihood to extract 
the factors. The scale scores were compared across self-defined groups in terms of religious 






Exploratory factor analysis 
The factor extraction revealed two factors with eigenvalues of greater than 1 (the 
Kaiser criterion), with the first factor (eigenvalue = 11.01) accounting for 52.67% of the 
variance and the second factor (eigenvalue = 1.63) accounting for a further 4.61%. A third 
factor had an eigenvalue of exactly 1 but, after inspection of the scree plot, we selected a 
two-factor solution. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) recommend reporting the pattern matrix 
when interpreting factors because it represents the unique contribution of the factors to the 
variance explained by the indicators, controlling for other factors in the model; this is shown 
in Table 4.2. Nearly all the items had high loadings on either the first factor (religious beliefs) 
or the second factor (atheistic beliefs). Many had lower negative loadings on the other 
factor although some of the atheism items are exceptions, notably items 4, ‘The idea of God 
is a delusion’, and 14, ‘Praying to God is a waste of time’. One item, 11, ‘Despite wars and 
crises, history reveals that human progress is inevitable over the long term’ (chosen in the 
light of Gray’s account of atheism and, on reflection, not explicitly endorsing either a 
religious or atheistic worldview) had low loadings on both factors. The factor scores were 
negatively correlated: r = - .50. When the religious belief and atheism scales were used to 
generate simple subscales, their α = .96 for religious beliefs (arguably suggesting some 
redundancy between the items) and α = .79 for atheistic beliefs, and the negative 






Pattern matrix from study 1 for a two-factor solution of religiosity and atheism items (extraction method: 
maximum likelihood; rotation: oblimin). 
 Factor loading 
1 2 
Factor 1: Religion (monotheism)   
1. The soul is immortal. .918 .160 
2. A higher power really exists. .951 .095 
5. God has revealed his plan to us in holy books. .675 -.200 
6. We can communicate directly to God by praying. .864 -.113 
7. Sometimes, it is possible for human beings to feel the presence of God. .538 -.329 
8. God or a divine power exists. .942 .034 
13. God or something divine sometimes interferes in the affairs of human 
beings. 
.763 -.129 
15. God sometimes reveals his will directly to human beings. .804 -.140 
16. There is an afterlife (immortality of the soul, resurrection of the dead or 
reincarnation). 
.945 .136 
18. God is aware of everything we do. .904 -.018 
19. God hears the prayers of human beings. .912 -.043 
20. Our fate in the life hereafter is determined by our deeds on Earth. .670 .045 
Factor 2: Atheism   
3. Religious beliefs will ultimately be replaced by scientific theories. -.097 .504 
4. The idea of God is a delusion. -.408 .395 
9. Belief in gods has been the source of great misery to humankind. -.055 .533 
10. Moral judgement should be based on respect for humanity rather than 
religious doctrine. 
-.335 .385 
11. Despite wars and crises, history reveals that human progress is inevitable 
over the long term. 
.075 .266 
12. There is nothing in the universe that cannot be explained by scientific laws. -.314 .373 
14. Praying to God is a waste of time. -.456 .426 





Comparisons by religious identity 
To validate the scores, we used one-way ANCOVA with religious identity (religious, 
agnostic, atheist; non-monotheistic religious identity and ‘other religious conviction’ 
excluded) and sex as fixed factors and age as a covariate. There was a significant difference 
for religious belief (F[2,442] = 534.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .71). Planned contrasts revealed that all 
three groups differed significantly from one another (p < .001 for each contrast), with the 
scores for agnostics falling between those of monotheists and atheists. There was no effect 
for age but a marginal affect for sex (F[1,442] = 3.87, p < .05, ηp2 = .009), with females 
scoring slightly higher than males. For atheism, a main effect for religious identity was also 
found (F[2,442] = 136.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .738), and agnostics again fell between monotheists 
and atheists (both contrasts p < .001), but there was no effect for age or sex. 
 
 
4.3.3 Study 1 Discussion 
As expected, two factors emerged. Also as expected, these were negatively 
correlated, which was perhaps inevitable given that some of the atheism items expressed 
hostility to religious ideas (e.g., ‘It is wrong to indoctrinate children into a religion’). The 
total scores clearly discriminated between self-identified monotheists, agnostics and 
atheists, with agnostics falling midway between monotheists and atheists. On the whole, 
the items loaded strongly on one factor although the atheism items also tended to load 
negatively on the religious factor, which is perhaps not surprising given that a negative 
attitude towards religion is an important element of atheism. One item (11) loaded poorly 




over the long term’. This item was included in light of Gray’s (2018) account of humanist 
varieties of atheism, but in retrospect, given its lack of explicit religious or atheistic content, 
its poor performance is not surprising. 
Given these promising but not conclusive findings, and this was a pilot investigation, 
and the sample was clearly not representative of the UK population, especially in terms of 
education and religious identity (in the 2011 census of England and Wales, 59% of the 
population identified as Christian, 5.0% as Muslim and 24.0% as having no religion [Office 
for National Statistics, 2013]).  it was decided to assess a slightly modified version of the 
MABS on a sample that was much more representative of the UK population. We also 
explored associations between religious and atheistic beliefs and two psychological 
constructs previously associated with them in studies in which atheism was treated as the 
absence of religious belief: death anxiety and analytic thinking. To explore the implications 
of relinquishing this assumption, we carried out analyses in which the two belief systems 
were treated as separate but negatively correlated as well as analyses in which we scored 
the participants on a unidimensional religious versus atheistic beliefs scale. 
4.4 Study 2 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants 
The participants were recruited by Qualtrics and were stratified by sex, age and 
household income to be approximately representative of the UK population. A total of 722 
UK residents attempted the survey, but the final sample was 638 after the removal of 
incomplete surveys and those completed implausibly quickly (pre-defined following pilot 
work by the survey company as < 15 minutes). Two hundred and ninety-six participants 




(M = 43.77 years, SD = 16.16). Five hundred and fifty-four (86.8%) identified as white British, 
with the rest belonging to a range of ethnic minority groups, and 245 (38.4%) had received a 
university education. Responses to the question about self-reported religious identity (using 
the same method as in study 1) yielded 325 (50.9%) Christian, 16 (2.5%) Muslim, 10 (1.6%) 
Jewish, 8 (1.3%) Hindu, 5 (0.8%) Buddhist, 4 (0.6%) Sikh, 46 (7.2%) other religions, 69 
(10.8%) agnostic and 155 (24.3%) atheist. This represents a percentage of Christians lower 
than that recorded in the 2011 census (Office of National Statistics, 2013) although not 
dramatically so, probably because the question was asked differently in this survey than in 




Monotheism and Atheism Beliefs Scale 
An 18-item scale was derived from the scale used in study 1 by excluding two items: 
‘God or a divine power exists’ (because it repeated another item (A higher power really 
exists.)) and ‘Despite wars and crises, history reveals that human progress is inevitable over 
the long term’ (because the factor loadings in study 1 were small on both factors). 
Responses were made on a 5-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree. The 
alpha coefficient was .96 for the monotheism subscale and .83 for atheism. 
 
The Death Anxiety Inventory 
The Death Anxiety Inventory (Tomás-Sábado et al., 2005) is a 17-item scale with four 
subscales (Externally Generated Death Anxiety, Death Acceptance, Death Finality and 
Thoughts about Death). Responses are rated on 5-point scales (‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally 




for Externally Generated Death Anxiety, .88 for Death Acceptance, .89 for Death Finality and 
.83 for Thoughts about Death. Given the high intercorrelations between the subscales (r = 
.67 – .89), we used the total scale score. 
 
The Cognitive Reflection Test 
The three-item CRT (Fredrick, 2005) was designed to assess the ability to reflect 
before answering questions designed to hint at a wrong answer (i.e., “A bat and a ball cost 
£1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” and “If 
you’re running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in?”). We 
expanded the scale to include an additional four items from Toplak and colleagues (2014) 
and three from Thompson and Oppenheimer (2016), presented in a four-option multiple 
choice format as recommended by Sirota and Juanchich (2018). The items were presented 
in random order, and 45 seconds were allowed for each answer, after which the 
questionnaire automatically moved to the next item. The alpha coefficient for the 597 
participants who completed all 10 items was (α =.70). Forty-one participants failed to 
complete all the test items. 
Analysis plan 
 
First, CFAs were conducted to compare two models: (1) a model in which all 
religiosity and atheism items loaded on a single religiosity/atheism factor and (2) a model in 
which religiosity and atheism were separate but correlated latent variables. Confirmatory 
factor models were conducted in Mplus 7.0 (Muthen & Muthen, 2013) with robust 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLR) (Yuan & Bentler, 2000). The following 
recommendations (Hu & Bentler, 1998, 1999) were followed to assess model fit: 




Index (TLI) (Tucker & Lewis, 1973) values above .95 reflected an excellent fit while values for 
those two indices above .90 reflected an acceptable fit; a root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) (Steiger, 1990) with 90% confidence intervals having values of .06 
or less reflected an excellent fit while values of less than .08 reflected an acceptable fit. The 
standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) (Chen, 2007) was also used, with values of 
.06 or less indicating an excellent fit and values of less than .08 indicating an acceptable fit. 
The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) was used to evaluate and compare 
the models, with the smallest value indicating the best fitting model. In relation to the BIC, 
Raftery (1996) suggests that a 2–6 point difference offers evidence of model superiority, a 
6–10 point difference indicates strong evidence of model superiority and a difference of 
greater than 10 points indicates very strong evidence of model superiority. Second, we 
calculated the total scores for both the religious belief and atheistic belief items as well as 
for a unidimensional scale in which atheism was assumed to be the opposite of religion; the 
latter scale was constructed by reverse-scoring the atheism items. We then used regression 
to fit the linear and quadratic relationships between the three scales—religious belief, 
atheistic belief and the unidimensional scale—and the two psychological constructs of 
interest (analytic thinking and death anxiety). In previous studies in which religious and 
atheistic beliefs were considered in a unidimensional framework, atheism has been 
associated with high scores on analytic thinking (Pennycook et al., 2016), and a curvilinear 
relationship has been reported between religiosity and death anxiety (Jong et al., 2018). In 
six analyses comparing the two models for each type of belief measure (independent 
variable: unidimensional, religious belief or atheistic belief) and each type of psychological 
construct (dependent variable: death anxiety or analytic thinking), we considered the 




models are more parsimonious than quadratic models, we assumed that they were 
preferable unless there was strong evidence of a better fit for the quadratic model. Finally, 
we used analysis of covariance to examine the relationship between religious identity 
(defined as in study 1) and our religious belief and atheistic belief scales as well as with 




Several features are worth noting in the scattergram showing the relationship 
between religious belief scores and atheistic belief scores (Figure 4.1). First, the majority of 
the participants fell in a band ranging from high religious belief to high atheistic belief, 
marked by the regression line. Second, very few participants had low scores on both scales. 
Third, there seems to be a group of individuals who defy the negative association between 






Scattergram showing the relationship between religious belief and atheistic belief scores in 
study 2. 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis 
The model fit indices for the CFA models show that the two-factor model provided 
an acceptable fit while the fit statistics for the one-factor model indicated a poor fit (Table 
4.3). The two-factor model’s lower BIC compared to the one-factor model also provides 
strong evidence of the superiority of the former. The standardised factor loadings for the 
religiosity and atheism latent variables were all positive and statistically significant, ranging 
from .545 to .941, and the correlation between the latent variables was -.459, p < .001. The 







 Religiosity and Atheism fit indices for a one-factor model and for correlated a two-factor 
model, Study 2. 
Model  𝒙𝟐(𝒅𝒇)𝒑 RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR BIC 
1 FACTOR MODEL 1187.415 (135) < .001 .111 .812 .787 .105 31132.337 
2 FACTOR MODEL 612.696 (134) < .001 .072 .915 .903 .062 30286.859 
 
 
Linear and quadratic associations between belief scales and psychological constructs 
Although our CFA clearly supported the superiority of a two-scale model (religious 
and atheistic belief) over a single, unidimensional model, a unidimensional scale based on 
totalling the item scores had an acceptable reliability (α = .94). This was to be expected 
given the correlation between the scales (r = - .46, p < .001) and considering that alpha 






 Regression models for linear and quadratic relationships between predictor measures of 
belief (unidimensional religious belief scale, religious belief scale and atheist belief scale) and 
death anxiety and analytic thinking (CRT scores), from Study 2. Lower BIC scores indicate 
better model fit, and a BIC difference of 10 is interpreted as strong evidence of model 
superiority (Raftery, 1996). 
 
 B linear (se) B quad (se) R-squared BIC 
 Analytic thinking (CRT scores)   
Unidimensional religious 
belief scale 
   
Linear  -0.042 (.006)**  .082** 2686.963 
Linear and quadratic -0.036 (.006)** 0.001 (.000)** .112** 2674.096 
Religious beliefs (total)     
Linear  -0.057 (.008) **  .091** 2681.690 
Linear and quadratic -0.054 (.007)** 0.002 (.001)** .110** 2675.474 
Atheist Belief (total)     
Linear  0.058 (.016)**  .022 2725.337 
Linear and quadratic 0.058 (.016)** 0.003 (.002) .025 2729.676 
     
 Death Anxiety   
Unidimensional religious 
belief scale 
    
Linear  0.337 (.039)**  .118** 5268.982 
Linear and quadratic 0.273 (.037)** -0.014 (.002)** .188** 5222.423 
Religious beliefs (total)     
Linear  0.540 (.050)**  .181** 5221.670 
Linear and quadratic 0.529 (.052)** -0.008 (.004) .187** 5223.393 
Atheist Belief (total)     
Linear  -0.103 (.122)  .002 5347.917 
Linear and quadratic -0.102 (.121) -0.040 (.017)* .014 5346.485 
 * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows the associations between the three types of scale score (religious 
belief, atheistic belief and the unidimensional scale) and death anxiety and analytic thinking 
(CRT). When the CRT was regressed on the unidimensional scale, the BIC offered strong 
evidence of the superiority of the quadratic model and a corresponding increase in the 




quadratic model when the CRT scores were regressed on religious beliefs, however, and, in 
the case of atheistic beliefs, the linear model had a superior BIC score, but neither model 
predicted a significant amount of the variance in analytic reasoning. Hence, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the relationship between unidimensional religiosity and analytic reasoning 
is curvilinear, but, when the two belief systems are considered separately, there is a 
significant, negative and linear association with religious belief but no association with 
atheistic belief. When death anxiety was regressed on the unidimensional belief scale, the 
BIC difference and the increase in variance that was accounted for offered strong evidence 
that the quadratic model was superior. When the two belief systems were considered 
separately, however, a different picture emerged. In the case of religious belief, the 
quadratic model was not superior to the linear model, and there was a positive association 
with death anxiety, but, in the case of atheistic beliefs, neither model accounted for a 
significant amount of the variance. 
 
Comparisons by religious identity 
Religious identity was defined as in study 1, and the total scores for the three 
identity groups are shown in Figure 4.2. Three-factor ANCOVA on the religious belief scores 
(religious identity, sex and university educated vs. not) with age as a covariate revealed a 
main effect for religious identity (F[2,561] = 195.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .41). All three groups 
differed significantly from one another (p < .001 for each comparison) (Figure 4.2). The 
effect for graduate status was not significant, but there was a significant effect for age 
(F[1,561] = 25.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .04), reflecting the tendency of older people to be less 




A similar analysis of the atheistic belief scores revealed a significant main effect for 
religious identity (F[2.561] = 71.66. p < .001, ηp2 = .20), with all three groups differing 
significantly from one another (p < .001) (also see Figure 2). There were also main effects for 
sex (F[1,561] = 10.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .02), which accounted for higher mean scores in males 
than females, and for university education (F[1,561] = 5.70, p < .02, ηp2 = .01), which 
accounted for higher scores among graduates, but there was no association between 
atheistic beliefs and age. 
 
Figure 4.2 







4.5 General Discussion 
This paper examines the utility of considering religious and atheistic beliefs as 
separate, albeit negatively correlated belief systems and introduces a new questionnaire 
measure that discriminates between the two, which may be useful to researchers. Some of 
the findings, particularly those in which the scores on the two measures were compared 
according to religious identity, may be considered to support a unidimensional account, 
with agnostics scoring midway on both scales. These differences support the validity of our 
measure, but, interestingly, inspecting the scattergram from study 2 (Figure 4.1) reveals a 
more nuanced picture. The absence of people with low religious and atheistic beliefs—those 
who, in the literature, have been referred to as ‘apathists’ (Rauch, 2003)—is striking. Of 
equal interest, substantial numbers scored highly on both religious and atheistic beliefs, a 
possibility that would not have been revealed by the use of a simple, unidimensional scale. 
It is possible that some of these responses were the consequence of inattentive responding; 
future studies might include attention checks to eliminate this possibility. In future research, 
these individuals merit special investigation. If, as some researchers have argued, atheism 
arises from the suppression of a natural human tendency to attribute intentionality to 
events (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), then it is possible that these individuals are 
particularly taxed by the struggle, which may have implications for their psychological 
health. Alternatively, it is possible that they possess the considerable intellectual complexity 
required to accommodate both belief systems. 
The data on death anxiety also point to the usefulness of treating religious and 
atheistic beliefs separately. A unidimensional measure revealed a curvilinear relationship, 




previous studies (Jong et al., 2018), but the analyses in which the two belief systems were 
treated separately suggest that this may be a misleading picture created by the 
superposition of both belief systems in a single scale. When treated separately, death 
anxiety was positively and linearly associated with religious belief, but there was no 
association with atheistic beliefs. 
The positive association with religious belief is not hard to understand and is 
supported by studies finding that priming death anxiety increases the strength of religious 
belief in those who are already religious (Willer, 2009), but the lack of association with 
atheism observed in this study merits consideration in further research. The literature on 
terror management theory suggests that anxiety about death leads to system justification, 
that is, a stronger belief in whatever system of understanding seems to give meaning to the 
self and the world (Solomon et al., 2015). Hence, it might be expected that, despite the lack 
of association seen in this study, provoking anxiety about death will lead to increased 
atheism in those who, for other reasons, are inclined to atheistic beliefs. At least one study 
has shown this effect, although only for explicit atheistic beliefs, whereas, for implicit beliefs 
(measured as associations between supernatural concepts and the concepts real or 
imaginary), all the participants showed more evidence of belief in supernatural entities 
(Jong et al., 2012). The relationship between analytic thinking and belief again points to the 
utility of considering the two belief systems separately. When considered independently, 
religious belief was negatively associated with analytic thinking as reported in previous 
studies (Pennycook et al., 2016). However, when the belief systems are considered 
separately, religious belief is again negatively associated with analytic thinking whereas 
atheistic beliefs bear no relationship at all with analytic thinking. Together with the previous 




which active suppression is required to relinquish religious belief (Norenzayan & Gervais, 
2013) but separate factors (perhaps cultural or intellectual) are required to develop an 
active atheistic belief system.  
 Some limitations of these studies are important. Study 1 was highly unrepresentative 
of the UK general population although study 2 was not. Given the importance of cultural 
factors in the development of belief systems, generalisation to other places and nations 
cannot be assured, and it would be useful to replicate these studies in a cross-cultural 
context. Our religiosity scale is focused on monotheistic belief systems, so it is possible that 
our findings will not generalise to, for example, Hindu societies. Nonetheless, it will be 
important in future studies to evaluate our scales in societies in which Christian beliefs and 
practices are more prevalent than in the UK (e.g., the United States, the Republic of Ireland, 
or Poland) and to establish whether the same factor structure can be replicated in 
predominantly Muslim countries. Finally, as already noted, the studies were cross sectional; 
therefore, causal relationships between death anxiety and analytic thinking and religious 
and atheistic beliefs cannot be assumed on the basis of these data alone. A major strength 
of the research is that it has yielded useful measures that can be employed in future studies 











Many types of beliefs are held tenaciously, often with great emotional investment, 
and are resistant to counter-argument. These master explanatory systems include paranoid 
belief systems, belief in conspiracy theories, religious beliefs, political ideologies, and 
paranormal beliefs. Here we explore the relationships between these belief systems and 
whether associations between them could be explained by a common latent strong belief 
factor, S, which we hypothesize is influenced by death anxiety and poor analytic reasoning. 
Two online studies collected data on paranoid, conspiracy, religious, political and 
paranormal beliefs in representative samples of the UK population (N1 = 1508, N2 = 638). 
We compared bifactor models which included the common latent trait with confirmatory 
factor analysis models in which each type of belief was represented by a single factor. In the 
first survey, the bifactor model of paranoia, conspiracy theories, religiosity, and paranormal 
beliefs but not including political ideologies was superior to the equivalent confirmatory 
factor analysis model. In the second survey, atheism was added to the belief systems and 
political ideologies scale was replaced by nationalism and patriotism scales. The bifactor 
model was superior to the equivalent CFA model but, as we had hypothesized, best fit was 
achieved when nationalism but not patriotism nor atheism were included in the model. In 
both studies, bivariate regression and multivariate regression models were used to test the 
relation between the common latent factor S and the specific belief factors and age, sex, 
analytical reasoning (Cognitive Reflection Test, [CRT]), and death anxiety. S was associated 




death anxiety. The research provided promising evidence of a common strong beliefs factor 
and its relationship with other psychological constructs were consistent across the two 
surveys. Further studies should aim to replicate these findings and may be informative 
about other strong belief systems such as delusions. 
5.2 Introduction 
In July 1984, Ron and Dan Lafferty visited the home of their brother Alan in the town 
of American Fork, Utah. Alan was away working at the time, but they were greeted by his 
wife Brenda who was taking care of her 15 month-old daughter Erica. Soon after their 
arrival, the two men stabbed to death both Brenda and Erica (Krakauer, 2003). Arrested 
after a half-hearted attempt to evade law enforcement agencies, the Laffertys, who 
belonged to a large family of Mormon fundamentalists, claimed that the murders had been 
carried out on the instruction of Jesus Christ; Dan, later asserted that he was the prophet 
Elijah. At trial, their crime presented a conundrum for mental health professionals who were 
unable to agree on whether the brothers were suffering from a shared psychotic illness or 
were in the grip of an extreme religious ideology. A similar dilemma faced psychologists and 
psychiatrists at the trial of the Norwegian mass-murder Anders Behring Breivik (Melle, 2013) 
who, in July 2011, bombed Norwegian government offices in Oslo, killing eight, before 
shooting to death sixty-nine young political activists attending a summer camp on the 
nearby island of Utøya. Breivick justified his actions on the grounds that he was a member 
of a secret organization of Knights Templar fighting feminism, the ‘Islamification’ of his 
country and the “cultural suicide of Europe”. Forensic problems such as these raise 





Pathological and nonpathological beliefs 
It would require very considerable time and effort to capture the full range of ways in which 
‘belief’ and related concepts are employed in the social sciences. For example, the term is 
sometimes used to denote phenomena to be explained (for example, in the anthropology of 
religion (Mair, 2013) and certain kinds of historical analyses; e.g. (Whitehouse et al., 2019)) 
and at other times as an explanatory variable (for example, in cognitive models of 
psychopathology, e.g. (Beck, 1976) or theories of decision making and behaviour change, 
e.g. (Ajzen, 1991)). Nonetheless, what is involved in holding a belief has rarely been 
analysed from a psychological perspective. Here, we build on the approach of contemporary 
analytical philosophers of mind who assume that “‘belief’ to refer to the attitude we have, 
roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true” (Schwitzgebel, 
2015). Although the extent to which nonhuman animals can be said to have beliefs can be 
debated, we further make the assumption that beliefs are propositional (Bentall, 2018). 
Hence, to believe something is to make propositions about the world and hold that these 
propositions are true. 
In the psychiatric literature, pathological beliefs are known as delusions, which are 
defined in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) as “Fixed beliefs that are 
not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” (p. 87). Typically, these beliefs 
follow themes that reflect common concerns about the individual’s position in the social 
universe, such as, persecution (paranoid delusions, the most common), reference (that 
certain gestures, comments, and environmental cues are directed at the self), and 
grandiosity. It has been argued that defining what distinguishes delusions from other kinds 




just for psychiatry but also for our understanding human belief systems in general (Ross & 
Mckay, 2017). 
Within psychiatry, delusions have typically been assumed to be qualitatively distinct 
from ordinary beliefs, and indeed, some have argued that they are “empty speech acts, 
whose informational content refers to neither world or self” (Berrios, 1991) and hence may 
not actually be beliefs at all (for a discussion see (Bortolotti, 2018)). These ideas have their 
origins in an influential analysis by the philosopher-psychiatrist Karl (Jaspers, 1913/1963) 
who argued that true delusions are ununderstandable in the sense of being impenetrable by 
empathy and inexplicable in terms of an individual’s personality and life history (see 
(Bentall, 2018) for a critique of this and other phenomenological criteria).  
This assumption is challenged by epidemiological evidence, which shows that 
apparently delusional beliefs are much more common than psychiatric admission statistics 
would imply. For example, in a sample of more than 7000 Dutch people, 3.3% were found to 
have ‘true’ delusions and 8.7% had delusions that were not clinically relevant (that is, which 
were not associated with distress) (van Os et al., 2000) and in a large sample of primary care 
patients in Southwest France, 69.3% of those without a history of psychiatric disorder 
reported that people were not who they appeared to be, 42.2% reported that seemingly 
innocuous events had double meanings and 25.5% reported that they were being 
persecuted (Verdoux et al., 1998). Consistent with these observations, taxometric and other 
kinds of statistical research on paranoid delusions (the one type that has been subjected to 
extensive psychological study (Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman, 2016; Murphy et al., 2018) has 
shown that extreme clinical variants of this kind of belief exist on a continuum with ordinary 
and more prevalent kinds of suspiciousness (Bebbington et al., 2013; Elahi et al., 2017). 




and it needs further investigations (David, 2010; Lawrie et al., 2010).  The demonstrated role 
of life events in paranoid beliefs also raises questions about their ununderstandability; in 
both clinical and nonclinical populations they are associated with disrupted early 
attachment relationships and lifetime experiences of victimisation (Mirowsky & Ross, 1983; 
Janssen et al., 2003; Bentall et al., 2012; Wickham, & Bentall, 2016; Wickham et al., 2015). 
 
Master explanatory systems 
Rather than searching for differences between pathological and nonpathological beliefs, we 
think it may be fruitful to consider whether there are any common factors involved in all 
kinds of belief that are emotionally-charged, held with strong conviction and that are 
resistant to change.  Such beliefs include religious and political ideologies, and we think it no 
accident that it was precisely these kinds of beliefs that created difficulties for the mental 
health professionals examining the Lafferty brothers and Anders Brevick. In what follows we 
will also consider conspiracy theories and beliefs about paranormal phenomena. We 
suggest that each of these can be described as a master explanatory system (MES) because 
they consist not of isolated propositions but of organised sets of interlinked propositions 
which individuals use when interpreting events in their world (Bentall, 2018).  It is important 
to note that many of these types of MES involve elements other than propositions; for 
example, religious and political ideologies typically involve social activities and are sources 
of social identity, which is why anthropologists in particular have often interpreted them in 
terms of a form of non-literal, ethical or social commitment (Mair, 2013). However, it is the 
propositional elements that we are concerned with here. These beliefs, like delusions, tend 




 Also, like delusions, MES tend to be thematically constrained and have discernible 
structures, possibly reflecting particular psychological dispositions or ‘mentalities’. For 
example, a right-left dimension of ideology contrasting preference for conserving existing 
institutions versus those support for radical change appears to be universal (Jost et al., 
2009) and predates modern political systems (Hibbing et al., 2014), although some 
researchers have argued that variation in political belief is best captured by two dimensions 
of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Duckitt, & Sibley, 2010). In 
the case of religious belief, proposed structures depend on whether analyses are restricted 
to monotheistic religions and whether identity, religious social practices are included. For 
example, using international survey data from Christian countries (Lemos et al., 2019) 
identify four highly correlated factors but only two pertain to belief as defined here (belief 
in God and supernatural beliefs, especially belief in afterlife) whereas the widely used Duke 
university religion index represents intrinsic religiosity as a single factor (Koenig, & Büssing, 
2010). Factor analytic studies suggest that belief in the paranormal represents a coherent 
set of dispositions, with some evidence of a single dimension running sometimes referred to 
as ‘sheep’(believers) vs ‘goats’ (unbelievers) with beliefs about the paranormal representing 
a lower level than belief in one’s own paranormal abilities (Lange, & Thalbourne, 2002; 
Drinkwater et al., 2018); even when an alternative multidimensional structure of 
paranormal beliefs have been proposed (Tobacyk, 2004), responses are dominated by a 
single dimension (Drinkwater et al., 2017). Similarly, a coherent unidimensional account of 
belief in conspiracies has been proposed, so that someone who believes in one type of 
conspiracy is likely to believe in others (Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013). 
Importantly, these structures suggest that the individual propositions within a belief system 




reason why support for free market economics by conservatives should be associated with 
support for high levels of military spending or family values, or why belief in God entails 
belief in an afterlife, or why someone who believes in one particular type of conspiracy 
theory should be more likely to believe in others (indeed, sometimes to the point of holding 
conspiracy theories that are logically contradictory (Wood et al., 2012)). 
 
A bifactor approach to identifying common factors in MES and paranoia 
How can we test whether common factors play a role across all these apparently 
different belief systems? One approach is to examine correlations between them and, 
indeed, modest to positive associations have often been reported between most of these 
belief systems, for example between paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories (Imhoff & 
Lamberty, 2018), belief in the paranormal e.g. (Darwin et al., 2011) and social dominance 
orientation e.g. (Wilson & Rose, 2014). Although the literature on the relationship between 
abnormal belief and religiosity has largely been clinically focused, delusionality (Peters et al., 
1999) and paranoia (Ayeni et al., 2011) have also been observed to be positively associated 
with religiosity. 
 Belief in conspiracy theories has been reported to be positively correlated with 
religiosity e.g. (Newheiser et al., 2011; Mancosu et al., 2017), belief in the paranormal e.g. 
(Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011), conservativism (Galliford & 
Furnham, 2017) and right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., (Bruder et al., 2013). Not surprisingly, 
numerous studies have reported that belief in the supernatural correlates with religiosity 
e.g. (Thalbourne, 1995; Lindeman & Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2016)  although there have also 




supernatural beliefs and political ideology is mixed in the limited available literature, e.g. 
(Heard et al., 1999).  Finally, positive associations have been reported between religiosity 
and both conservativism and authoritarianism (Schlenker et al., 2012). 
 Promising though this evidence is, the diversity in the measures employed and some 
overlap between some of them (it should be no surprise that religious people are more 
likely to believe in religious conspiracy theories; (Newheiser et al., 2011) limits what can be 
deduced from these studies. Bifactor models provide a more promising framework for 
identifying common processes across different MES.  In these models, covariations between 
different specific or ‘group’ factors (in this case belief systems) are explained by one general 
factor common to all (see Figure 5.1 for a conceptual diagram comparing a CFA model of 
seven belief systems – those actually investigated in our Study 2 – to a bifactor model). The 
general factor and specific factors are assumed to be orthogonal, so that each indicator 
(response on the items of a belief questionnaire) is caused by both the factor specific to that 
questionnaire and also the general factor. Importantly, goodness of fitness statistics can be 
used to compare a bifactor model with simpler confirmatory factor analysis models in which 
there is no general factor. As conventional goodness of fit statistics will always favour 
bifactor solutions, novel statistical methods have been proposed to determine whether a 
bifactor model is superior to a conventional factor model (Dueber, 2017; Rodriguez et al., 
2016) and it has also been argued that the validity of bifactor solutions must be 
demonstrated by showing that the general factor is specifically associated with theoretically 
important constructs (Greene et al., 2019). 
 The first question that we address in this research, then, is whether a model which 
includes a general strong belief factor, which we henceforth refer to as ‘S’ (for ‘strong’ 






A conceptual diagram of CFA model of seven belief systems (Left) to a bifactor model (Right) 
 
The causes of S 
If we find S, the implication is that one or more hidden processes play a role in determining 
a strong belief in all the MES we are considering. What could these processes be? 
Theoretical accounts of delusional beliefs generally point to two different kinds of 
processes: emotion-related processes that drive the belief system and cognitive 
impairments that prevent the belief system from being reasoned away (Coltheart, 2007; 
Bentall et al., 2009) and we see no reason to assume that MES are different. 
One emotion-related process that has been implicated in a wide range of belief 
systems is death anxiety (DA). It is perhaps unsurprising that DA is associated with 
religiosity, although the relationship may be complex and nonlinear (Jong et al., 2018), 





also been reported to be associated with paranormal and superstitious belief in some 
studies (Tobacyk, 2007; Wong, 2012) but not in others (Houran, 1997). It has also been 
associated with conservative beliefs (Jost et al., 2004), and severity of mental illness 
(Menzies et al., 2019) although we are aware of no study which specifically considered 
paranoid beliefs. These findings are supported by a substantial body of evidence that 
priming fear of death (mortality salience) provokes an increase in the strength with which 
existing belief systems are held (Solomon et al., 2015), although some concerns have been 
raised about the replicability of this effect (Klein et al., 2020). There is also debate about 
whether mortality salience leads to a shift towards more conservative and religious beliefs 
or whether it instead enhances belief in whatever belief systems are already held (and so 
makes atheists more atheist and liberals more liberal), with studies providing some evidence 
for both effects (Burke et al., 2013; Jong et al., 2012). On the basis of these findings, we 
therefore tentatively predict that death anxiety will be associated with ‘S’, a general 
tendency to strong belief and, furthermore, that a mortality salience intervention will 
increase the strength of ‘S’. 
 A second process that has been implicated in the willingness to hold a wide range of 
beliefs has emerged from dual process models of cognition. Although these theories differ 
in detail (Evans, 2008) it is now widely accepted that human reasoning processes fall into 
two main types: type 1 (fast, intuitive and associative) versus type 2 (slow, analytic, 
reflective and propositional) (Kahneman, 2012), and it seems plausible that acceptance of 
emotionally-significant belief systems will be facilitated by ‘cognitive miserliness’, that is to 
say when individuals fail to use slow thinking to appraise propositions about the world. 
(Frederick, 2005)’s cognitive reflection task (CRT) has been the most widely used measure of 




analytical thinking (Toplak, 2014). (Bronstein et al., 2019) reported a modest association 
between poor performance on the CRT and subclinical paranoia, and a similar association 
has been reported for conspiracy theories by (van Prooijen, 2017). Poor CRT performance 
has also been found to supernatural beliefs and religiosity (Pennycook et al., 2016) and 
social conservativism in some (Deppe et al., 2015) but not all studies (Yilmaz & Saribay, 
2017). We therefore tentatively hypothesise that ‘S’ will be predicted by CRT performance. 
 
Summary of hypotheses 
In this study we report two studies to test hypotheses derived from the above review of the 
literature on strongly held belief systems. In both, we assessed paranoia, belief in conspiracy 
theories, religious belief, belief in the paranormal and political beliefs and compared the 
goodness of fit of confirmatory factor models which treat these belief systems as separate 
phenomena with bifactor models in which a general ‘S’ factor explaining the correlations 
between the five belief systems is also included, hypothesizing that the bifactor models will 
be better fit. We also tested the  validity of the bifactor model by assessing whether the 
general factor was associated with two variables which we predicted, on theoretical 









Participants were recruited to be a close to representative national sample by the 
survey company Qualtrics, and were stratified by age (minimum age 18 years; 
approximately equal numbers from age bands 18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-49; 50-64; 65+), sex 
and household income (approximately equal numbers from quintiles defined on the basis of 
Office for National Statistics data 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/
incomeandwealth/bulletins/householddisposableincomeandinequality/financialyearending2
016): £0-599; £600-1,155; £1,156-2,247; £2,248-£3,604; £3,605-£7.061; £7,062 and above). 
1,852 UK residents attempted the survey but, after removal of incomplete surveys or 
surveys completed implausibly quickly (pre-defined following pilot work by the survey 
company as < 12 minutes) the final sample was 1,508. An initial analysis of data from the 
survey in which we examined the relationship between paranoia and conspiracy theories, 
showing that they were correlated by separate phenomena, has been reported elsewhere 
(Alsuhibani, Shevlin, Freeman, Sheaves, and Bentall, in submission). 
 Of these, 742 (49.2%) were male with a mean age of 50.57 years (SD = 18.12) and 
766 (50.8%) were female with a mean age of 45.04 years (SD = 15.64). 1440 (95.5%) were 
British nationals and 68 had other nationality. An indication of the representativeness of the 
sample can be judged from responses to questions about voting behaviour. For the UK 
general election of 2017, 32.7% reported voting Conservative, 32.5% voted Labour, 18% 




31.0% respectively). For the 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the European 





The revised Paranoia and Deservedness Scale (PaDS –R) was designed on the basis of 
psychometric analyses of the original scale (Melo et al., 2009) in a large sample of healthy 
individuals and patients with psychosis (Elahi et al., 2017) and other recent findings 
indicating that paranoia consists of four elements: interpersonal sensitivity, mistrust, fear of 
persecution and ideas of reference (Bebbington et al., 2013). The revised scale consists of 8 
paranoia items (the P scale), two each from these domains (e.g. “My friends often tell me to 
relax and stop worrying about being deceived or harmed”, “You should only trust yourself”, 
“I believe that some people want to hurt me deliberately”, and “Sometimes I think there are 
hidden insults in things that other people say or do”) and two further items measuring 
beliefs about whether persecution is deserved, which are not used in this study. Items are 
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”. In this 
sample, the eight-item P scale had an alpha coefficient of .91. 
 
Generic Conspiracy Beliefs Scale (GCBS; (Brotherton et al., 2013) is a 15-item scale (e.g. 
“Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public” and “Groups of scientists 
manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public”). Responses are 
rated on 5-point scales (“Definitely not true” to “Definitely true”).The alpha coefficient for 




endorse one conspiracy theory are likely to endorse a contradictory conspiracy theory, two 
additional items were included: “Princess Diana faked her death so that she could retreat 
into isolation” and “Princess Diana had to be killed because the British government could 
not accept that the mother of a future king was involved with a Muslim Arab”. Relicating 
Wood etal’s finding, we found that endorsement of these beliefs was moderately 
correlated; r = .39, p < .001. However, these items were not considered in the present 
analysis because they were not part of the original scale.)  
 
Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS; (Huber & Huber, 2012) is a 15-item scale (e.g. “How 
often do you think about religious issues?”, “To what extent do you believe that God or 
something divine exists?” and “How often do you take part in religious services?”. 
Responses for 12 items are rated on 5-point scales (“Never” to “Very often”). While 3 items 
only are rated on 8-point scales (“Never” to “Several times a day”). The alpha coefficient for 
the scale was: .97. 
 
Social and Political Attitudes Scale .There is considerable debate about the best way to 
characterise political ideologies, with some researchers arguing for single factor left vs right 
solutions (Jost et al., 2009) and others advocating for multidimensional accounts (Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2010). However, we found no widely used political attitude scale suitable for a UK 
population sample and wished to sample beliefs that are likely to be salient to the UK 
general public. We therefore developed a 14-item scale based on previous scales by (Wilson 
& Patterson, 1968) and subsequent variants, e.g.  (Everett, 2013). These scales require 




practices, eg. the death penalty, abortion. We excluded items that are irrelevant to the UK 
political environment (e.g. gun control). Each item was followed by five response options: 
ranging from “strongly agree with” to ”strongly disagree with”.  
Exploratory factor analysis in a separate sample of 496 mainly university students 
suggested a three factor solution: conservativism (e.g. support for the death penalty and 
monogamy), social liberalism (support for immigration and multiculturalism) and personal 
liberalism (e.g. support for abortion rights) with eigenvalues of 3.23, 1.189 and 1.68, 
accounting for 48.53% of the total variance. Alpha coefficients for the subscales in the 
present study were: .64 for conservatism, .69 for social liberalism and .67 for personal 
liberalism. 
 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) is a 26 item scale distributed on 7 different 
subscales (traditional religious belief, psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary 
life forms and precognition). In this study items relating only to three of these belief types 
were used: witchcraft (4 items, e.g. “Black magic really exists” and “There are actual cases of 
witchcraft”), Superstition (3 items, e.g. “Black cats can bring bad luck” and “The number 13 
is unlucky”) and precognition (4 items, e.g. “Astrology is a way to accurately predict the 
future” and “Some psychics can accurately predict the future”). Responses are rated on 7-
point scales (“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”). The alpha coefficient in the present 






Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; (Frederick, 2005) is a 3-item scale in which requires an 
answer to simple mathematical questions, in which the structure of the question implied 
the wrong answer, so that the correct answer requires effortful reflection and ‘cognitive 
miserliness’ leads to wrong answer e.g. “A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs 
£1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”. A second version of the scale, the 
CRT-2 (Thompson & Oppenheimer, 2016) included 4-item scale with a lower degree of 
mathematical complexity, e.g. “A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are 
left?” and we combined both measures to make a 7-item scale. Participants typed their 
answers into a textbox. To ensure that the participants answered the questions quickly, only 
30 seconds from the moment of presentation was allowed for each answer, after which the 
questionnaire automatically moved to the next item. For scoring, the intuitive incorrect 
answer = 1, right answer = 2 and any other answers = 0. The alpha coefficient for 1,235 who 
completed all 7 items was .71. 
The Death Anxiety Scale (Tomás-Sábado et al., 2005) is a 17-item scale with four subscales 
(externally generated death anxiety, death acceptance, death finality and thoughts about 
death). Responses are rated on 5-point scales (“Totally disagree” to “Totally agree”). Given 
the high inter-correlations between subscales, r = .67 – .89, we decided to use the total 




Our approach with this dataset was essentially exploratory and iterative. Our models were 
calculated in Mplus 7.0 (Muthen & Muthen, 2013) using robust maximum likelihood 




in the survey ensured that all participants completed all of the measures). We first 
compared a confirmatory factor model in which all nine different kinds of belief (paranoia, 
conspiracy theories, religiosity, social liberalism, personal liberalism, conservatism and belief 
in witchcraft, superstition and precognition) loaded on separate uncorrelated factors with a 
bifactor model in which the factors were uncorrelated but all items additionally loaded on 
an additional general strong belief factor which, in the tradition of previous bifactor 
analyses (e.g. of intelligence and psychopathology) we designate with the single latter ‘S’. 
When interpreting the comparative fit of the different models we used  the following 
recommended model fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1999): a non-significant chi-square (χ2), 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI: (Bentler, 1990) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI: (Tucker and Lewis, 
1973) values above .95 reflect excellent fit, while values of these two indices above .90 
reflect acceptable fit; Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation with 90% confidence 
intervals (RMSEA;  (Steiger, 1990) with values of .06 or less reflect excellent fit while values 
less than .08 reflect acceptable fit. The Standardized Root-Mean-Square Residual (SRMR; 
(Chen, 2007) was also used with values of .06 or less indicating excellent fit and values less 
than .08 indicating acceptable fit. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; (Schwarz, 1978) 
was used to evaluate and compare models if models well fitting, with the smallest value 
indicating the best fitting model. In relation to the BIC, (Raftery, 1996) suggested that a 2-6 
point difference offers evidence of model superiority, a 6-10 point difference indicates 
strong evidence of model superiority, and a difference greater than 10 points indicates very 
strong evidence of model superiority. 
 Once the superiority of the bifactor model had been demonstrated, we sought to 
refine it by eliminating any belief scales with low or negative loadings on the bifactor 




When we had achieved a final model, we evaluated the reliability and replicability of each 
dimension in accordance with the recommendations of (Rodriguez et al., 2016) using 
(Dueber, 2017) software, which we used to calculate the following: omega reliability (ω; the 
proportion of common variance explained by the general and specific factors); omega 
hierarchical (ωH; the proportion of variance within the symptom indicators attributable to 
the general (or specific) factor(s), controlling for the specific (or general) factors), relative 
omega (ωR: represents the proportion of reliable variance due to the general factor 
independent of the specific factors, and each specific factor independent of the general 
factor) and index H (the extent to which a set of items represents a latent variable and the 
likelihood of that latent variable replicating across studies). Omega coefficients and index H 
values range from 0–1, and values ⩾ 0.80 reflect satisfactory reliability and replicability. We 
also report the item explained common variance (I-ECV), which reflects the extent to which 
an item's responses are accounted for by variation on the latent general dimension alone. 
 Finally, we used multivariate and bivariate regression models to investigate the 
effect of age, gender, analytical reasoning and death anxiety on the general and specific 
factors. Factor scores were used for the latent variables (general and specific factors) and 
sum scores were used for the observed variables. In these analyses, 282 participants were 
not included because they failed to complete all CRT items within the 30 seconds time limit. 
Differences in parameter estimates were tested using Wald tests. If a Wald test was 
significant, the regression coefficients between the observed variables and the latent 









Fit indices for a bifactor model including nine belief systems (paranoia, conspiracy mentality, 
religiosity, witchcraft, superstition, precognition, social liberalism, conservatism and 
personal liberalism) were 2 (1173) = 7278.94, p < .001; RMSEA = .059; CFI = .869; TLI = .857, 
SRMR = .073. These were superior to the indices for the CFA model (2 (1188) = 8135.28 , p 
< .001; RMSEA = .062; CFI = .851; TLI = .840, SRMR = .067). The BIC was also lower for the 
bifactor model (BIC = 220740.51) compared to the CFA model (BIC = 221487.06) and 
indicates strong evidence of the superiority of the bifactor model. However, despite this 
superiority, the CFI and TLI for the bifactor model did not reach .90 suggesting that model 
needed to be modified.  
 Examination of the factor loadings (see Supplementary Table 5.S1) revealed low 
loadings on the general factor, but strong loadings on the specific factors, for all three sets 
of political belief items (social liberalism bifactor range -.149, .043; conservativism bifactor 
range: -.173, .009; personal liberalism bifactor range: -.053, .085). Interestingly, the majority 
of these loadings (all but three) are negative, suggesting a negative association between 
political beliefs and the general factor. The implication of this finding would seem to be that 
a strong belief factor that is common to the remaining belief systems – paranoia, belief in 
conspiracy theories, the three kinds of supernatural beliefs and religious ideology – plays 
little or no role in political ideology. Hence, we recalculated both the CFA and the bifactor 




 The bifactor model fit indices improved once political beliefs had been removed ; (2 
(592) = 4021.75, p < .001; RMSEA = .062; CFI = .914; TLI = .903, SRMR = .070) and remain 
better than those for the CFA (2 (614) = 5381.92, p < .001; RMSEA = .072; CFI = .881; TLI = 
.870, SRMR = .061). The BIC was lower for the bifactor model (BIC = 159329.32) compared 
to the CFA model (BIC = 160528.48) and indicating that, on this index, the former was 
superior. The standardised factor loadings for the bifactor model latent variables, shown in 
Table 5.1, were all positive and statistically significant ranging from .202 to .840.  
Table 5.1. 
 Study 1: Standardised factor loadings. 
Item General Paranoia 
Conspiracy 
mentality 
Religiosity Witchcraft Superstition Precognition I-ECV 
1 .28 .55      .21 
2 .30 .71      .15 
3 .27 .80      .10 
4 .27 .71      .13 
5 .29 .72      .14 
6 .32 .72      .16 
7 .20 .50      .14 
8 .31 .75      .14 
9 .30  .65     .17 
10 .33  .66     .20 
11 .50  .52     .49 
12 .43  .67     .29 
13 .33  .63     .22 
14 .35  .69     .21 
15 .41  .68     .26 
16 .52  .49     .53 
17 .48  .57     .42 
18 .36  .62     .25 
19 .36  .73     .20 
20 .44  .69     .28 
21 .52  .49     .54 
22 .38  .66     .25 
23 .22  .50     .16 
24 .41   .76    .22 
25 .46   .72    .29 
26 .40   .84    .19 
27 .63    .48   .63 
28 .72    .54   .64 
29 .69    .52   .63 
30 .81    -.24   .92 
31 .76     .25  .91 
32 .75     .84  .46 
33 .85     -.02  .99 
34 .59      .66 .45 
35 .77      .22 .92 
36 .72      .51 .67 







 Table 5.2 shows the reliability and replicability estimates for the bifactor dimensions. 
Most of the dimensions except witchcraft and precognition had satisfactory – or near 
satisfactory – construct replicability (i.e. index H values ⩾ 0.80) and all had satisfactory – or 
near satisfactory - reliability (i.e. ω values ⩾0.80). However, witchcraft, superstition and 
precognition had low levels of replicability, and  reliability indicating that these dimensions 
accounted for very little reliable item variance, adjusting for S. 
Table 5.2. 
Study 1: Reliability and construct replicability results for the bifactor dimensions of strong beliefs  
 S Paranoia 
Conspiracy 
mentality 
Religiosity Witchcraft Superstition Precognition 
ω 0.97 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.91 
ωH 0.68 0.78 0.67 0.70 0.16 0.16 0.28 
ωR 0.71 0.86 0.71 0.77 0.17 0.17 0.31 
H 0.95 0.89 0.91 0.83 0.54 0.71 0.59 
Note: ω = omega reliability; ωH = omega hierarchical reliability; ωR = relative omega reliability; H = construct replicability. 
 
Predictors of S 
 
Table 5.3 shows the regression coefficients and tests of equality (Wald test) for multivariate 
and bivariate regression models in which age, gender, death anxiety and CRT performance 
were used to predict both the general and specific factors. It will be recalled that we 
predicted that death anxiety and poor CRT performance would be specifically associated 




  Age was negatively correlated with S, paranoia, conspiracy mentality, witchcraft and 
superstition but positively associated with religiosity and precognition in both the bivariate 
and multivariate models. Female sex was associated with S in both types of analyses, but 
males scored higher on conspiracy mentality and witchcraft in the multivariate model only. 
Female sex was associated with paranoia in the bivariate analysis only. 
 Analytical reasoning was negatively associated with S in both analyses, as we had 
predicted. However, negative associations of lesser magnitude were also found with 
conspiracy mentality and, witchcraft in both types of analyses. Moreover, paranoia was 
positively associated with CRT scores in the multivariate model only, and superstition was 
negatively associated in the bivariate model only. Death anxiety was strongly associated 
with S and paranoia and there was a smaller association with conspiracy mentality and 
witchcraft in both types of models; it was also positively associated with superstition but 
negatively associated with precognition in the bivariate model. 
Table 5.3. 










Wald (df) p Witchcraft Superstition Precognition 
 (se)  (se)  (se)  (se)  (se)  (se)  (se) 
Age 
Multivariate -105(.026)** -.327(.026)** -.144(.029)** .081(.030)* -.130(.029)** -.135(.031)** .178(.028)** 
205.73(6) 
p <.001 




Multivariate -.163(.026)** .016(.036) .082(.028)** -.015(.029) .076(.028)** .031(.029) -.042(.028) 
56.17(6) 
p <.001 




Multivariate -.156(.025)** .037(.027)* -.119(.029)** -.009(.028) -.091(.027)** -.049(.026) .042(.030) 
56.12(6) 
p <.001 





Multivariate .333(.028)** .271(.029)** .095(.034)** .016(.031) .155(.031)** .043(.031) -.057(.030) 
207.66(6) 
p <.001 
Bivariate .417(.024)** .359(.024)** .167(.028)** -.014(.026) .211(.025)** .088(.026)** -.115(.025)** 
459.48(6) 
p <.001 
R-squared  .232(.022)** .227(.021)** .055(.012)** .006(.004) .064(.013)** .025(.009)** .041(.011)** 
167.85(6) 
p <.001 





5.3.3 Discussion of Study 1 
In this study we found preliminary evidence for our hypothesised general belief factor S. 
However, adequate fit indices for the bifactor model were found only when we excluded 
political beliefs. Furthermore, the reliability of the supernatural beliefs dimensions was low, 
and the loadings of these items on the specific dimensions were low in the final model. 
Hence, in this analysis S seemed to be a common process influencing paranoid, conspiracy 
and religious beliefs, with equivocal contributions to supernatural beliefs. A better test of 
the validity of the bifactor approach is the relationship with the two variables we had 
hypothesized would predict S: as expected, both poor CRT performance and death anxiety 
did, indeed, predict the general factor. However, it is notable that there was also a strong 
association between death anxiety and paranoia, even in the multivariate model in which 
the other belief factors were included. Although both CRT scores and death anxiety were 
also associated with conspiracy mentality, these effects were modest compared to the 
effects for S and (in the case of death anxiety) paranoia. 
 These initial findings do not provide unequivocal evidence in favour of S but were 
sufficiently promising to encourage an attempted replication with a new sample of 
participants and improved measures. First, we considered the possibility that the failure to 
find an association between S and political beliefs might have reflected the measure of 
political beliefs we employed, which focused on specific policies rather than more general 
political orientation. As alternative political constructs we decided to study nationalism (the 
uncritical acceptance of the moral superiority and prerogative of one’s country in their 
policies and actions throughout the world, sometimes also called ‘blind patriotism’) and 
patriotism (the individual’s feelings of love and devotion to and pride in the customs and 




2011; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey et al., 2001). We tentatively hypothesized 
that nationalism, because it is associated with social threat, and because analytical 
reasoning would be required to think realistically about the strengths of other countries, 
would be more related to S than patriotism. 
 Secondly, we replaced our short religiosity items with a scale specifically designed 
for this study, which provides separate measures of religiosity and atheism(Alsuhibani et al., 
in submission). This measure was developed following philosophical analyses of the atheism 
construct (e.g. (Gray, 2018) which portrayed it as a positive belief system and therefore not 
simply the absence of religious belief. Given the considerable evidence cited earlier that 
religiosity is associated with high death anxiety (Jong et al., 2018) and low analytical 
reasoning (Pennycook et al., 2016) we hypothesized that religiosity but not atheism would 
be associated with S. 
 Additionally, we rewrote our paranoia scale because the items in the short version of 
the Paranoia and Deservedness Scale employed in Study 1 (e.g. “My friends often tell me to 
relax and stop worrying about being deceived or harmed”) arguably do not refer to belief in 
the sense defined in this study. Hence, items were reworded to make them clearly 
represent propositions about the world (e.g. “It is important to be on guard against being 









Participants were recruited by the survey company Qualtrics using the same 
sampling frame employed in Study 2, with participants stratified by sex, age, and household 
income. 722 UK residents attempted the survey but, after removal of incomplete surveys or 
surveys completed implausibly quickly (pre-defined following pilot work by the survey 
company as < 15 minutes) the final sample was 638. Of these, 296 (46.4%) were male with a 
mean age of 46.60 years (SD = 15.83) and 342 (53.6%) were female with a mean age of 




The following measures were the same as those in Study 1:  the 15-item of the 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale employed in Study 1 (α = .96), the 11-item of the Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale (α = .89 for witchcraft: .90 for superstition,  .88 for precognition and 
.93 for the whole scale) and the 17-item Death Anxiety Scale (α = .95) 
 The following new measures were employed in this study: 
 
The revised Paranoia Scale designed especially for this study was based on the PaDS 
employed in Study 1, but items were rewritten so that each contained a specific proposition 
formatted similarly to the items of the GCBS, and with an identical response format. There 
were 8 items, 2 for each of the domains of paranoia identified by (Bebbington et al., 2013): 




situations”); mistrust (“You should only trust yourself”); ideas of reference (“When I am out 
in public, people sometimes talk about me”) and fear of persecution (“Some people want to 
hurt me deliberately”). Coefficient alpha for the scale was .85. 
 
Monotheism and Atheism Beliefs Scale. This is an 18-item scale, with 11 items measuring 
religiosity and 7 items measuring atheistic beliefs. The items were selected following an 
exploratory factor analysis of a convenience sample of 488 mainly educated and 
professional respondents to a social media invitation (see (Alsuhibani et al., in submission) 
for details and confirmatory factor analysis of factor structure based on the data from this 
study). Responses were made on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The alpha coefficient for the monotheism subscale was .96 and for atheism 
was .83. 
 
Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism. Items were adapted from those used in the 
International Social Survey Programme (Davidov, 2011). Constructive Patriotism was 
measured by three questions: ‘‘How proud are you of Britain in the way democracy 
works?’’; ‘‘How proud are you of Britain National Health Service?’’; and ‘‘How proud are you 
of Britain’s fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?’’ These were measured on a 4-
point scale ranging from 1 (not proud at all) to 4 (very proud). Nationalism was measured by 
two statements: ‘‘The world would be a better place if people from other countries were 
more like the British’’ and ‘‘Generally speaking, Britain is a better country than most other 






Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Fredrick, 2005) was expanded to include 4-items from 
(Toplak et al., 2014) and 3-items from (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). This version used 
the four-option multiple choice format with choices presented in random order as 
recommended by Sirota and Juanchich (2018); 45 seconds was allowed for each answer, 
after which the questionnaire automatically moved to the next item. The alpha coefficient 




As in Study 1, we first compared a confirmatory factor model in which all seven 
different kinds of belief (paranoia, conspiracy theories, religiosity, atheism, constructive 
patriotism, nationalism,  witchcraft, superstition and precognition) loaded on separate 
uncorrelated factors with a bifactor model in which all items additionally loaded on a 
general strong belief factor. Once the superiority of the bifactor model had been 
demonstrated, we sought to refine it by eliminating belief scales with low or negative 
loadings on the bifactor (indicating that these beliefs were not related to a general tendency 
towards strong belief); we had hypothesized in advance that these would be items from the 
atheism and patriotism measures. Then, we followed the analysis plan used in study 1 to 
investigate the associations of S with the specific factors on age, gender, analytical thinking 
and death anxiety. 
 
5.4.2 Results 
Fit indices for a bifactor model including nine belief systems (paranoia, conspiracy 




and nationalism) were (2 (1483) = 4481.83, p < .001; RMSEA = .056; CFI = .888; TLI = .879, 
SRMR = .086) and superior to the CFA model (2 (1504) = 4838.25, p < .001; RMSEA = .059; 
CFI = .875; TLI = .868, SRMR = .064). The BIC was also lower for the bifactor model (BIC = 
96111.99) compared to the CFA model (BIC = 96332.68) and indicates very strong evidence 
of the superiority of the bifactor model, although the CFI and TLI did not reach .90.  
  Examination of the factor loadings (see supplementary Table 5.S3) revealed low 
loadings on the general factor (bifactor loadings -.085, .048), but strong loadings on the 
specific factors for the constructive patriotism items. The implication of this finding would 
seem to be that constructive patriotism is not related to S as we had hypothesized. We had 
also hypothesised that atheism would not be related to S, in fact five of the items loaded 
negatively on S and the two items with positive loadings were nonsignificant. A plausible 
explanation for this pattern of results is that atheism requires the suppression of the strong 
belief factor. 
 When we recalculated both the CFA and the bifactor models while excluded the 
atheism and constructive patriotism items we found that the bifactor model fit indices have 
improved and remain better than those for the CFA. In the revised bifactor model, the fit 
indices were acceptable (2 (988) = 3109.47, p < .001; RMSEA = .058; CFI = .913; TLI = .905, 
SRMR = .070) and much improved from the CFA model (2 (1014) = 3784.61, p < .001; 
RMSEA = .065; CFI = .886; TLI = .879, SRMR = .066). The BIC was also lower for the bifactor 
model (BIC = 76250.18) compared to the CFA model (BIC = 76757.41) and indicates strong 
evidence of the superiority of the bifactor model. The standardised factor loadings for the 
bifactor model latent variables (see Table 5.4) were all positive except for two of the four 






Study 2: Standardised Factor Loadings 
Item General Paranoia 
Conspiracy 
mentality 
Nationalism Religiosity Witchcraft Superstition Precognition I-ECV 
1 -.07 .37       .03 
2 .38 .49       .38 
3 .17 .74       .05 
4 .27 .66       .14 
5 .25 .74       .10 
6 .39 .65       .26 
7 .29 .42       .33 
8 .26 .68       .13 
9 .37  .68      .23 
10 .43  .68      .29 
11 .65  .44      .68 
12 .58  .58      .50 
13 .48  .59      .40 
14 .48  .61      .38 
15 .52  .63      .41 
16 .68  .41      .73 
17 .59  .51      .57 
18 .49  .54      .45 
19 .49  .68      .34 
20 .55  .63      .43 
21 .65  .46      .67 
22 .52  .61      .43 
23 .23  .52      .16 
24 .18   .90     .04 
25 .11   .74     .02 
26 .49    .47    .53 
27 .52    .64    .40 
28 .53    .66    .40 
29 .48    .76    .28 
30 .44    .75    .26 
31 .50    .52    .48 
32 .55    .70    .39 
33 .52    .55    .47 
34 .49    .80    .27 
35 .49    .81    .27 
36 .55    .58    .48 
37 .68     .42   .72 
38 .58     .62   .47 
39 .83     .18   .96 
40 .66     .58   .56 
41 .73      .36  .80 
42 .81      .39  .81 
43 .76      .42  .77 
44 .85       -.05 .99 
45 .87       -.10 .98 
46 .76       .23 .92 








Table 5.5 shows the reliability and replicability estimates for the bifactor dimensions. 
Most of the dimensions except witchcraft and superstition had satisfactory – or near 
satisfactory – construct replicability (i.e. index H values ⩾ 0.80). Moreover, all the bifactor 
dimensions had satisfactory – or near satisfactory - reliability (i.e. ω values ⩾ 0.80) but 
witchcraft, superstition and precognition had extremely low values for ωH and ωR, 
indicating that these dimensions accounted for very little reliable item variance when 
adjusting for S. 
 
Table 5.5. 
Study 2: Reliability and construct replicability results for the bifactor dimensions of strong beliefs. 
  
 S Paranoia 
Conspiracy 
mentality 
Religiosity Nationalism Witchcraft Superstition Precognition 
ω 
0.98 0.86 0.96 0.96 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.94 
ωH 0.77 0.73 0.53 0.60 0.79 0.27 0.19 0.07 
ωR 0.78 0.78 0.55 0.63 0.97 0.30 0.21 0.08 
H 0.97 0.97 0.89 0.91 0.84 0.58 0.35 0.69 
 Note: ω = omega reliability; ωH = omega hierarchical reliability; ωR = relative omega reliability; H = construct replicability. 
 
 
Predictors of S 
Table 5.6 shows the regression coefficients and tests of equality (Wald test) from 
multivariate and bivariate regression models. Age was negatively correlated with paranoia, 
conspiracy mentality and superstition, and positively correlated with nationalism, 
witchcraft, and precognition in both regression models. It also had a positive correlation 




the bivariate model only. Male gender was positively associated with nationalism, and 
negatively with precognition in both regression models but female gender was associated 
with S in the bivariate model only. 
 Analytical reasoning was negatively associated with S and, less strongly, with 
religiosity in both regression models, but there was also a small negative association with 
nationalism in the multivariate model only. Conspiracy mentality was negatively associated 
with analytical reasoning and witchcraft had a small positive association with CRT scores in 
the bivariate model only. 
 Death anxiety was strongly associated with S. There were also positive associations 
of smaller magnitude with paranoia, conspiracy mentality and religiosity, but death anxiety 
was negatively correlated with witchcraft in both regression models.  There were also small 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4.3 Discussion of Study 2 
 In study 2 we sought to replicate the findings from Study 1 using improved 
measures, and specifically hypothesized that S would be related to nationalism but not 
patriotism, and religiosity but not atheism. In general, the hypotheses were supported and 
the overall fit of the final bifactor model was excellent. Death anxiety and analytical reason 
were much stronger predictors of S than any other dimension. However, the supernatural 
belief dimensions, which we measured in the same way as in Study 1, showed low levels of 
reliability when accounting for S and, therefore, the place of these beliefs within a bifactor 
framework remains uncertain. 
5.5 General Discussion 
In this paper we have proposed that many strongly held beliefs that are resistant to 
counter-argument can be described as master explanatory systems (Bentall, 2018) and that 
these systems may be at least partially explicable in terms of a latent psychological 
propensity or set of processes that facilitate strong beliefs in general. We further 
hypothesized that two constructs – death anxiety and poor analytic reasoning would be 
associated with this propensity. We sought to test this account by evaluating bifactor 
models in which different kinds of master explanatory systems – paranoia, belief in 
conspiracy theories, political ideology, religious belief and belief in the supernatural – were 
each explained by their own latent factors but also by a common strong belief factor, which 
we have dubbed S, associated with the items in all of the scales. We tested this model in 
two samples, both fairly representative of the UK population. Although we had clear 
hypotheses at the outset, our approach was exploratory as we sought to identify exceptions 





 Overall, our findings provide cautious, but not unequivocal support for our 
hypotheses. In both studies, the bifactor model of strong beliefs was superior to the 
equivalent confirmatory factor analysis model, and the fit statistics for the final model 
suggested good fit. In Study 1, this required the exclusion of the political belief items, which 
were drawn from a questionnaire which was specifically developed for this study and may 
not have been ideal for our purpose. In the second study, we had hypothesized in advance 
that patriotism and atheism would be constructs that would not fit well into a bifactor 
framework and, indeed, this proved to be the case. 
 Although, the reliability and replicability analyses were acceptable for the general 
dimension, some of the specific dimensions showed a questionable reliability and 
replicability in both studies. The general dimension accounted for 95% of reliable variance in 
study 1 and 97% of reliable variance in study 2. However, when the variance attributable to 
the general dimension was partitioned out, the paranormal beliefs dimensions (for study 1: 
witchcraft 17%, superstition 17%, and precognition 31%, and for study 2: witchcraft 30%, 
superstition 21%, and precognition 8%) explained little reliable variance compared to the 
other beliefs (i.e. paranoia, conspiracy mentality, religiosity, and nationalism). One way of 
interpreting these findings would be to say that these constructs are almost pure S – they 
are beliefs that are driven by the general dimension and very little influenced by belief-
specific factors. We found consistent results with respect to predictors of S across the two 
studies; it was negatively associated with age and female gender and, as we had 
hypothesized at the outset, negatively associated with analytical reasoning and positively 
associated with death anxiety. 
 The former relationship replicates many previous studies which have shown an 




as religious beliefs (Pennycook, 2012), conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014), paranoid 
beliefs (Bronstein et al., 2019), and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2012). The 
association with death anxiety is consistent with the literature on mortality salience 
(Solomon et al., 2015), which suggests that belief in a worldview can protect individuals 
against the anxiety associated with mortality and that the contemplation of one’s mortality, 
for example prompted by an experimental mortality salience intervention, can lead to world 
view defence (Greenberg et al., 1997). (It should be noted here that the replicability of this 
mortality salience effects has been questioned (Klein et al., 2020).) 
 We must acknowledge that, in our multivariate models of predictors of S, although 
the general factor was predicted by both of these variables in line with our hypotheses, 
there were also residual effects on specific belief systems. In study 1, there was an effect of 
these two variables mainly on paranoia in addition to the effects on S. In study 2 there were 
residual effects on most of the specific factors, but these were very small in magnitude 
compared to the effect on S. 
 This study has several strengths. First, there were large representative samples of 
the UK population in both studies. Second, a wide range of beliefs was used in testing the 
bifactor models. Third, the replication study has confirmed the major findings in the first 
study. On the other hand, in Study 1 we chose measures of political ideology and religiosity 
that may not have been best suited to test our models. The fact that our approach was 
exploratory in terms of the inclusion and exclusion of variables during model fitting raises 
the possibility that we have over-fitted the data and a pre-registered replication in a larger 
sample should be a priority for further research. Finally, although we were inspired to carry 
out this research by wondering what the unique features of delusions were (if any), we did 




between pathological and non-pathological beliefs. There have been very few studies of 
analytical reasoning in patients suffering from psychosis (Freeman et al., 2014) and, so far as 
we are aware, no specific studies of death anxiety in relation to psychosis although death 
anxiety has been shown to be elevated in psychiatric patients in general in comparison with 
healthy people (Menzies et al., 2019). It is therefore possible that S is one factor that 
contributes to delusional beliefs but there are other factors that make those beliefs 
uniquely delusional. 
 Arguably, strong belief is a ubiquitous phenomenon – all of the belief systems we 
have studies are prevalent globally – but also a phenomenon that leads to much strife and 
human suffering: for example, through the violence associated with terrorism and warfare, 
the stifling of views that are regarded as heretical, the justification of discrimination of 
specific racial, sexual or cultural minorities, or simple distrust between people who hold 
different belief systems. We are of course not arguing that people should not have 
worldviews or strong beliefs. However, understanding the psychological processes that 
propel people to hold strong beliefs in general may provide clues about how to promote 









A core tenet of terror management theory is that mortality salience (MS) strengthens 
individuals’ worldview defence. In earlier studies, we found that the associations between 
different kinds of strongly held belief systems (i.e., paranoia, conspiracy theories, political 
ideology, religiosity and belief in the supernatural) can be explained by a common latent 
factor, which we described as ‘S’, and further, that this factor is positively associated with 
death anxiety. The present study examined whether this factor is enhanced following MS 
manipulation. We conducted an online experimental study involving 245 participants who 
were divided into two group (123 in the MS group and 122 in the experimental group) and 
found that MS manipulation increased the participants’ death anxiety, decreased their 
analytical reasoning according to the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and enhanced S. An 
important novel finding was that some participants, especially those in the MS condition, 
failed to adhere to the experimental protocol. When those participants were compared with 
the compliant participants by means of a two-way ANOVA that also included the group 
condition, a main effect for the group condition but no effect for compliance was found in the 
case of the CRT. Moreover, in relation to death anxiety, the experimental effect remained, 
although the non-compliant participants also showed greater death anxiety than the 
compliant participants. In the case of S, there was a strong effect for the non-compliant 
participants scoring higher, although the effect for the experimental manipulation narrowly 
failed to reach the level of significance. In conclusion, strong beliefs can be impacted by 





Pathological beliefs, which in the psychiatric literature are also known as delusions, are 
defined in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) as ‘Fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of 
conflicting evidence’. However, it has long been recognised that it is difficult to distinguish 
between pathological and non-pathological beliefs on the basis of their epistemic 
characteristics (Sullivan-Bissett et al., 2017). Moreover, epidemiological evidence indicates 
that these kinds of beliefs are much more common than the psychiatric admission statistics 
imply (van Os, 2000). Thus, it is reasonable to search for common factors involved in all kinds 
of beliefs that are emotionally charged, held with strong conviction and resistant to change. 
Such beliefs, which have been described as MES (because they afford an explanatory 
framework that is pertinent to a wide range of real-life experiences; Bentall, 2018), include 
religious and political ideologies. 
 In two recent studies, Alsuhibani et al., (manuscript submitted for publication) sought 
to determine whether there are any common mechanisms underlying the most common 
types of delusional systems, paranoia and other MES beliefs (i.e. paranoia, conspiracy 
theories, religiosity, nationalism and paranormal beliefs). They did so by testing whether 
survey data collected from representative samples of the UK population fitted a bifactor 
model that assumes that different types of beliefs can be explained by specific factors related 
to each system as well as by a common general factor that affects them all, a latent strong 
beliefs factor termed ’S’ (for strong belief). In both studies, the bifactor model proved superior 
to confirmatory factor analysis models that treated the specific belief systems as independent 
factors. Further investigation revealed that the latent factor S was strongly associated with 
poor analytical reasoning (as measured using the CRT; Sirota & Juanchich, 2018) and positively 




specific belief factors. Hence, death anxiety (positively) and analytic reasoning (negatively) 
appeared to operate through S to render any belief system held by the individual stronger. 
 
6.2.1 Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
TMT is a social psychological theory that attempts to explain the relationship between anxiety 
regarding death and various psychological and social phenomena (Solomon et al., 2015). 
According to the theory, many cultural phenomena play a role in minimising the fear of death. 
Culture provides people with a purpose in life and also prescribes beliefs and practices that 
influence behaviour and expectations, thereby diverting people from the existential terror of 
death. Most cultures view death as the final step after living a normalised life that promises 
fulfilment in humans (Burke et al., 2010). Many cultures also promote belief in the immortality 
of humans (Wolfe & Tubi, 2019), and such beliefs provide comfort in relation to the dreaded 
event that is death. Beliefs such as reincarnation, afterlife and heavenly souls are developed 
through religion and culture, and their main goal is to mitigate people’s existential terror (Juhl 
& Routledge, 2016). Symbolically, people manage the fear of death by developing perceptions 
of the continuity of their existence after death, particularly through their children, being a 
member of a particular tribe or culture and the legacy that they intend to leave behind (Darrell 
& Pyszczynski, 2016). Such beliefs are meant to provide people with a sense of security in life, 
and they are quite extensive today due to the development of numerous cultural beliefs 
worldwide (Routledge & Vess, 2018).  
 
6.2.2 Worldview Defence 
One of the core principles of TMT is that people need to sustain their faith in a meaningful 




there is a purpose to their existence (Arndt & Goldenberg, 2017). Another core principle of 
TMT is the belief that individuals are valued within the context of a meaningful worldview 
(Greenberg et al., 2016). At its heart, this requires that the worldview constructed by 
individuals places them at the centre of natural events that take place around them (Wolfe & 
Tubi, 2019). This corresponds with the concept of self-esteem, and it implies that people need 
to develop a perception of the self as an important entity in life (Pyszczynski et al., 2019). 
Believing in one’s self-worth is, therefore, integral to protecting the mind from overthinking 
about the finiteness of life (Yetzer et al., 2018).   
 For this reason, it is expected that people will act to defend their cultural worldview 
when their MS is threatened (Florian et al., 2001). In a meta-analytic integration of published 
studies that have tested this hypothesis, Burke et al., (2010) found a robust effect size for the 
MS manipulations (r = .35). However, all the included manipulations were very similar, 
typically requiring participants to spend a brief period contemplating their own death. Thus, 
it is possible that the results would not be replicated in real-life near-death experiences, which 
prompt many people to re-evaluate their values, rejecting cultural ones and embracing more 
personal ones (Martin et al., 2004). 
 If MS does indeed strengthen individuals’ worldview defence, given that individuals’ 
worldviews differ, it presumably must do so through the common mechanism S that underlies 
all worldviews (that the present study terms MES).  
  
6.2.3 Purpose of the Study 
This experimental study sought to test the hypothesis that MS increases the strong belief 
factor S. Thus, we measured S in the participants after they had been induced to think about 




procedure; the control condition). We also assessed the impact of MS on the two factors we 
previously identified as being predictive of S, namely death anxiety (based on the expectation 
that it should be increased by MS, which can be considered a manipulation check) and 
analytical reasoning (a previous study found that mortality salience leads to a decrease in 




The participants were recruited, and the study administered online by the survey company 
Qualtrics using the same sampling frame as employed in the previous study, with the 
participants being stratified by sex, age and household income. Some 450 UK residents 
attempted the survey, with 245 actually completing it. Non-completion occurred due to the 
failure to get to the end of the survey or due to exclusion because of a duplicated Internet 
Protocol address associated with identical age and sex. Of the participants who completed 
the survey, 118 (48.2%) were male and had a mean age of 31.13 years (SD = 14.56), while 127 
(51.8%) were female and had a mean age of 24.46 years (SD = 16.72).  
 
6.3.2 Measures 
We used the most widely employed form of MS priming manipulation (Rosenblatt et al., 
1989), which consists of two open-ended questions: ‘Please briefly describe the emotions that 
the thought of your own death arouses in you’ and ‘Jot down, as specifically as you can, what 
you think will happen to you as you physically die’. For the aversive control condition, the 
word ‘death’ was replaced with ‘dental pain’ in the two open-ended questions (i.e., ‘Please 




as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you are physically experience 
dental pain’. To ensure that the participants spent sufficient time on the task, they were asked 
to write a minimum of 300 characters (4–5 sentences) for each question.  
 To prevent the activation of defensive processes that might prevent the detection of 
a MS effect, previous researchers have recommended that participants be required to 
complete distraction and delay tasks prior to completing the outcome measure and, further, 
that such tasks should not be too complicated, too long or related to thoughts of death 
(Pyszczynski, 1999; Solomon et al., 2015). In Burke et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis, the effects of 
MS were found to be greater after a delay.  
  In the present study, we used two delay tasks. First, we asked the participants to read 
a short passage from ‘The Growing Stone’, a story included in the collection Exile and the 
Kingdom by Albert Camus (1957) (Greenberg et al., 1994). The passage was chosen because 
it was recommended as a delay task on the Terror Management Theory website 
(https://tmt.missouri.edu/materials.html) and describes a scene at night (Table 6.S1). 
Second, we used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), as it is the delay task 
most commonly used in relation to MS manipulation (Burke et al., 2010). 
 During a preliminary inspection of our data, we noticed that some participants did not 
adhere to the experimental protocol, typically through writing about topics other than death 
or dental pain. In a post-hoc analysis, the answers given during the MS and control tasks were, 
therefore, reviewed by the first author and assigned a score of 1 = valid response (for those 
who completed the task by writing a minimum of 300 characters that were entirely on topic), 
2 = partially valid response (partially on topic but not all 300 characters pertaining to the topic) 
or 3 = invalid response (response entirely off topic). These scores were then used to divide 




for least one of the conditions) and those who showed poor adherence (a score of 3 for at 
least one of the conditions). 
 The PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) consists of two ten-item scales designed to measure 
the mood dimensions of positive and negative affect. The participants are presented with 
single mood descriptors (e.g., excited) and then asked to rate, on a five-point scale ranging 
from ‘very slightly or not at all’ to ‘very much’, the extent to which they feel each of the mood 
states ‘right now’. The alpha coefficient in this study for positive affect was .85, while for 
negative affect it was .91.  
The Strong Beliefs Scale is 25-item scale designed especially for use in this study. It 
was derived from the bifactor model described in Alsuhibani et al. (manuscript submitted for 
publication). We chose the two items that loaded the highest on the strong belief factor from 
each of the scales, namely PADS (e.g. ‘When I am out in public, people sometimes talk about 
me’), GCBS (e.g. ‘Secret organisations communicate with extra-terrestrials but keep this fact 
from the public’), paranormal beliefs (e.g. ‘A horoscope can accurately tell person’s future’), 
religiosity (e.g. ‘God sometimes reveals His will directly to human beings’), nationalism (e.g. 
‘Generally speaking, Britain is a better country than most other countries’) and patriotism 
(e.g. ‘I love my country’). The participants’ responses were rated on five-point scale ranging 
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The alpha coefficient for the scale was .91. 
However, because we were interested in the latent construct S, we performed a confirmatory 
factor analysis in Mplus 7.0 (Muthen & Muthen, 2013) with a robust maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLR; Yuan & Bentler, 2000) to obtain the factor scores for the strong beliefs scale. 
The CRT (Sirota & Juanchich, 2018) is a seven-item scale, to which we added a further 




item scale used a four-option multiple choice format with the choices presented in a random 
order, as recommended by Sirota and Juanchich (2018). The alpha coefficient was 0.74. 
The Death Anxiety Inventory (Tomás-Sábado et al., 2005) is a 17-item scale featuring 
four subscales (Externally Generated Death Anxiety, Death Acceptance, Death Finality and 
Thoughts About Death). The participants’ responses were rated on a five-point scale ranging 
from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally agree’. The alpha coefficient for the total scale was .93, while 
the subscales’ alphas were .75 for Externally Generated Death Anxiety, .83 for Death 
Acceptance, .86 for Death Finality and .82 for Thoughts About Death. Given the high inter-
correlations between the subscales (r = .58 – .78), we decided to use the total scale score. 
 
6.3.3 Procedure 
The information page informed the participants that the survey was designed to investigate 
why people hold strong beliefs about religion, politics and the world. After providing informed 
consent, the participants were randomly assigned to either the MS priming manipulation or 
the dental control priming using the randomisation procedure in the Qualtrics software. After 
the priming task, the participants completed the ‘The Growing Stone’ and the PANAS as filler 
tasks, before completing the strong beliefs questionnaire, the CRT and (because we worried 






6.3.4 Analysis  
We used an independent-samples T-test to compare the mean scores for the PANAS, Death 
Anxiety Inventory, CRT and Strong Beliefs Scale between the two experimental groups (MS 
and control). Then, to explore the impact of adherence or non-adherence to the priming 
protocol, we used a two-way between-subjects ANOVA with the group (MS vs control) and 
adherence vs non-adherence to protocol as factors. All the analyses were conducted using 
IBM SPSS Statistics version 25.  
 
6.4 Results 
The means and SDs for the dependent variables are presented in Table 6.1, which also shows 
the confidence intervals for the differences between the groups. The results of the Levene’s 
tests of the inequality of the variances were all non-significant. There were significant 
differences found between the groups in terms of the scores, the MS group scored higher and 
positive mean in the negative affect PANAS (t(243) = 2.46, p = .015), Death Anxiety Inventory 
(t(243) = 3.13, p =.002) and CRT (t(243) = -2.75, p = .006), while a just significant effect was 
found for the Strong Beliefs Scale (t(243) = 1.98, p = .049). Given that multiple tests used in 
those comparisons, the final comparison for strong beliefs should be treated with extreme 






Descriptive Statistics and Confidence Intervals for the MS and Control Groups 
 
N Mean SD 
Mean 
Difference 
95% CI of the Diff. 
Lower Upper 
Strong Beliefs MS 123 0.12 0.97 
0.243 0.001 0.485 
Control 122 -0.12 0.95 
Positive Affect 
(PANAS) 
MS 123 28.24 7.98 
0.662 -1.385 2.709 
Control 122 27.58 8.29 
Negative Affect 
(PANAS) 
MS 123 22.19 9.79 
2.982 .590 5.374 
Control 122 19.20 9.21 
Death Anxiety MS 123 50.67 14.68 
5.806 2.151 9.461 




MS 123 10.35 3.71 
-1.298 -2.227 -0.369 Control 122 11.65 3.67 
 
When we compared the two groups (MS and control) with regard to the quality of 
their answers during the priming task, we found that the MS group failed to complete the 
task properly (38/123) more frequently than the control group (21/122) (χ2 (1, N=123) = 6.27, 
p = 0.012). 
The groups’ scores in the two conditions, when broken down according to whether 
they adhered or did not adhere to the experimental protocol, are presented in Figure 6.1. The 
two-way ANOVA (group x adherence) for death anxiety revealed a significant experimental 
effect (F(1, 245) = 6.261, p = .013) as well as greater death anxiety in those who failed to 




experimental group and the answer type was found to be non-significant (F(1. 245) = .218 p 
= .641). 
A comparable analysis concerning the CRT revealed a significant effect for the 
experimental group (F(1, 245) = 8.146, p = .005), although the adherence effect and the 
interaction between the experimental group and adherence were not found to be significant 
(F(1, 245) = 1.349, p = .247 and F(1, 245) = 1.972, p = .161, respectively). 
Finally, the two-way ANOVA concerning strong beliefs showed a strong effect for 
adherence (F(1, 245) = 13.756, p < 0.001) with a narrowly non-significant effect for the 
experimental condition (F(1, 245) = 3.211, p = .074) and a non-significant effect for the 
interaction (F(1, 245) = 1.394, p = .239).  
Figure 6.1  













Although previous studies of MS found it to exert non-significant effects on the PANAS 
(Tremayne & Curtis, 2007; Trémolière et al., 2013), the present study found that the MS group 
reported higher negative affect when compared with the control group. This arises the 
questions around the distraction task and whether it is appropriate to be used as a distraction 
or not. Despite this inconsistency with previous reports, the findings of this study indicate 
that the MS manipulation represented an effective emotional stimulus. Also, the MS 
manipulation increased death anxiety, poor analytical reasoning CRT, and enhanced S.  
Only a few prior studies have employed death anxiety as an outcome variable 
following MS interventions, probably because terror management theorists (e.g. Greenberg 
et al., 1997) have tended to assume that worldview defence serves to prevent death anxiety 
from being experienced. However, Routledge et al. (2013) observed an effect on death 
anxiety, albeit only in those participants who reported a low personal need for structure (i.e. 
who did not exhibit a tendency to seek out clear and certain perceptions of the world). In this 
study, we did not measure the need for structure, and higher death anxiety was observed in 
those participants who had experienced the MS intervention. Our analytical reasoning results 
were consistent with those of Trémolière et al. (2013), with thoughts of death being found to 
be associated with poor analytical reasoning in the MS group. In the group comparisons, a 
weak effect was noted on the strong belief factor S, as we had hypothesised.   
 An interesting complication arose in this study from the observation that some 
participants failed to adhere to the study protocol, which was especially common in the MS 
group. The fact that there was a main effect with regard to adherent vs non-adherent 
participants on death anxiety represents strong evidence that non-adherence is associated 




reasoning, adherence vs non-adherence did not appear to modify the effect of MS. Indeed, 
the participants in the MS condition performed worse irrespective of whether they followed 
the protocol or not. In relation to the strong belief factor, S, however, a very strong effect on 
the part of adherence was found, implying that the worldview defence was especially strong 
in those who were intolerant of death anxiety. A trend was noted in the expected direction 
of the intervention effect, although it failed to reach significance. 
 Overall, the findings of this study provide partial support for our hypothesis that 
thoughts regarding death can impact the mechanisms linked to strong belief in general, 
although they also raise a number of further questions. First, no previous research has 
considered compliance vs non-compliance with regard to the experimental protocol and the 
possibility that non-compliance is related to intolerance of death-related thoughts 
(Pyszczynski, personal communication). Thus, our observations concerning this effect are 
novel and potentially informative with regard to the mechanisms underlying MS, although 
they still require replication. Second, it is unclear whether any effect on S is mediated by 
increased death anxiety and impaired analytical reasoning. As these measures were 
administered after the measurement of S, it was not appropriate to conduct a mediational 
analysis, although this should be addressed in future research. 
 It is important to recognise that this study had a number of strengths and limitations. 
The major strength of the study was the fact that it involved a larger and more representative 
sample than in many previous MS studies. It could be argued that online presentation is a 
weakness, although such an approach ensured that experimenter cuing effects were 
eliminated, which could be seen as a strength. Another limitation is that we used four t- tests 
to compare group outcomes (scores on PANAS, death anxiety, CRT, strong beliefs), raising the 




conservative) would give a critical p value of 0.05/4 = 0.0125. Therefore, the differences 
observed, especially on the strong beliefs measure, should be treated with considerable 
caution. Also, the answers of the MS manipulation would be better if they were reviewed by 
an independent rater (blind to the hypotheses) rather than the first author. Finally, we did 
not administer our outcome measures prior to the experimental manipulation because 
parallel forms were not available for death anxiety or S and because we feared that presenting 
the Death Anxiety Scale would prime MS effects and, therefore, undermine our ability to 
detect group differences. As a consequence, we could only make group comparisons and so 
were unable to observe any pre-to-post changes in our dependent measures. In future 
studies, this problem could be solved by developing parallel form measures of S and death 
anxiety and then administering them some time (perhaps a few weeks) prior to the 
experimental manipulation. In conclusion, MS manipulation could enhance the strong belief 






Chapter 7. General Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the contributions of the present thesis to knowledge in the field. As such, 
it critically examines the findings of the studies on MES. Many strongly held beliefs are 
resistant to counterargument, which means that many of the beliefs we consider to be 
pathological (i.e., delusions) may be at least partially explicable in terms of the processes that 
facilitate strong beliefs in general. 
 
7.2 Summary of the Key Results of Each Study 
Table 7.1 summarises the data samples employed in this thesis. In the first paper, our 
confirmatory factor analyses concerning the three studies showed that paranoia and 
conspiracist thinking were better explained as two correlated factors rather than as a single 
factor model. These two distinct yet correlated factors were also both correlated with a 
number of psychological constructs, for example, the two factors of the external locus of 
control (chance and powerful others). Loneliness was also correlated with both paranoia and 
conspiracist thinking, although the effect was greater in relation to paranoia. Paranoia was 
highly associated with high negative self-esteem and low positive self-esteem, whereas 






 All the data collected in this thesis, Sample , the sample size, and the chapters used it.  
Data collected Sample Sample 
size 
Data used in 
First survey  Online survey, sample from University 
of Liverpool, University of Oxford, and 
Ulster University.  
496 Chapter 3: first study. 
Second survey Representative of the UK population 
sample by Qualtrics. 
1508 Chapter 3: second study. 
Chapter 5: first study. 
 
Third survey Online survey by Qualtrics, sample 
from twitter. 
488 Chapter 4: first study. 
Fourth survey Replication of the UK population 
sample. Online survey by Qualtrics. 
638 Chapter 3: third study. 
Chapter 4: second study. 
Chapter 5: second study. 
Fifth survey Online experiment by Qualtrics. 245 Chapter 6. 
 
 These results are consistent with those of prior studies (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018; 
Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Kay & Eibach, 2013; Kay et al., 2008; Tiernan et al., 2014; van Prooijen 
& Acker, 2015). However, in the present study, insecure attachment (anxious attachment) 
and avoidant attachment were both found to be highly associated with paranoia when 
compared with conspiracist thinking. The final psychological construct we studied was 
analytical reasoning, and we found poor analytical reasoning to be associated with only 
conspiracist thinking. 
In the second paper, we sought to fill a gap in the literature concerning religious beliefs 
by developing a scale that could measure monotheism and atheism as two distinct factors. 
The confirmatory factor analyses showed that monotheism and atheism were better 
explained as two separate dimensions than as one dimension. The second paper also 
investigated the association of both death anxiety and analytical reasoning with the two belief 
systems. It found that death anxiety was associated with religious beliefs but not with atheist 
beliefs, while analytical reasoning was negatively associated with religious beliefs but had no 




In the third paper, with regard to the first study, we attempted to confirm the 
presence of a common strong belief element in all nine different kinds of beliefs, namely 
paranoia, conspiracy theories, religiosity, social liberalism, personal liberalism, conservatism, 
and belief in witchcraft, superstition and precognition. The study compared the separate 
correlated factors with a bifactor model that included a common underlying factor to explain 
the covariation between the belief systems. The utilised method involved comparing model 
fit indices, for example, the non-significant chi-square, comparative fit index, the Tucker Lewis 
index of best fit and the Bayesian information criterion. Using the thresholds for these indices, 
beliefs that were not related to a general tendency toward strong beliefs were eliminated. 
Bifactor-specific statistics concerning the reliability, hierarchical and relative omega values 
were also used to interrogate the bifactor models. Moreover, multivariate and bivariate 
regression models were employed to study the effects of age, gender, analytical reasoning 
and death anxiety on the general and specific factors used in the bifactor model. 
The first study found preliminary evidence regarding the hypothesised general belief 
factor S. Nonetheless, the threshold for strong beliefs entailing adequate fit indices for the 
model was only arrived at after excluding political beliefs. The model also showed low-
reliability levels for beliefs related to the supernatural. The inferred latent factor we termed 
‘S’ contributed considerably to paranoia, conspiracy and religious beliefs, and it made 
equivocal contributions to supernatural beliefs. Aside from these findings, the study also 
noted a strong relation between death anxiety and paranoia in the multivariate model in 
which the other beliefs were included. 
The second study involved the development of a confirmatory factor model with 
which the previously identified strong beliefs could be confirmed. It focused on seven 




patriotism, nationalism, witchcraft, superstition and precognition), which were each loaded 
on separate uncorrelated factors within the bifactor model. Essentially, all the beliefs with 
belief scales that were low or negative in the bifactor model that showed no strong relation 
to the general tendency toward strong belief were eliminated. The eliminated beliefs had 
been hypothesised to be beliefs related to atheism and patriotism.  
The method of analysing the associations of S with specific factors (age, gender, 
analytical thinking and death anxiety) applied in the first study was also used in the second 
study. The second study, therefore, replicated the first, albeit with improved measures that 
were sufficient to confirm its findings. The general finding of the second study was that the 
hypotheses were supported by the excellent overall fit of the final bifactor model. Death 
anxiety and analytical reasoning were found to be stronger predictors of S than any of the 
other beliefs, as was the case in the first study. However, in the second study, the 
supernatural belief dimensions were found to exhibit low levels of S reliability when assessed 
using the same measures as used in the first study. 
The fourth paper detailed an online experimental study conducted to determine 
whether MS enhances the mechanisms behind the strong belief latent factor S identified in 
the earlier bifactor analyses. Independent-samples T-tests were used to compare the mean 
scores of the PANAS, Death Anxiety Inventory and Strong Beliefs Scale between the 
experimental groups – one of which had been induced to think about non-mortality 
threatening aversive experiences and one that had not – in order to assess the impact of 
death anxiety. A two-way ANOVA of the groups was also conducted to identify the level of 
adherence and non-adherence to the study protocol. 
The study found that the MS group reported higher negative affect when compared 




effects on both positive and negative affect scales (Tremayne & Curtis, 2007; Trémolière et 
al., 2013). The analytical reasoning results were consistent with those of some prior studies 
that found thoughts of death to be associated with poor analytical reasoning in the MS group 
(Trémolière et al., 2013). The overall findings supported the hypothesis that thoughts of death 
affect the mechanisms linked to strong beliefs. Post hoc, we wondered whether these findings 
could have been compromised by the non-compliance with the experimental protocols on 
the part of some of the study’s participants. We found that the level of non-compliance was 
greater in the MS condition and, surprisingly, that the effects on the outcome variables were 
the greatest in the non-compliant participants. One plausible explanation for this is that non-
compliance reflected a peculiar sensitivity to mortality issues, meaning that, paradoxically, 
these participants showed a strong MS effect simply as a consequence of being asked to 
perform the intervention task. This would imply that death anxiety was causal in terms of the 
observed effects. However, although the intervention brought about an increase in death 
anxiety and a decrease in analytical reasoning, as the measures were administered after the 
assessment of S, this represents an interesting area of future research. 
 
7.3 Contributions and Limitations 
The present study contributes to the explication of MES due to its many strengths. To begin 
with, it drew data from a large representative sample of the UK population, and it also tested 
a wide range of beliefs. Another major strength is the fact that the replication studies detailed 
in the first three papers confirmed the initial findings, thereby boosting their credibility. 
However, although the bifactor analysis results were acceptable with regard to the 
general dimension, some of the specific dimensions yielded questionable replicability and 




reliable variances in studies one and two, respectively, although little reliable variance was 
observed in some of the specific belief factors when this general dimension was eliminated. 
In study one, for example, witchcraft and superstition both had variances of 17% and 
precognition of 31%, while in study two, witchcraft had a variance of 30%, superstition of 21% 
and precognition of only 8%. These low variances suggest that very little reliable variance can 
be explained by factors specific to the beliefs in question. The fact that the bifactor model 
was only adequate after excluding political beliefs in the first study, as well as after excluding 
patriotism and atheism in the second study, suggests that a general dimension reflecting a 
propensity to hold strong beliefs cannot account for all belief systems. Although we predicted 
these findings with regard to atheism and patriotism, we did not preregister these 
predictions, which represents a weakness of the study. Overall, the findings point to the need 
to develop a strong theoretical statement regarding which beliefs are affected by S prior to 
proceeding to further any preregistered replications. 
A second limitation of the research concerns the fact that the different studies used 
common datasets. This meant that, for example, we did not consider death anxiety in the 
structural equation models comparing paranoia and conspiracy theories simply because, at 
the time that the work was performed, we had not developed the theoretical formulation of 
S that informed our bifactor analyses. Some findings did not replicate across the studies, 
possibly due to the different analytic models involved. Most conspicuously, in the structural 
equation models comparing paranoia to conspiracy theories, deficient analytical reasoning 
appeared to make very little contribution to paranoia, while in the bifactor studies, we 
seemed to find a strong relationship between both conspiracy theories and S, which was in 




analytical reasoning does have a strong influence on paranoia, albeit via the strong belief 
common factor S. 
 
7.4 MES and Delusions 
A final limitation of the present study is the fact that it did not include clinical samples. This 
could be considered a major oversight given that the whole project was inspired by the 
thought that there may be common factors involved in delusional beliefs and MES such as 
religious and political beliefs, as postulated by Bentall (2018). The original intention was to 
conduct parallel studies with samples of patients with psychosis, although this was ultimately 
not possible due to the time and resources required to undertake the studies reported in this 
thesis. As the similarity hypothesis implies, would deluded patients show high levels of death 
anxiety and impaired analytical reasoning and, further, would they show a greater propensity 
to strongly hold non-delusional beliefs? A few studies have reported high death anxiety 
among psychiatric patients in general (Pollak, 1980; Templer et al., 1971), while others have 
reported poor analytical reasoning among patients with psychosis (Freeman et al., 2014; 
Puveendrakumaran et al., 2020), although to the best of our knowledge no studies have 
examined, for example, the propensity for strong political and religious beliefs among 
psychotic samples. This appears to be a fruitful avenue of future research. 
 The idea that common factors play a role in delusional and non-delusional beliefs does 
not preclude the possibility that there are also specific factors that play a role in delusional 
beliefs. It would be useful, therefore, if future studies conducted comparisons between 
deluded patients and people with strong political and religious ideologies, for example, using 
the phenomenological approaches briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. In his account of the MES 




are not shared with other people. Thus, to understand what makes delusions different, it may 
be necessary to focus on both the social-cognitive processes and environmental factors (e.g. 
social isolation) that affect belief transmission and proliferation within different populations. 
Interestingly, a recent epidemiological study found social isolation to be very strongly 
associated with paranoid beliefs (Butter et al., 2017). 
 The present findings may have clinical implications, although this issue needs to be 
explored in future clinical studies. For example, little or no attention has been paid to the 
question of whether addressing death anxiety might prove useful in psychotic patients. In 
fact, perhaps because death anxiety is to some extent a universal human condition (Becker, 
1974), the psychological research on how to address it remains sparce and, to some extent, 
centred on philosophical insights rather than psychological theory (Yalom, 2008). One 
approach that may be more easily implemented involves enhancing analytical reasoning 
(Cullen et al., 2018; Ku & Ho, 2010; Lambe et al., 2016). 
 
7.5 Final Comments 
The four studies described in this thesis explored the concept of MES and yielded insights into 
the common factors that may underlie strongly held beliefs as well as certain factors that 
distinguish particular sets of beliefs. The findings provide initial and qualified support for the 
notion that there may be common processes underlying many tenaciously held belief 
systems. This work was largely exploratory and, although none of the included studies can be 
considered definitive, it sets the agenda for the future replication, expansion and refinement 
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 Additional measures included in the three surveys. Note that each survey was 




Duke University Religion Index (DUREL; Koenig and Büssing, 2010) a five-item measure of 
religious involvement. The scale covers three major dimensions of religiosity: organizational 
religious activity (ORA) (e.g. “How often do you attend church or other religious meetings?”; 
non-organizational religious activity (NORA) (e.g. “How often do you spend time in private 
religious activities, such as prayer, meditation or studying religious texts?” and intrinsic (or 
subjective) religiosity (IR) (e.g. “In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., 
God)”. Participants have to respond on 6-point scales for the activity measures (from 
“Never” to “More than once/week” for ORA and from “Rarely or never” to “More than once 
a day” for the NORA), and respond using 5-point scales (“Definitely not true” to “Definitely 
true of me”) for the intrinsic religiosity items. 
 
Social and Political Attitudes Scale (Wilson and Patterson, 1968) is a 14 item scale compiled 
from previous scales. Participants are asked to what extent they favour each item (e.g. “The 
death Penalty”, “Spending money on the demand forces”, “Legalized abortion” and “Lower 
taxes to promote business”). And they have to respond on 5-point scales ranging from 





Identity constructs was assessed by using three-items: “I identify with….”; “I feel a sense of 
belonging to….”; “I feel strong ties with….” The first and last were taken from Doosje et al.’s 
(1995); The third item, ‘I feel a sense of belonging to’ was added as the literature suggested 
that having strong ties or identifying with a group did not in fact mean that an individual felt 
they ‘belonged’ (Lee and Robbins, 1998).  
 Each item is rated along a 7-point scale (“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”) for 
eight different constructs: “my family”; “my friends in my home town”; “my university”; “my 
friends at university”; “people with the same religious beliefs as me”; “people I attend a 
place of worship with”; “people who share my political opinions”; “a political organization or 
party”. The scale has previously been piloted in a study of social identity in Liverpool 
University students (in preparation for publication). 
 
One-item self-esteem scale (Robins et al., 2001): “I have high self-esteem” rated on a 7-point 
scale (“Not very true of me” to “Very true of me”). 
 
The Short Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (SWEMWBS; Haver et al., 2015) In 
this 7-item short scale, participants will read statements about feelings and thoughts (e.g. 
“I’ve been feeling optimistic about the future”; “I’ve been feeling relaxed”; “I’ve been 
dealing with problems well”; and “I’ve been feeling close to other people”. The SWEMWBS 
is scored on a 5-point scale, ranging from “none of the time” to “all of the time”. 
 
The Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R; Haidt, McCauley and Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji et 
al., 2007). The DS-R consists of 25-items and covering 3 dimensions of disgust: core disgust 




The DS-R items are divided into two parts, part 1 with items from 1 to 13 to answer with 2-
point scale (True or False) (e.g. “I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under some 
circumstances”, “Seeing a cockroach in someone else’s house doesn’t bother me”, “I would 
go out of my way to avoid walking through a graveyard”, and “I never let any part of my 
body touch the toilet seat in a public washroom”). Items in part 2 from 14 to 25 ask the 
participant’s opinion about different experiences (e.g. “if you see someone put ketchup on 
vanilla ice cream and eat it, “You are about to drink a glass of milk when you smell that it is 
spoiled” and “A friend offers you a piece of chocolate shaped like dog-doo”) and the 
answers are a 3-points scale (Not, Slightly and Very). 
 
Study 2: 
Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS; Huber and Huber, 2012) is a 15-item scale (e.g. “How 
often do you think about religious issues?”, “To what extent do you believe that God or 
something divine exists?” and “How often do you take part in religious services?”. 
Responses for 12 items are rated on 5-point scales (“Never” to “Very often”). While 3 items 
only are rated on 8-point scales (“Never” to “Several times a day”). 
 
Social and Political Attitudes Scale (Wilson and Patterson, 1968) is a 14-item scale compiled 
from previous scales. Participants are asked to what extent they favour each item (e.g. “The 
death Penalty”, “Spending money on the demand forces”, “Legalized abortion” and “Lower 
taxes to promote business”). And they have to respond on 5-point scales ranging from 





Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) is a 26 item scale distributed on 7 different 
subscales (Traditional religious belief, Psi, Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, 
Extraordinary life forms and Precognition). In this study three subscales only were used. 
Witchcraft (4 items) (e.g. “Black magic really exists” and “There are actual cases of 
witchcraft”), Superstition (3 items) (e.g. “Black cats can bring bad luck” and “The number 13 
is unlucky”) and Precognition (4 items) (e.g. “Astrology is a way to accurately predict the 
future” and “Some psychics can accurately predict the future”). Responses are rated on 7-
point scales (“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”). 
 
The Death Anxiety Inventory (Tomás-Sábado, Gómez-Benito and Limonero, 2005) is a 17-
item scale with four subscales (Externally Generated Death Anxiety, Death Acceptance, 
Death Finality and Thoughts About Death). Responses are rated on 5-point scales (“Totally 
disagree” to “Totally agree”). 
 
Social Network Index (Cohen et al., 1997) is a 12-item scale that assesses participation in 12 
types of social relationships. These include relationships with a spouse, parents, parents-in-
law, children, other close family members, close neighbours, friends, workmates, 
schoolmates, fellow volunteers, members of groups without religious affiliation, and 
religious groups. 
 
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (Garrett and Weeks, 2017) is a 12-item scale divided into three 
subscales; Faith in Intuition for facts (e.g. “I trust my gut to tell me what's true and what's 




political (e.g. “Facts are dictated by those in power”). Responses are rated on 5-point scale 
(1 = “Strongly disagree”, 5 = “Strongly Agree”). 
 
Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney, 1992). A three-subscales (Ethnic group (e.g. “I 
am active in organizations or social groups that include mostly members of my own ethnic 
group.”), Religious group (e.g. “I have spent time trying to find out more about my religion, 
such as its history, traditions, and customs.”), and Nationality (e.g. “In order to learn more 
about my nationality, I have often talked to other people about my nationality.”) each 
subscale has 12 items. Responses are rated on 5-point scale (1 = “Strongly disagree”, 5 = 
“Strongly Agree”). 
 
Dependence on Routines (Zmigrod, Rentfrow and Robbins, 2018). an 8-item scale measures   
participants’ dependence on routines in their daily lives (e.g. “I tend to change my plans last 
minute.”). Responses was measured with a 5-item Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
characteristic of me) to 5 (entirely characteristic of me). Responses are rated on 5-point 
scale (1 = “Strongly disagree”, 5 = “Strongly Agree”). 
 
The Hopelessness Scale (Fraser et al., 2014). A brief two-item scale (e.g. “The future seems 
to me to be hopeful and I believe that things are changing for the better.” And “I feel that it 
is possible to reach the goals I would like to strive for.) Responses are rated on 5-point scale 
(1 = “Strongly disagree”, 5 = “Strongly Agree”). 
 
Facial trust detection test: based on the trustworthiness dataset (25 identities) from 




databases of the Social Perception Lab’s website 
(http://tlab.princeton.edu/databases/secretdatabaseportal/). The databases consist of 
identities manipulated on different traits (attractiveness, competence, dominance, 
extroversion, likeability, threat, and trustworthiness). We selected randomly using the 
website www.Random.org only 10 computer-generated male faces (5 trustworthy and 5 
untrustworthy). For each face, participants will be simply asked to rate, “How much would 
you trust this person” on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = I would not trust this person at all”, 7 = “I 
would trust this person completely.”). A Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy 
(QCAE; Reniers et al., 2011). 
 
General Trust Questionnaire (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Is a 6-item scale (e.g. “Most 
people are basically honest.” And “I am trustful.”). Responses are rated on a 5-point scale (1 
“Strongly disagree”, 5 “Strongly agree”). 
 
Name Letter Effect (Nuttin, 1987). A measure for implicit self-esteem. Participants have to 
rate the attractiveness or likability of the alphabet letters. Each letter were presented in 
both capital and small case and the participant had to rate the likability to it on a 9-point 
scale (1 “I do not like it at all”, 9 “I like it a lot”)  
 
The Big Five Personality Traits (Rammstedt and John, 2007). a 10-item scale measuring the 
Big Five personality traits Extraversion (e.g. “I see myself as someone who is reserved.”), 
Agreeableness (e.g. “I see myself as someone who is generally trusting”), Conscientiousness 
(e.g. “I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy”), Emotional Stability (e,g, “I see myself 




someone who has an active imagination”). Responses are rated on a 5-point scale (1 
“Strongly disagree”, 5 “Strongly agree”). 
 
Study 3: 
British History Test. This scale was designed specifically for this survey and consists of 10 
true or false questions about Great Britain’s history.  
 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) is a 26-item scale distributed on 7 different 
subscales (Traditional religious belief, Psi, Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, 
Extraordinary life forms and Precognition). In this study three subscales only were used. 
Witchcraft (4 items) (e.g. “Black magic really exists” and “There are actual cases of 
witchcraft”), Superstition (3 items) (e.g. “Black cats can bring bad luck” and “The number 13 
is unlucky”) and Precognition (4 items) (e.g. “Astrology is a way to accurately predict the 
future” and “Some psychics can accurately predict the future”). Responses are rated on 7-
point scales (“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”). 
 
Monotheism and Atheism Beliefs Scale. An 18-item scale distributed on two subscales; 11-
items of Monotheism (e.g. “God is aware of everything we do”) and 7-items on Atheism 
(e.g. “Religious beliefs will ultimately be replaced by scientific theories”) Responses were 
made on a 5-point scale: 1: strongly disagree; 2: disagree; 3: neither agree or disagree; 4: 
agree; 5: strongly agree. 
 
Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism (Davidov, 2010). Constructive Patriotism was 




works?’’; ‘‘How proud are you of Britain National Health Services?’’; and ‘‘How proud are 
you of Britain’s fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?’’ They were measured on a 
4-point scale ranging from 1 (not proud at all) to 4 (very proud). Nationalism was measured 
by two statements: ‘‘The world would be a better place if people from other countries were 
more like the British’’ and ‘‘Generally speaking, Britain is a better country than most other 
countries’’. They were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). 
 
Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire, Short-Form (RFQ3; Storch et al., 2004) 
is a 3-item scale (e.g. “My faith is extremely important to me”). Responses were measures 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 
Authoritarian Parenting Scale (Buri, 1991) We used the authoritarian subscale only in this 
study. 20-item about parent authority; 10-item for mother (e.g. “Whenever my mother told 
me to do something as I was growing up, she expected me to do it immediately without 
asking any questions”) and 10-item for father (e.g. “As I was growing up my father let me 
know what behaviour he expected of me, and if I didn’t meet those expectations, he 
punished me.”). Responses were made on a 5-point scale: 1: strongly disagree; 2: disagree; 
3: neither agree nor disagree; 4: agree; 5: strongly agree. 
 
The Patient Health Questionnaire – Depression Module (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, and 
Williams, 2001) a 9-item scale based on the 9 DSM-IV criteria (e.g. “Little interest or 
pleasure in doing things”) and responses are ranging from “0” (not at all) to “3” (nearly 





Facial trust detection test: based on the trustworthiness dataset (25 identities) from 
(Todorov et al., 2013 and Todorov & Oosterhof, 2011). The faces dataset obtained from the 
databases of the Social Perception Lab’s website  
(http://tlab.princeton.edu/databases/secretdatabaseportal/). The databases consist of 
identities manipulated on different traits (attractiveness, competence, dominance, 
extroversion, likeability, threat, and trustworthiness). We selected randomly using the 
website www.Random.org only 10 computer-generated male faces (5 trustworthy and 5 
untrustworthy). For each face, participants will be simply asked to rate, “How much would 
you trust this person” on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = I would not trust this person at all”, 7 = “I 
would trust this person completely.”).  
 
The Mortality Salience priming manipulation (MS; Rosenblatt et al., 1989) consists of two 
open-ended questions: “Please, briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own 
death arouses in you” and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen 
to you as you physically die.”. For the aversive control condition, the word death will be 
replaced in this survey with dental pain. 
 
Strong Beliefs Questionnaire is a 12-item scale designed especially for this study. It was 
derived from the bifactor model in study 2. We chose the highest factor-loading items on 
the strong belief factor from the scales: PADS (e.g. “Some people want to hurt me 
deliberately..”), GCBS (e.g. “A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all 
major world decisions, such as going to war..”) , Paranormal beliefs (e.g. “A horoscope can 








Study 1 partial correlation coefficients between psychological predictor variables and 
paranoia and conspiracy mentality. 
 
 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
The partial correlations controlled for the other outcome variable (i.e. when paranoia is the 
predicted variable, conspiracy mentality is the control variable and vice-versa).  
Predictor Variables 
Paranoia Conspiracy Mentality 
r Partial r r Partial r  
Attachment Model of Self -.464*** -.455*** -.115* .060 
Model of Others -.188*** -.161** -.110* -.047 
Self-
schemas 
Positive Self -.293*** -.307*** -.017 .098* 
Negative Self .391*** .413*** .012 -.147** 
Positive Others -.206*** -.203*** -.045 .030 
Negative Others .401*** .344*** .255*** .131** 
Locus of 
control 
Internality -.120* -.118* -.028 .016 
Chance .413** .366*** .222*** .089 
Powerful Others .342*** .288*** .223*** .117* 





Study 2 partial correlation coefficients between psychological predictor variables and 
paranoia and conspiracy mentality. 
 
 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
The partial correlations controlled for the other outcome variable (i.e. when paranoia is the 
predicted variable, conspiracy mentality is the control variable and vice-versa). 
  
Predictor Variables 
Paranoia Conspiracy Mentality 
r Partial r r Partial r  
Attachment Model of Self -.434*** -.416*** -.148*** .053* 
Model of Others -.164*** -.198*** .033 .118*** 
Self-esteem Positive  -.242*** -.304*** .070** .202*** 
Negative .729*** .682*** .356*** .058* 
Locus of Control Internality -.028 -.065* .070** .091*** 
Chance .519*** .404*** .438*** .273*** 
Powerful Others .542*** .436*** .430*** .255*** 
Loneliness  .590*** .539*** .287*** .038 
Cognitive 
Reflection Test 






Study 3 partial correlation coefficients between psychological predictor variables and 
paranoia and conspiracy mentality. 
 
 Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
The partial correlations controlled for the other outcome variable (i.e. when paranoia is the 
predicted variable, conspiracy mentality is the control variable and vice-versa). 
  
Predictor Variables 
Paranoia Conspiracy Mentality 
r Partial r r Partial r  
Attachment Avoidant Attachment .039 .034 .020 .000 
Attachment Anxiety .008 -.010 .033 .034 
Self-esteem Positive  -.059 -.096* .048 .090* 
Negative .468*** .322*** .430*** .255*** 
Locus of Control Internality .119** .098* .069 .011 
Chance .413*** .243*** .450*** .307*** 
Powerful Others .432*** .264*** .455*** .306*** 
Narcissism  .195*** .053 .301*** .239*** 
Cognitive 
Reflection Test 




Supplementary Table 5.S1 
Study 1: Bifactor model of standardised correlation with specific factor and general factor: nine 
factors (paranoia, conspiracy mentality, religiosity, 3 paranormal beliefs (witchcraft, superstition and 
precognition) and 3 social and political attitudes (social liberalism, personal liberalism and 
conservatism). 
 
 Item  (se) p 
General Factor 
 (se) p 
Paranoia 
1. My friends often tell me to relax and stop worrying 
about being deceived or harmed. 
.545(.019) < .001 .288(.025) < .001 
2. Sometimes, when I am out in public, I feel that 
people might be talking about me. 
.708(.015) < .001 .303(.024) < .001 
3. I’m often suspicious of other people’s intentions 
towards me. 
.800(.012) < .001 .270(.025) < .001 
4. People will almost certainly lie to me. .704(.015) < .001 .271(.025) < .001 
5. I often worry about being criticized or rejected in 
social situations 
.713(.014) < .001 .294(.025) < .001 
6. I believe that some people want to hurt me 
deliberately. 
.717(.014) < .001 .323(.024) < .001 
7. You should only trust yourself. .500(.021) < .001 .208(.026) < .001 
8. Sometimes I think there are hidden insults in things 
that people say or do. 
.749(.013) < .001 .312(.024) < .001 
Conspiracy mentality 
1. The government is involved in the murder of 
innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and 
keeps this a secret 
.651(.016) < .001 .300(.024) < .001 
2. The power held by heads of state is second to that of 
small unknown groups who really control world politics 
.662(.016) < .001 .329(.024) < .001 
3. Secret organizations communicate with 
extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public 
.510(.018) < .001 .508(.020) < .001 
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the 
result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some 
organization 
.666(.015) < .001 .436(.022) < .001 
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or 
suppress evidence in order to deceive the public 
.626(.017) < .001 .332(.024) < .001 
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of 
terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement 
.689(.015) < .001 .358(.024) < .001 
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible for 
making all major world decisions, such as going to war 
.682(.015) < .001 .412(.022) < .001 
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the 
public 
.491(.019) < .001 .526(.020) < .001 
9. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on 
people without their knowledge 
.568(.017) < .001 .487(.021) < .001 
10. New and advanced technology which would harm 
current industry is being suppressed 
.616(.017) < .001 .358(.023) < .001 
11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its 
involvement in criminal activity. 
.723(.014) < .001 .368(.023) < .001 
12. Certain significant events have been the result of 
the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate 
world events. 
.692(.015) < .001 .439(.022) < .001 
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or 
staged in order to distract the public from real alien 
contact. 
.484(.019) < .001 .528(.020) < .001 
14. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies 
are routinely carried out on the public without their 
knowledge or consent. 
.655(.016) < .001 .384(.023) < .001 
15. A lot of important information is deliberately 
concealed from the public out of self-interest. 
.499(.020) < .001 .216(.026) < .001 
Religiosity 
2. To what extent do you believe that God or something 
divine exists? 
.762(.014) < .001 .403(.023) < .001 
7. To what extent do you believe in an afterlife—e.g. 
immortality of the soul, resurrection of the dead or 
reincarnation? 
.723(.014) < .001 .457(.022) < .001 
12. In your opinion, how probable is it that a higher 
power really exists? 







1. Black magic really exists. .476(.021) .001 .634(.017) < .001 
4. Witches do exist. .536(.020) < .001 .728(.014) < .001 
7. Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is 
possible to cast spells on persons. 
.514(.020) < .001 .689(.015) < .001 
10. There are actual cases of witchcraft. -.242(.022) < .001 .806(.011) < .001 
Superstition 
2. Black cats can bring bad luck. .239(.179) .180 .765(.013) < .001 
5. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck. .829(.628) .187 .760(.013) < .001 
8. The number “13” is unlucky. -.027(.028) .336 .845(.009) < .001 
Precognition 
3. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future. .665(.020) < .001 .590(.018) < .001 
6. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future. .225(.020) < .001 .769(.012) < .001 
9. Some psychics can accurately predict the future. .512(.019) < .001 .713(.014) < .001 
11. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict 
the future. 






3. Multiculturalism. .792(.016) < .001 -.035(.027) .194 
7. Higher benefits for the poor. .448(.024) < .001 -.083(.027) .002 
8. Immigration. .787(.016) < .001 -.065(.027) .015 
11. International government. .524(.022) < .001 -.138(.026) < .001 
12. Rehabilitation for offenders. .491(.023) < .001 .028(.027) .288 
Conservatism 
1. The death penalty. .487(.024) < .001 -.173(.026) < .001 
2. Spending money on the armed forces. .654(.021) < .001 -.055(.027) .040 
4. Stiff jail terms for criminals. .721(.020) < .001 -.007(.027) .797 
10. Lower taxes to promote business. .342(.027) < .001 -.143(.026) < .001 
13. Traditional family values. .638(.022) < .001 -.040(.027) .134 
14. Monogamy. .354(.027) < .001 .009(.027) .730 
Personal 
liberalism 
5. Voluntary euthanasia. .587(.026) < .001 -.053(.027) .049 
6. Gay rights. .573(.026) < .001 -.033(.027) .220 





Supplementary Table 5.S2 
Study 1: Bifactor model of standardised correlation with specific factor and general factor: 
six factors (paranoia, conspiracy mentality, religiosity and 3 paranormal beliefs (witchcraft, 
superstition, and precognition) 
 Item  (se) p 
General Factor 
 (se) p 
Paranoia 
1. My friends often tell me to relax and stop worrying 
about being deceived or harmed. 
.548(.019) < .001 .282(.025) < .001 
2. Sometimes, when I am out in public, I feel that 
people might be talking about me. 
.710(.015) < .001 .298(.025) < .001 
3. I’m often suspicious of other people’s intentions 
towards me. 
.801(.012) < .001 .266(.025) < .001 
4. People will almost certainly lie to me. .705(.015) < .001 .267(.025) < .001 
5. I often worry about being criticized or rejected in 
social situations 
.715(.014) < .001 .290(.025) < .001 
6. I believe that some people want to hurt me 
deliberately. 
.719(.014) < .001 .317(.024) < .001 
7. You should only trust yourself. .502(.020) < .001 .204(.026) < .001 
8. Sometimes I think there are hidden insults in things 
that people say or do. 
.751(.013) < .001 .308(.024) < .001 
Conspiracy mentality 
1. The government is involved in the murder of 
innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and 
keeps this a secret 
.652(.016) < .001 .296(.025) < .001 
2. The power held by heads of state is second to that of 
small unknown groups who really control world politics 
.663(.016) < .001 .326(.024) < .001 
3. Secret organizations communicate with 
extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public 
.515(.018) < .001 .501(.020) < .001 
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the 
result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some 
organization 
.669(.015) < .001 .431(.022) < .001 
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or 
suppress evidence in order to deceive the public 
.627(.016) < .001 .330(.024) < .001 
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of 
terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement 
.691(.015) < .001 .354(.024) < .001 
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible for 
making all major world decisions, such as going to war 
.684(.015) < .001 .408(.023) < .001 
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the 
public 
.494(.019) < .001 .523(.020) < .001 
9. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on 
people without their knowledge 
.571(.017) < .001 .484(.021) < .001 
10. New and advanced technology which would harm 
current industry is being suppressed 
.616(.017) < .001 .357(.024) < .001 
11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its 
involvement in criminal activity. 
.725(.014) < .001 .364(.023) < .001 
12. Certain significant events have been the result of 
the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate 
world events. 
.694(.015) < .001 .436(.022) < .001 
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or 
staged in order to distract the public from real alien 
contact. 
.488(.019) < .001 .524(.020) < .001 
14. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies 
are routinely carried out on the public without their 
knowledge or consent. 
.657(.016) < .001 .380(.023) < .001 
15. A lot of important information is deliberately 
concealed from the public out of self-interest. 
.497(.020) < .001 .218(.026) < .001 
Religiosity 
2. To what extent do you believe that God or something 
divine exists? 
.760(.014) < .001 .406(.023) < .001 
7. To what extent do you believe in an afterlife—e.g. 
immortality of the soul, resurrection of the dead or 
reincarnation? 
.721(.015) < .001 .461(.021) < .001 
12. In your opinion, how probable is it that a higher 
power really exists? 




1. Black magic really exists. .484(.021) < .001 .627(.017) < .001 




7. Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is 
possible to cast spells on persons. 
.520(.020) < .001 .685(.015) < .001 
10. There are actual cases of witchcraft. -.240(.021) < .001 .812(.011) < .001 
Superstition 
2. Black cats can bring bad luck. .245(.209) .242 .761(.013) < .001 
5. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck. .842(.730) .249 .754(013) < .001 
8. The number “13” is unlucky. -.024(.028) .402 .849(.009) < .001 
Precognition 
3. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future. .661(.020) < .001 .594(.018) < .001 
6. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future. .221(.020) < .001 .769(.012) < .001 
9. Some psychics can accurately predict the future. .506(.019) < .001 .718(.014) < .001 
11. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict 
the future. 








Supplementary Table 5.S3 
Study 2: Bifactor model of standardised correlation with specific factor and general factor: nine 
factors (paranoia, conspiracy mentality, constructive patriotism, nationalism, religiosity, atheism, 
and 3 paranormal beliefs (witchcraft, superstition, and precognition) 
 Item  (se) p General Factor 
 (se) p 
Paranoia 
1. It is important to be on guard against being 
deceived or harmed. 
.370(.038) < .001 -.072(.041) .079 
2. When I am out in public, people sometimes 
talk about me. 
.478(.032) < .001 .377(.035) < .001 
3. Other people’s intentions towards me are not 
always good. 
.741(.022) < .001 .174(.040) < .001 
4. People will almost certainly lie to me. .694(.024) < .001 .267(.038) < .001 
5. There is a risk that I will be criticised or 
rejected in social situations. 
.740(.022) < .001 .251(.038) < .001 
6. Some people want to hurt me deliberately. .649(.026) < .001 .390(.035) < .001 
7. You should only trust yourself. .418(.035) < .001 .292(.038) < .001 
8. There are sometimes hidden insults in things 
that people say or do. 
.680(.025) < .001 .257(.038) < .001 
Conspiracy mentality 
1. The government is involved in the murder of 
innocent citizens and/or well-known public 
figures, and keeps this a secret 
.681(.023) < .001 .367(.036) < .001 
2. The power held by heads of state is second to 
that of small unknown groups who really control 
world politics 
.676(.023) < .001 .431(.034) < .001 
3. Secret organizations communicate with 
extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the 
public 
.441(.028) < .001 .647(.025) < .001 
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is 
the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of 
some organization 
.581(.025) < .001 .581(.028) < .001 
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or 
suppress evidence in order to deceive the public 
.595(.026) < .001 .482(.032) < .001 
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of 
terrorism on its own soil, disguising its 
involvement 
.612(.025) < .001 .478(.032) < .001 
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible 
for making all major world decisions, such as 
going to war 
.627(.024) < .001 .522(.030) < .001 
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed 
from the public 
.412(.027) < .001 .676(.023) < .001 
9. Technology with mind-control capacities is 
used on people without their knowledge 
.510(.027) < .001 .591(.027) < .001 
10. New and advanced technology which would 
harm current industry is being suppressed 
.539(.028) < .001 .489(.032) < .001 
11. The government uses people as patsies to 
hide its involvement in criminal activity. 
.682(.023) < .001 .490(.031) < .001 
12. Certain significant events have been the 
result of the activity of a small group who 
secretly manipulate world events. 
.634(.024) < .001 .548(.029) < .001 
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned 
or staged in order to distract the public from real 
alien contact. 
.455(.027) < .001 .646(.025) < .001 
14. Experiments involving new drugs or 
technologies are routinely carried out on the 
public without their knowledge or consent. 
.605(.025) < .001 .522(.030) < .001 
15. A lot of important information is deliberately 
concealed from the public out of self-interest. 
.521(.031) < .001 .223(.039) < .001 
Constructive Patriotism 
CP1: How proud are you of Britain in the way 
democracy works? 
.437(.077) < .001 -.051(.041) .208 
CP2: How proud are you of Britain's National 
Health Services? 
.254(.055) < .001 .048(.041) .240 
CP3: How proud are you of Britain's fair and 
equal treatment of all groups in society?’’ 





N1: The world would be a better place if people 
from other countries were more like the British. 
.896(.025) < .001 .183(.040) < .001 
N2: Generally speaking, Britain is a better country 
than most other countries. 
.736(.038) < .001 .109(.040) .007 
Religiosity 
1. The soul is immortal. .466(.029) < .001 .491(.032) < .001 
2. A higher power really exists. .640(.023) < .001 .522(.030) < .001 
5. God has revealed his plan to us in holy books. .652(.023) < .001 .535(.030) < .001 
6. We can communicate directly to God by 
praying. 
.755(.020) < .001 .480(.032) < .001 
7. Sometimes it is possible for human beings to 
feel the presence of God. 
.744(.020) < .001 .439(.033) < .001 
11. God or something divine sometimes 
interferes in the affairs of human beings. 
.519(.027) < .001 .503(.031) < .001 
13. God sometimes reveals his will directly to 
human beings. 
.693(.022) < .001 .557(.029) < .001 
14. There is an afterlife (immortality of the soul, 
resurrection of the dead or reincarnation). 
.553(.026) < .001 .523(.030) < .001 
16. God is aware of everything we do. .792(.019) < .001 .493(.031) < .001 
17. God hears the prayers of human beings. .807(.019) < .001 .491(.031) < .001 
18. Our fate in the life hereafter is determined by 
our deeds on Earth. 
.579(.025) < .001 .555(.029) < .001 
Atheism 
3. Religious beliefs will ultimately be replaced by 
scientific theories. 
.590(.030) < .001 .058(.041) .155 
4. The idea of God is a delusion. .781(.021) < .001 -.101(.041) .013 
8. Belief in gods has been the source of great 
misery to humankind. 
.576(.031) < .001 -.069(.041) .089 
9. Moral judgement should be based on respect 
for humanity rather than religious doctrine. 
.515(.033) < .001 -.188(.040) < .001 
10. There is nothing in the universe that cannot 
be explained by scientific laws. 
.575(.030) < .001 .003(.041) .945 
12. Praying to God is a waste of time. .775(.021) < .001 -.120(.040) .003 
15. It is wrong to indoctrinate children into a 
religion. 




1. Black magic really exists. .428(.031) < .001 .673(.023) < .001 
4. Witches do exist. .623(.031) < .001 .576(.028) < .001 
7. Through the use of formulas and incantations, 
it is possible to cast spells on persons. 
.184(.027) < .001 .832(.014) < .001 
10. There are actual cases of witchcraft. .586(.031) < .001 .654(.025) < .001 
Superstition 
2. Black cats can bring bad luck. .358(.035) < .001 .734(.020) < .001 
5. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck. .388(.033) < .001 .813(.015) < .001 
8. The number “13” is unlucky. .418(.035) < .001 .765(.018) < .001 
Precognition 
3. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the 
future. 
-.035(.030) .252 .852(.013) 
< .001 
6. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s 
future. 
-.078(.047) .094 .872(.012) 
< .001 
9. Some psychics can accurately predict the 
future. 
.214(.088) .015 .756(.020) 
< .001 
11. Some people have an unexplained ability to 
predict the future. 







Supplementary Table 5.S4 
Study 2: Bifactor model of standardised correlation with specific factor and general factor; seven 
factors (paranoia, conspiracy mentality, nationalism, religiosity, and 3 paranormal beliefs 
(witchcraft, superstition, and precognition) 
 Item  (se) p General Factor 
 (se) p 
Paranoia 
1. It is important to be on guard against being 
deceived or harmed. 
.368(.038) < .001 -.067(.041) .098 
2. When I am out in public, people sometimes 
talk about me. 
.479(.032) < .001 .375(.035) < .001 
3. Other people’s intentions towards me are not 
always good. 
.741(.022) < .001 .174(.040) < .001 
4. People will almost certainly lie to me. .659(.024) < .001 .266(.038) < .001 
5. There is a risk that I will be criticised or 
rejected in social situations. 
.740(.022) < .001 .250(.038) < .001 
6. Some people want to hurt me deliberately. .650(.026) < .001 .388(.035) < .001 
7. You should only trust yourself. .418(.035) < .001 .291(.038) < .001 
8. There are sometimes hidden insults in things 
that people say or do. 
.680(.025) < .001 .259(.038) < .001 
Conspiracy mentality 
1. The government is involved in the murder of 
innocent citizens and/or well-known public 
figures, and keeps this a secret 
.680(.023) < .001 .368(.036) < .001 
2. The power held by heads of state is second to 
that of small unknown groups who really control 
world politics 
.675(.023) < .001 .432(.034) < .001 
3. Secret organizations communicate with 
extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the 
public 
.442(.028) < .001 .645(.025) < .001 
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is 
the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of 
some organization 
.581(.025) < .001 .581(.028) < .001 
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or 
suppress evidence in order to deceive the public 
.593(.026) < .001 .484(.032) < .001 
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of 
terrorism on its own soil, disguising its 
involvement 
.612(.025) < .001 .479(.032) < .001 
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible 
for making all major world decisions, such as 
going to war 
.628(.024) < .001 .522(.030) < .001 
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed 
from the public 
.412(.027) < .001 .676(.023) < .001 
9. Technology with mind-control capacities is 
used on people without their knowledge 
.511(.027) < .001 .589(.027) < .001 
10. New and advanced technology which would 
harm current industry is being suppressed 
.537(.028) < .001 .490(.031) < .001 
11. The government uses people as patsies to 
hide its involvement in criminal activity. 
.681(.023) < .001 .491(.031) < .001 
12. Certain significant events have been the 
result of the activity of a small group who 
secretly manipulate world events. 
.634(.024) < .001 .548(.029) < .001 
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned 
or staged in order to distract the public from real 
alien contact. 
.456(.027) < .001 .645(.025) < .001 
14. Experiments involving new drugs or 
technologies are routinely carried out on the 
public without their knowledge or consent. 
.605(.025) < .001 .522(.030) < .001 
15. A lot of important information is deliberately 
concealed from the public out of self-interest. 
.517(.031) < .001 .228(.039) < .001 
Nationalism 
N1: The world would be a better place if people 
from other countries were more like the British. 
.896(.025) < .001 .183(.040) < .001 
N2: Generally speaking, Britain is a better country 
than most other countries. 
.736(.038) < .001 .109(.040) .007 
Religiosity 
1. The soul is immortal. .467(.029) < .001 .492(.032) < .001 




5. God has revealed his plan to us in holy books. .656(.023) < .001 .530(.030) < .001 
6. We can communicate directly to God by 
praying. 
.758(.020) < .001 .475(.032) < .001 
7. Sometimes it is possible for human beings to 
feel the presence of God. 
.745(.020) < .001 .437(.033) < .001 
11. God or something divine sometimes 
interferes in the affairs of human beings. 
.521(.027) < .001 .501(.031) < .001 
13. God sometimes reveals his will directly to 
human beings. 
.695(.021) < .001 .553(.029) < .001 
14. There is an afterlife (immortality of the soul, 
resurrection of the dead or reincarnation). 
.553(.026) < .001 .523(.030) < .001 
16. God is aware of everything we do. .795(.019) < .001 .488(.031) < .001 
17. God hears the prayers of human beings. .810(.019) < .001 .487(.031) < .001 
18. Our fate in the life hereafter is determined by 
our deeds on Earth. 




1. Black magic really exists. .424(.031) < .001 .675(.023) < .001 
4. Witches do exist. .620(.032) < .001 .580(.028) < .001 
7. Through the use of formulas and incantations, 
it is possible to cast spells on persons. 
.180(.027) < .001 .833(.014) < .001 
10. There are actual cases of witchcraft. .581(.031) < .001 .658(.024) < .001 
Superstition 
2. Black cats can bring bad luck. .364(.035) < .001 .731(.020) < .001 
5. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck. .391(.033) < .001 .812(.015) < .001 
8. The number “13” is unlucky. .420(.035) < .001 .764(.018) < .001 
Precognition 
3. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the 
future. 
-.047(.033) .152 .851(.013) 
< .001 
6. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s 
future. 
-.095(.044) .031 .872(.011) 
< .001 
9. Some psychics can accurately predict the 
future. 
.231(.068) .001 .761(.020) 
< .001 
11. Some people have an unexplained ability to 
predict the future. 








The Growing Stone delay task: 
Opinion Questionnaire 1: Literature 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the questions below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone trail, now a 
mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—first on one side of the road, 
then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet metal roofs. On the right near the second 
one, a tower of course beams could be made out in the light fog. From the top of the tower 
a metal cable, invisible at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the light from the 
car before disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. The car slowed 
down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored to extricate 
himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame lurched a little. In the shadow 
beside the car, solidly planted on the ground and weighed down by fatigue, he seemed to 
be listening to the idling motor. Then he walked in the direction of the embankment and 
entered the cone of light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of the slope, his broad 
back outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned around. In the light from the 
dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. The man signaled and the 
chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell over the trail and the forest. 
Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible soley as a broad dark motion flecked 
with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far beyond, must be the other 




lamp in the distance. The big man turned back toward the car and nodded. The chauffeur 
switched off the lights, turned them on again, then blinked them regularly. On the 
embankment the man appeared and disappeared, taller and more massive each time he 
came back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a lantern held up by an invisible 
arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from the lookout, the man disappeared 
into the night. With the lights out, the river was shining intermittently. On each side of the 
road, the dark masses of forest foliage stood out against the sky and seemed very near. The 
fine rain that had soaked the trail an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, 
intensifying the silence and immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the black 
sky misty stars flickered.   
 
How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the story? 
 
        1      2      3       4      5       6        7        8       9 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
 
Do you think the author of this story is male or female? 
 
_______ male       _______ female 
 
 
